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David John Mossley 
T H E S I S A B S T R A C T 
Biological Being: Philosophical Issues in Scientific 
Realism, Experiments and (Dis)Unity 
The biological sciences are changing the ways in which we understand ourselves. Biological Being is 
a philosophical exploration of biology, mapping some of the features of the field that make it so 
important in generating these changes Two central themes are at the heart of this exploration: 
biology is a science that should be grasped from a realist position, and it is a science that reveals a 
disunified, pluralistic world of kinds of things. After an introduction of some the issues involved, in 
three substantial chapters these themes are unpacked and analysed. 
The first major chapter is about experimentation and biology. In it the experimental realism of 
Hacking is rejected, whilst the core notion of intervention and manipulation of the world as a vital 
epistemic tool is retained. Similarities and differences between experiments in the physical and 
biological science are investigated. 
This comparison is continued in the second major chapter, which is about natural kinds and biology's 
relationship to the physical sciences. Reductionism. even in its weaker forms, is rejected along with 
the notion of scientific unity. Recent attempts by Rosenberg to understand biology as an instrumental 
science are contrasted with Dupre's realism, and a system of type-hierarchies that could support 
realism for biology described. 
The third major chapter then looks at biology and the construction of human kinds by the social 
sciences. A reading of Foucault is given that attacks the idea that there can be a simple distinction 
drawn between those sciences that discover and those which construct kinds. Biology's role in the 
social sciences is explored. 
A final chapter draws the components of the thesis together and seeks a general understanding of 
rationality underpinning the whole discussion in recent work by Putnam. 
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Preface 
0 P r e f a c e 
There is no doubt that obtaining a consensus can be important in democratic politics. 
But it is less central in philosophy, where, as Wittgenstein said, the philosopher is a 
citizen of no group of ideas, that's just what makes him a philosopher'; and indeed a 
political dissensus can become the source of a philosophical questioning that transforms 
the wide reflective equilibrium' in unexpected and unpredictable ways. Thus, we need 
some resistance to our new consensus about consensus in order to find again the fresh air 
to pursue the odd multiple paths of those attempts w hich question things We need again 
sceptical, disobedient, dissident or cynical styles in philosophy, like those of Foucault or 
Wittgenstein.1 
~T" used to think that philosophy is tremendously exciting because it shows you how 
-^things really are. Now I see something far more powerful—the uncovering of what is 
not, what is assumed and what is obscure. An undiscovered truth has nothing like the dan-
gerous consequences of a firmly held false belief. In itself this would make philosophy a 
necessity to the survival of a species that evolves through its culture and its technology, but 
it has a further virtue. It presents us with alternatives, 'odd multiple paths,' which show us 
other possibilities for thinking about things. We are given new ways of understanding both 
the commonplace and the exotic that liberate and transform us. Often this is the origin of 
our seeing that the assumed fixed parts of our world are not fixed at all. 
Of course there are vices too—the problem of not seeing the wood for the trees in the 
struggle to discover beetles in the piles of decaying leaves on the forest floor. Certainly 
analytic philosophers sometimes chop off their sense of being human when dissecting the 
lived, and more literary minded philosophers sometimes twist metaphors beyond compre-
1 Rajchman. J. (1995) 'Foucault Ten Years After' New Formations Number 25 Summer 1995, 
16-17. 
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hension to tell us about the obvious I am not too concerned about these vices. I believe 
that doing philosophy with a sense of its power can genuinely make a difference to us, to 
who we think we are. and what we think we are doing (even when we are doing philosophy 
... ). Philosophy then gets its hands dirty and shows us how things can be different, better 
even, more just, more humane, more beautiful. 
It is from Foucault, for whom I have a great respect and admiration, that I take some of 
this picture of philosophy, although I have substantial disagreements w ith many of the gen-
eral conclusions that have been extrapolated from his work. In his superb discussion of 
post-Kantian philosophy, 'What is Enlightenment9," Foucault draws to a close by remark-
ing: 
It seems to me that Kant's reflection [on the Enlightenment] is ... a way of philosophiz-
ing that has not been without its importance or effectiveness during the last two centu-
ries. The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a 
doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of know ledge that is accumulating, it has to be 
conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we 
are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on 
us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.2 
I am certainly not a structuralist, post-structuralist, nor a relativist (all labels applied mis-
leadingly to Foucault), but this attitude to philosophy is one I embrace. Philosophy at its 
very best is like this. It has to be done with passion and a spirit of experimental adventur-
ing. I believe this to be as true of metaphysics as it is of the history of the concept of mad-
ness—I know metaphysicians who would disagree! Now this really is tremendously excit-
ing. 
2 Foucault. M. What is Enlightenment' in Rabinow. P (ed >( 1984) The Foucault Reader: an 
Introduction to Foucault's Thought ed Harmondsworth Penguin Books. 50. 
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Such words probably seem out of place at the beginning of a thesis concerned with certain 
issues in the philosophy of biology Furthermore, bold gestures often turn out to be empty, 
or trivial. However. I hope that this thesis is the start of a much larger project that articu-
lates an approach to the dangers of some apparently real things, and some real things that 
we do not normally acknowledge. I am prepared to face the charge of being empty or triv-
ial by indicating how the issues I confront here do have practical importance in contempo-
rary life. We desperately need a philosophical examination of life that begins with our be-
ing situated in the biological world to a greater degree than ever before, given our scientific 
theories as descriptions of that world. If we are to understand what it is that we are, and 
what we are becoming, not only as the culture of Western thought, nor just as Homo sapi-
ens, but also as individuals that are part of both of these larger groupings, this project has 
to recognise biology as one of the major components of w hat w e now think we are.3 This is 
the larger project.4 
3 1 am not proposing that it is just our being embodied' that should be re-examined, although, as 
many recent studies have shown, this is a neglected area of research; see, for example, the very 
different approaches to bodies and human physicalify in Harre, R. (1991) Physical Being Ox-
ford: Blackvvell; Lingis, A. (1994) Foreign Bodies London: Routledge; Ousdshoorn, N. (1994) 
Beyond the Natural Body: An Archceology of Sex Hormones London: Routledge; and the col-
lection MacCannell. J. F. and Zakarin. L. (eds.)(1994) Thinking Bodies Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
4 1 shall relurn to the larger project at the end of the thesis—the sketch I give is clearly not a de-
tailed picture, as this would be inappropriate here. However, a further brief note is in order: 
Foucault spoke of the need for an analysis of biopower, the ways that our biological/medical 
knowledge of ourselves is used, underpins and manipulates debates involving almost all aspects 
of our culture, morality and society 1 propose that there is now a greater need, as we face great 
advances in biology and its potential applications, to make explicit what we assume about biol-
ogy in such talk, to prevent the misuse of this knowledge. This would be done through a new 
'philosophy of life.' Understanding the philosophy of biology is the beginning of this project. It 
goes far beyond current concerns about genes and genetic manipulation and the undesirable re-
emergent social Darw inism that one now sees in right-w ing musings on social justice and re-
sponsibility. 
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To begin with biology then Moving away from Foucault to a certain extent,5 I would de-
scribe my approach to rationality and ontology as generally realist, if I could find a suit-
able definition of what this might mean Cnspin Wright s point that realism has two com-
ponents—a modest one about the independent existence of whatever the domain one is a 
realist about, and a more presumptuous claim about the possibility of "getting at" this exis-
tent domain with our limited human resources, and then getting it right6—seems well 
made 7 But the arguments become increasingly technical when one looks for the details of 
what these components might mean in practice. Some issues that are part of this debate 
will emerge in the body of this thesis, and at the end 1 shall approach the question of ra-
tionality and objectivity again However, what 1 hope to present the reader with is an ap-
proach to philosophy of science that can incorporate aspects of science that recent work in 
biology and philosophy of biology have made apparent and which show us the necessity of 
retaining a realist perspective. Our motivations for finding out about the world are indeed 
value-laden and replete with our concerns with power, politics and social status. Politically 
we live a diverse world. The main point will be that disunity and pluralism about the world 
5 In his later writings there emerges a rather interesting account of how our various techniques 
and theories of the self should be understood in terms of their status, which cannot be just 
dismissed as relativism about rationality. As I shall argue throughout, Foucault's concerns are 
at the heart of our current worries about rationality and being. His emphasis on discussing how 
particular aspects of our supposed culture pose questions—about mental, criminal and sexual 
behaviour and being, for example—for our political life to attempt to resolve (but which it al-
ways fails to do completely), gives an overarching role to his philosophical thought. And in 
places it sounds as though this project has a fairly robust understanding of rationality at its core 
' ... the work of a history of thought would be to rediscover at the root of these diverse solu-
tions the general form of problemization that has made them possible—even in their very op-
position: or what has made possible the transformations of the difficulties and obstacles of a 
practice into a general problem for which one proposes diverse practical solutions. . this de-
velopment of a given into a question, this transformation of a group of obstacles and difficulties 
into problems to which the diverse solutions will attempt to produce a response, this is what 
constitutes the point of problcmization and the specific w ork of thought ' 'Polemics. Politics, 
and Problemizations—an interview with Michel Foucault" (1983) in Rabinow op cit. 389. 
There has been much discussion of this topic and I shall not pursue it here. See p 172 below 
6 Wright. C. (1994) Truth and Objectivity Harvard: Harvard University Press. 1-2. 
1 Of course, this is not an uncontroversial position. Clearly Michael Dummett would argue oth-
erwise: see Dummctt. M. (1978) Truth and Other Enigmas London: Duckworth. 
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need not lead to an abandonment of attempts to be normative about what is best in our cur-
rent methods and attitudes to that world and the sciences we use to describe it. We are fi-
nite, with limited powers in forming a picture of the world that is perspectival—onlv real-
ists can make this claim. 
Science dominates many aspects of Western culture and can quite properly inform, and be 
informed by the kind of reading of philosophy I have given so far Science is, in the broad-
est terms, about' the world: there is no reason why seeing this aboutness as a complex 
thing should lead to our throwing up our hands in despair and turning to Paul Feyerabend 
to tell us that there is another reason for our doing science that is not part of trying to accu-
rately understand the world.8 The world may not be simple—why should we suppose that it 
i s 9 
We stand on a threshold of startling innovations in biology.9 Daniel Dennett's recent 
claims 1 0 for the traditional core of modern biology, evolution through natural selection, are 
enough on their own to suggest that it is a process of tremendous generative power. Evolu-
tion through natural selection challenges our traditional notions of mind, ontology, morality 
and meaning." Add to this the burgeoning prospects for artificial life, 1 2 biotechnology, 
For a clear discussion of how to avoid some of the dangers of extreme views about methodologi-
cal issues and the faults inherent in any complete social constructivist picture of science, see 
Gower, B. (1997) Scientific Method: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction London. 
Routledge, particularly chapter 12. 
9 For a speculative account of what some biologists think they might be able to do see Murphy, 
M. P. and O'Neill. L. A. J. (eds.) (1995) What is Life? The Next Fifty Years: Speculations of 
the Future of Biologv Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
1 0 Dennett. D. C. (1996) Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life London: 
Allen Lane. Penguin Press. 
1 1 We need not go all the way with Dennett's account of mind to see this point. Indeed. I am 
fairly pessimistic that his program could ever produce a theory for the mind that was suitably 
robust in dealing with the vast array of human experience. My ow n experiences w ith Buddhist 
meditation have highlighted for me the difficulties of the so-called ineffable' in attempts to de-
scribe our experiences, let alone explain them. 
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gene therapy, cloning ... , and there emerges a new biology that is far more pregnant with 
changes to our understanding of what we are than the new phy sics could ever be. Quine, 
typically, suggested that '[pjhysics investigates the essential nature of the world, and biol-
ogy describes a local bump ' 3 But biology threatens to impact on our lives precisely 
because it is about our local bump.14 Looking at one. admittedly hyperbolic claim, the con-
ceptual transformations could be staggering: 
The human body . . is an architectonic compilation of millions of agencies of chimerical 
cells. Each cell in the hand typing this sentence comes from two. maybe three, kinds of 
bacteria. These cells themselves appear to represent the latter-day result, the fearful 
sy mmetry , of microbial communities so consolidated, so tightly organized and histologi-
cally orchestrated, that they have been selected together, one for all and all for one, as 
societies in the shape of organisms.'5 
In terms of current developments this lies alongside news that soon we shall be able to 
transplant the stem cells of human testes into animals—presenting us with the possibility of 
non-human animals fathering human children—and that Dolly the sheep is a clone. So one 
question that interests me is this: If biology can change how we understand the basic con-
cepts of what we are in relation to the rest of the living world and what that world of 
1 2 See particularly the splendid overview collection by Boden. M A. (1996) The Philosophy of 
Artificial Life Oxford. Oxford University Press. 
1 3 Quine, W. V. O. (1981) Theories and Things Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 93. 
1 4 Many workers in A-Life would claim that is precisely because traditional biology investigates 
only the life of carbon chemistry that we need models of what other living systems could be 
like. Having a particular biochemical composition may be a very contingent matter: 
'Organisms have been compared to extremely complicated and finely tuned biochemical ma-
chines. Since we know that it is possible to abstract the logical form of a machine from its 
physical hardware, it is natural to ask w hether it is possible to abstract the logical form of an 
organism from its biochemical wetware. The field of Artificial Life is devoted to the investiga-
tion of this question.' Langton. C. G. (1996) Artificial Life' in Boden op cit., 54. If such maps 
lead to the gold they promise then there is no grounding for the claim that biology can only be 
about a local bump—biology could eventually embrace all sy stems that have a universal fea-
ture, life. 
1 5 Sagan. D. (1992) 'Metametazoa: Biology and Multiplicity ' in Crary. J. and Kwinter, S. (eds.) 
Incorporation, Zone 6 New York: Zone. 365-366. 
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living things is. how will it affect our understanding of ourselves in relation to ourselves? 
And what kinds of people will there be7 I am curious about how these questions might be 
answered through an exploration of the metaphysics and epistemology of the possibilities, 
rather than just the usual worries about ethics alone.16 Which brings us back to the start of 
a metaphysics of the self, in the widest sense In fact the questions that are important here 
are to do with understanding life per se where biology is but one crucial part. The follow-
ing should help to lay down the framework of how I see biology's use in this respect. In 
dealing with three perspectives on biology as a science I hope to present a diverse science 
which has nevertheless real content and connections with all sorts of other knowledge gath-
ering and theory generating activities. 
I make no bones about drawing on writers and evidence from many different traditions in 
philosophy and biology I hope I remain critical enough to tell the good from the bad, and 
open-minded enough to avoid dismissing ideas that were not originally expressed in Eng-
lish, or which have not yet been received into the cannon of academic analytic philosophy. 
I am also somewhat concerned that philosophy of science is often (thankfully not always) 
stylistically presented as though it were science. This is a consequence of the kind of ques-
tions that particular philosophers consider, but it does not help promote the idea that phi-
losophy can generate new perspectives and ways of talking about important things. I have 
tried to avoid this scientific' way of writing philosophy. 
Throughout the thesis I have placed short poetic pieces that I hope add to the argument, 
rather than distract the reader with their clumsiness They are all my own work. Any at-
tempt at tracing the influences on me in writing these would be a thesis and bibliography 
on its ow n. I considered using dialogue to illustrate some points, but felt that perhaps haiku 
16 cf. Glover (1984) What Sort of People Should There Be? Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 
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would be more ... experimental The seventeenth century' writer Basho, arguably the great-
est Japanese haiku poet, instructed the writing of poetry: 
Go to the pine if you want to iearn about the pine, or to the bamboo if you want to learn 
about the bamboo. And in doing so. you must leave your subjective preoccupation with 
yourself Otherwise you impose yourself on the object and do not learn. Your poetry is-
sues of its own accord when you and the object have become one—when you have 
plunged deep enough into the object to see something like a hidden glimmering there. 
However well phrased your poetry may be. if y our feeling is not natural—if the object 
and yourself are separate—then your poetry is not true poetry but merely your subjective 
counterfeit 1 
Basho's Zen insights are perhaps a little opaque to Western thinking, but the notion that 
knowledge must be more than just intellectual engagement, that it is genuine experience of 
reality, is a deeply fascinating one 
These opening remarks are intended as a polemic, a sketch of other hidden themes in this 
thesis, the content of which w ill be laid out more fully in Biological Being below. 
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DNA thinking 
About DNA structure: 
More alive than ever! 
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Biological Being 
1 B i o l o g i c a l B e i n g 
It should be no embarrassment to philosophy that its conundrums often fail to engage the 
attention of working scientists If philosophy is a discipline in its own right, this is to be 
expected. Nor should a misplaced scientism lead us to think that philosophy is barred 
from making normative claims by way of criticizing what scientists do. ... 
The idea that philosophy is an a priori discipline and the idea that it is simply a part of 
science are both wrong Philosophy is not a unity; different philosophical problems are 
structured differently. Nor can one tell in advance how one philosophical problem is re-
lated to others, and to matters that arise in other arenas of thought We should relish the 
fact that philosophy can be surprising. Understanding the nature of a problem is not 
something we do in advance of try ing to solve it.'8 
here is no problem with biology . I am not proposing that there is something wrong 
that needs fixing with biology per se. What I address here is a small part of the 
philosophical picture of biology that will allow us to begin properly to embrace and assess 
the vast possibilities that confront us. Before we can start understanding what we are to do 
with the new possibilities that biology generates we need to understand, at least in some 
basically comprehensive way, what we can do. That is, we need to see what our contempo-
rary philosophical approach to biology is in relation to the other sciences and our other 
knowledge gathering and generating practices—this is what this thesis is about. I am not 
trying to 'understand the nature of a problem . . . in advance of try ing to solve it,' merely 
showing how we might combine a number of important discussions about biology to clarify 
where we now are. Along the way I discuss some very different notions of scientific real-
Sober. E. (1994) From a Biological Point of View: Essays in Evolutionary Philosophy Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. 
T 
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ism, whilst supporting scientific realism 1 9 as an unavoidable and largely uncontroversial 
consequence of taking a broader look at the philosophy of science than is usual; one that 
incorporates theory and practice I shall examine three different perspectives on the life 
sciences, and show how they all should be taken as a piece. Without other perspectives 
there is a tendency to over-simplify all the special sciences and thereby make mistakes in 
assessing the weight to assign to philosophically significant parts of scientific practice. 
Roughly, these perspectives are methodological, metaphysical and (culturally) epistemo-
logical in nature There are two linking themes to these perspectives. The first, as I have 
already mentioned, is scientific realism, in particular Ian Hacking's experimental realism. 
The second is the (dis)unity of science, focusing on debates between John Dupre and Alex-
ander Rosenberg over biology and its status in relation to a realist approach to the physical 
sciences. These themes, these strands, as we shall see, are entwined in a complex way The 
use of the three perspectives highlights what we can learn from a range of thought on sci-
ence, biology, and the uses of scientific know ledge. But it is not necessary that we can un-
tangle the relationship between these strands Social and political concerns have a role but 
they do not negate the rational goals of the scientist. Demonstrating that from each per-
spective there are means for determining good, rational science and scientific practice will 
be enough. The dependence of the three perspectives' realism on each other supports rather 
than undermines realism. What I mean by this will become clearer as we proceed. As a 
consequence I do not consider this to be a thesis in the philosophy o/biology, rather a the-
sis in philosophy about biology. 
1 9 I shall more closely address the nature of this scientific realism in the context of global realism 
issues at the end. I leave it to the reader to judge whether I would be better off taking the label 
'pragmatist' after I have discussed the philosophical positions of Putnam and Rorty in the con-
text of discussing metaphysical' realism, rationality and objectivity in Chapter 5 
16 
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i Out l ine 
Chapter Two is about experiments and opens my discussion of Ian Hacking's philosophy 
of science In it I explore some contemporary approaches to experiments in methodology to 
see whether they offer any substantial advances in our understanding of science practice. I 
offer some suggestions for what experiments tell us and how they might augment discus-
sions about realism. I introduce the notion of metaphysical disunity in biology and contrast 
it with methodological disunity with which it can be confused. Hacking's thoughts on sci-
entific realism emerge as important philosophical contributions to thinking about experi-
ments and realism, but are shown to be incomplete Without a metaphysical context in 
which to apply an agent perspective description for particular experiments, it is unclear 
just what kinds of things are supposed to be real. I conclude the chapter with some exam-
ples of experiments in biology and human genetics that illustrate a diversity of experimen-
tal techniques and some overlap of methodology w ith experiments in the physical sciences. 
Disunity of things does not imply disunity of actions and methods; but disunity of things is 
a stronger thesis than mere ontological pluralism. 
Chapter Three then focuses on the details of the second theme—that of possible meta-
physical disunity in science—which emerges from analysis of biology's own diverse ontol-
ogy and varied taxonomies. This chapter is most obviously drawn from topics that have 
been at issue in the philosophy of biology for many years: reductionism, especially about 
how one might interpret the claims of genetics,20 the status of essentialism and natural 
kinds, and attempts to place the entities that biology discusses in a reasonable relation with 
2 0 The philosophical debate about what genes mean' has some interesting parallels with the dec-
ades old discussion of how quantum mechanics might be interpreted. I leave it to the reader to 
fill in the detail here. 
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those discovered by physics. Here John Dupre's The Disorder of Things21 and Alexander 
Rosenberg's Instrumental Biology or the Disunity of Science" are the basis for this dis-
cussion I argue that we cannot properly decide about the metaphysical status of the kinds 
and entities biology postulates without additional information about their place and use in 
our understanding of ourselves. 
Chapter Four explores further some of the issues raised earlier about biology and interven-
tion in the world, about what we learn when we create and use phenomena to create other 
things. It concludes my discussion of the philosophy of science presented by Ian Hacking. 
He presents us with the possibility that biological kinds are constructed in much the same 
"nominalist" way that the categories of social science are in his reading of Foucault. And 
yet they do appear to fit his own criteria for experimental realism. I present a better inter-
pretation of Foucault that is sensitive to his own stated aims and motivations for his whole 
philosophical project This gives us a solution to how we might incorporate worries about 
the uses of biological knowledge into a philosophical picture of real manipulation of enti-
ties in a pluralist metaphysics. I then illustrate my argument with analysis of a recent study 
of the history of sex hormone research. 
Chapter Five is in two parts. Firstly, I tie together the arguments presented. No answers 
can be given to our questions about scientific realism and the (dis)unity of science from 
any single perspective. The biological sciences do not absolutely fail to fit into the philoso-
phy of experiment that emerges from physics-centred theories, but neither do they result in 
a smoothly structured ontology . The methodological considerations throw us back on deep 
2 1 Dupre. J. (1994) the Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science 
Cambridge. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press Referred to hereafter as Disorder. 
" Rosenberg. A. (1994) Instrumental Biology or the Disunity of Science Chicago: Chicago Uni-
versity Press. Referred to hereafter as Instrument. 
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questions about our being the kind(s) of beings we are in a material world And the conse-
quent ontology will be complicated and disunified. Consideration of experimentation show 
there must be some unity, whatever minor differences there are in the methods employed, 
but how this is articulated is not just an issue in philosophy of science Practice is impor-
tant for realism Metaphysics is important for practice. And an understanding of the con-
text of application is important for metaphysics Given this, scientific realism then emerges 
as a position that cannot be extracted from any of the perspectives alone. However, we are 
left with the questions about rationality that I take to underpin my epistemology. So the 
second part of Chapter Five explores what kind of philosophical context could support the 
position I describe for comprehending realism in science I use the ongoing debate between 
Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty to provide a context for this Of necessity this discus-
sion is inconclusive. 
There then follows a concluding Postscript chapter in which I return to the themes I have 
stated in my Preface. With a broader philosophy of biology now a little clearer, I sketch 
how the debate might proceed and what will be important for future research. 
ii P h i l o s o p h y and S c i e n c e 
By now it should be obvious that I certainly believe that there is much that philosophy can 
contribute to discussions in and about science. Although I am not in total agreement with 
some of his more general claims, Philip Kitcher's The Advancement of Science: Science 
without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions11 is a clear and well argued demonstration 
Kitcher, P. (1993) The Ach'ancenient of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity without 
Illusions Oxford: Oxford University Press. Referred to hereafter asAch'ancement. 
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that claims about the recent abdication of philosophy and the coronation of sociology are 
misguided: 
philosophical reflections about science stand in relation to the complex practice of 
science much as economic theory does to the complicated and messy world of transac-
tions of work, money, and goods. Much traditional philosophy of science, in the style of 
some economic modeling, neglects grubby details and ascends to heights of abstraction 
at which considerable precision and elegance can be achieved. We should value the pre-
cision and elegance, for its own sake, for its establishing standards against which other 
efforts can be judged, and for the possibility that extreme idealizations may lay bare 
large and important features of the phenomena But like ventures in macroeconomics, 
formal philosophy of science inevitably attracts the criticism that it is entirely unrealis-
tic, an aesthetically pleasing irrelevancy. To rebut such charges—or to concede them and 
to do better service to philosophy's legitimate normative project—we need to idealize the 
phenomena but to include in our treatment the features that critics emphasize.24 
This I have tried to do I address real concerns about the construction of scientific knowl-
edge based on socio-political needs in the very area where I feel many future dangers lie, 
that is, in biology; I am concerned with the details of practice in the laboratory and field; 
and I take on board the diversity of contemporary biology itself. However, in the sense that 
I believe there is still a genuine conceptual task in which we must engage—that is, looking 
at the limits and possibilities of w hat we might think and do—philosophy in science and in 
relation to science retains, in a general sense, a modernist role, albeit in a contingent form. 
iii Words 
Finally a note on terminology I shall use throughout, except where explicitly stated, 
'biology." biological science," the biological sciences" and the life sciences" to mean the 
same thing, namely 'the study of living organisms, including their structure, function, evo-
-4 ibid. 10. 
20 
Biological Being 
lution. distribution, and interrelationships " : 5 (Perhaps it would be better to say 'systems' 
rather than "organisms' so as not to exclude the possibility of life not dependent on carbon 
compounds we find on Earth. However, on the whole, biology is about life in the form of 
carbon based organisms with general dependence on DNA and RNA : 6 ) I include in this 
definition ecology , although I shall discuss some features of this field separately I have not 
made finer distinctions because they would not have added to my argument as such (in part 
it would have pre-empted some points of issue), and in most cases (beyond general special 
science distinctions) the arbitrariness of divisions between fields of enquiry dissolves any 
philosophical value in labelling a laboratory for one purpose rather than another.27 I do 
discuss some differences between theories about genes and heredity at the level of biochem-
istry and molecular biology on the one hand, and Classical Mendelian theory on the other; 
the difference here is one of philosophical importance, as we shall see. At the end of my 
discussion there will emerge a good motivation for some detailed analysis of whether the 
philosophical content of neighbouring fields of any domain of study really are as similar as 
they are supposed to be here: this will be argued for. rather than being presumed at the out-
set. 
25 Collins English Dictionary (1979) Glasgow: Collins. 
2 6 Having said this, it is quite clear that defining life' is particularly difficult task in itself. This 
does not detract from biology as a serious study, but it certainly adds to its philosophical inter-
est. Again, this is one of the motivations for A-Life research. It also connects my thoughts to 
Aristotle, who perhaps comes closest to exploring a philosophy of life in the way I envision: De 
Anima lurks, largely unacknowledged, in the shadows—stripped of its vitalism to be sure! 
"7 Of course, field boundaries are serious and can result in peculiar miscomprehension between 
scientists who have been taught or developed idiosy ncratic techniques and expressions specifi-
cally for one project when discussing essentially similar material with scientists from another 
group. Field boundaries and distinctions are also important, therefore, for understanding the 
sociology of science and its history . 
21 
Biological Being 
Haiku 
Picking spring flowers 
To dissect their colours 
I change the world. 
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2 E x p e r i m e n t s 
Philosophers long made a mummy of science When finally they unwrapped the cadaver and 
saw the remnants of an historical process of becoming and discovering, they created for 
themselves a crisis of rationality That happened around 1960. 
It was a crisis because it upset our old tradition of thinking that scientific knowledge is the 
crowning achievement of human reason. Sceptics have alway s challenged the complacent 
panorama of cumulative and accumulating human knowledge, but now they took their am-
munition from the details of history "8 
he revolution of thought surrounding the nature of science, its status, theories, laws and 
methods, that occurred around 1960 2 9 has run its course. The historical strategies 
employed by Hanson, Kuhn and Feyerabend. three of the heroes of the revolution, have trans-
formed the philosophical debate about science in way s that are well known and now part of 
the intellectual history of the twentieth century . They made complex discussions about the 
logic of confirmation, of cumulative and progressive science seem, for a time, archaic and re-
dundant in the face of uncertainty and unspecifiable change They questioned the notion of a 
fixed, timeless rationality to which science could both appeal and contribute. They made us 
look at history as more than a "repository for ... anecdote or chronology."30 Above all they 
" Hacking. I. (1983) Representing and Inten>ening Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1. Re-
ferred to hereafter as R&J. 
2 9 This date seems to me to be inaccurate Although Kuhn's Structure was originally published in 
1962. and the fallout from Wittgenstein's work was beginning to have a profound influence on the 
understanding of how science talk could be understood before then, genuine debate over the conse-
quences of the revolution, and thereby the actual crisis in thought, did not take place until the late 
1960s and throughout the '70s. 
3 0 Kuhn. T. S. (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1. 
i In t roduct ion 
T 
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challenged a generation of philosophers who had spent their best energies defining and refining 
a picture of science that could not. according to the revolutionaries, be acceptable, for it made 
no reference to the changing, contingent nature of scientific knowledge and practice, past and 
present, nor to the diversity of know ledge gathering activ ities human beings employ 3 1 
This is how the history of the revolution is usually sketched and it serves as a beginning, how-
ever inaccurate, because the revolution over the use of history has ended.32 The history of sci-
ence has its own ministry in the new government. There is now little to doubt in the statement, 
'Philosophy of science without history of science is empty; history of science without philoso-
phy of science is blind.' 3 3 
Consequently it was something of a surprise when Ian Hacking pointed out in 19833 4 that on 
further analysis there was little to choose between the two camps before and after the storming 
of the Bastille to "liberate" rationality from the tyranny of philosophical objectivity. Both 
3 1 There is a second wave to this revolution. It concerns the social construction of knowledge. My 
stance to the Edinburgh School and its off-spring will become clearer in what follows. Whereas 
Kuhn et al. raised serious points of issue about the historical placing of knowledge from a variety 
of theoretical perspectives, the contentious Barnes/Bloor reading of Wittgenstein is not sufficient 
to ground their claims for the social construction of all scientific knowledge. I shall discuss this 
point in more detail in connection with an account of Michel Foucault's criticisms of our assump-
tions about natural, social and medical scientific knowledge. See footnote 41. 
3 2 See p. 46 for discussion of how one might read Kuhn's concept of history and its role for philoso-
phy of science and why, despite his best efforts to draw attention to his theories' application to the 
natural sciences, it is in the arena of social science only that he can be said to have made a genuine 
impact on science practice. 
3 3 Lakatos, I.. (1970) PSA 1970, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science VIII, 91. One wonders 
whether anyone truly doubted it at all. Kuhn's contribution to the historiography of science was 
certainly important, but the editors of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, which 
originally published Kuhn's SSR, who included Otto Neurath and Rudolf Carnap. could not be ac-
cused of being historically ignorant. 
3 4 Allan Franklin ((1993)'E.\perimental Questions' Perspectives on Science vol. 1 no. 1, 127) has 
suggested that it was Hacking's 1981 article Do we see through a microscope?' (Hacking, I. 
(1981a) Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62. 305-22) that started the process of redressing the 
balance between experiment and theory in the history, philosophy and sociology of science.' How-
ever, it seems to me that it was only with the more direct analysis of experiment as a whole in Rep-
resenting and lnter\>ening that he brought to the fore the precise nature of what actually needed to 
be redressed. 
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sides seemed obsessed with theories and their meaning, how they refer, how they change. 
Neither had really got to grips with the actual practice of scientists, particularly the practices 
in experimentation He noted that: 
Philosophers of science constantly discuss theories and representation of reality, but say al-
most nothing about experiment, technology, or the use of knowledge to alter the world.35 
He was not entirely alone in this philosophical observation36 but pressed the point into signifi-
cant philosophical use in the debate about how realism is to be understood in relation to scien-
tific practice: 
Experimental work provides the strongest evidence for scientific realism This is not be-
cause we test hypotheses about entities. It is because entities that in principle cannot be 
'observed' are regularly manipulated to produce a new phenomena (sic) and to investigate 
other aspects of nature. They are tools, not for thinking but for doing.37 
This has seemed a second minor revolution and has prompted a number of philosophers to re-
examine experiments. Hacking considered this a 'Back to Bacon" campaign, but the philoso-
phy that has emerged has been of a different kind than Francis Bacon's attempt to lay down 
the foundations of a fixed epistemology of experiments, recipes for experimenters and fact 
gathers. Theories about the epistemology, ontology, logic, history and sociology of experi-
ments have abounded, produced by philosophers, historians and sociologists alike. So many 
older, well-established issues have found new life in the context of the philosophy of experi-
ments that this revolution itself seems to have lost some of its force. But quite clearly experi-
3iR&], 149. 
3 6 Nancy Cartwright's work on the phenomenological nature of scientific laws dovetails with Hack-
ing's thoughts to articulate an anti-Humean attitude to causality and probability, and to separate 
talk of the truth of theories from the reality of entities, see Cartwright. N. (1983) How the Laws of 
Physics Lie Oxford: Clarendon Press As will also become apparent, I share many of Cartwright's 
worries about the universality of fundamental physical laws, not to mention biological and psycho-
logical ones, but I have serious doubts about a simple div ide between theory and entity realism, for 
any domain. 
37 R&L 262. 
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merits are a fundamental part of much of science, and I want to be open to the suggestion that 
philosophically significant issues are being missed by ignoring or dismissing them In looking 
at some parts of the current state of the debate about experiments, I focus on the role of ex-
perimentation in science as a metaphy sical and epistemological issue, to show how it is at the 
heart of a wider notion of interv ention and manipulation, which can be part of a defence of a 
form of scientific realism, but which is inadequate on its own Ultimately this will demonstrate 
how new tools and methods can be accommodated in philosophy and philosophy of science 
w ithout the end of anything, be it history, epistemology or philosophy itself. Indeed, since part 
of my thesis is an examination of fresh claims about the disintegration of the metaphysical 
framework for an assumed unity to science that arises from science itself, something does 
need to be said about how these arguments are manifest in practical terms.38 Add to this the 
importance of biology, and biology as an experimental and world manipulating science, and 
such an examination has become imperative, and long overdue in biology . On their own these 
seem to be good enough reasons to look again at experiments, but they need clarify ing. 
1 The importance of practice 
Understanding science as more than just its conceptual product, knowledge, has been the mo-
tivation behind the various fields of what has come to be called 'science studies,' whether this 
is seen as a philosophical, sociological or historical exercise. As noted, concern for science as 
a practical enterprise has produced interesting, diverse and controversial results that have in-
fluenced our understanding of science-as-knowledge and the traditional ways that philosophy 
has engaged with science, both descriptively and normatively Similar stress on practice can 
Dupre does not discuss experiments at all in Disunity . In a recent paper presented to the British 
Society for the Philosophy of Science he suggested, rather more as a hope than a direct claim, that 
philosophical examination of experimentation would reveal a disunity of practice to match his 
theoretical analysis. As I show below , combining current analy sis of experiments with examples 
from the biological sciences, prov ides only partial fulfilment of this hope This does not undermine 
the notion of ontological disunity in science. 
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be found in the works of other philosophers of science, of course, most notably Ian Hacking, 
Andrew Pickering and David Gooding39 and I draw on their work heavily, but I hope that my 
approach will be distinguishable from these others Of experimentation David Gooding has 
said: 
Analytic philosophy views the relationship between theory and experiment as a logical rela-
tionship between propositions So experiment must be a means of generating observation 
statements which bear a logical relationship to statements derived from theory. ... This fo-
cus on explicitly represented knowledge implicitly proscribes consideration of the other 
sorts of stuff with which science is made: instruments are invisible or feature at best in a 
subsidiary way , as merely practical means to theoretical ends; observers' agency figures not 
at al l . 4 0 
This is true of traditional descriptions of practice in science generally. Before going further we 
need to make some preliminary distinctions. When we speak of agency there are two possible 
points of view, the human and the non-human. The sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) 
movement championed by, amongst others. Barry Barnes. David Bloor and Harry Collins, 4 1 
has been at the forefront of science studies' concern with viewing all of science practice from 
the perspective of human agency The questions that these sociologists ask are of the form 
"How do we explain this or that practice in terms of the interests and motivations of the peo-
ple involved?" But this seems to imply that the complex machines that test, measure, record 
and manipulate the stuff of the world are invisible and entirely fluid in their behaviour—to say 
nothing of the material world itself. Machines need tuning and fixing and understanding. They 
can play a large role in just how an experiment is conducted. If the experimental set-up has to 
3 9 See Hacking, R&T. Gooding, D (1990) Experiment and the Making of Meaning Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Press; Pickering. A. (1995) The Mangle of Practice: Time Agency and Science Chicago: 
Chicago University Press. 
A" Gooding, op. cit. 9. 
4 1 See. for example. Barnes. B. (1977) Interests and the Growth of Knowledge London: Routledge; 
Bloor. D. (1976) Knowledge and Social Imagery London: Routledge: Collins. H. (1985) Changing 
Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice Bev erley Hills: Sage. 
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be changed, even slightly, to accommodate the particular X-ray detector a biologist is using to 
track potassium ion flow through a semi-permeable membrane, then what has been called 
'material agency ' has a role to play in correctly analysing the experiment. There has been 
some discussion about the coherence of material agency, SSK supporters claiming that only 
human agency can make any sense of understanding science from outside science s own inter-
ests. Material agency, they say. is in the realm of science itself, so no self-respecting science 
critic should call on it I shall not pursue the details of this position here How ever, as a sketch 
of a simple reply, let us note that the argument already presupposes there is a known, predict-
able and largely transparent quality to machines, scientific apparatus and the world. As An-
drew Pickering points out: 
The contours of material agency are never decisively known in advance, scientists continu-
ally have to explore them in their work, problems arise and have to be solved in the devel-
opment of. say. new machines. And such solutions—if they are found at all—take the form, 
at minimum, of a kind of delicate material positioning or tuning, where I use "tuning" in 
the sense of tuning a radio set or car engine, with the caveat that the character of the 
"signal" is not known in advance in scientific research A~ 
So when I speak of agency I am referring to both human and non-human agency in science. 
Human interests and concerns for social, political and cultural ends in science practice should 
be considered alongside the way s that the materials and apparatus of research imposes its own 
"interests." There aren't just "people doing things," but people doing things to stuff that does 
things. 
But the question remains: why should we. as philosophers, be looking at practice at all? Are 
not the conceptual and cognitive components of science, their derivation, inter-relationships, 
epistemological and metaphysical consequences the essence of philosophy of science? It is 
i : Pickering. A. (1995) The Mangle of Practice Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 14. 
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worth going over some of the arguments in favour of practice to make explicit the premise to 
which I have laid claim: namely, that experiments43 are a philosophically significant aspect of 
contemporary scientific research 
Firstly, what scientists do is interesting—at least to me it is Through work on the philoso-
phy of biology, I have come to see that the detail of what scientists do and what they think 
they are doing is as worthy of study as w hat they think, especially if one is worried about sci-
ence and public policy . If we are truly concerned with the ethical consequences of the Human 
Genome Project, for example, it seems only proper that we should be as concerned with what 
is done, and what we are in fact capable of doing with DNA and genetic material (in some 
detail), as we are with the supposed knowledge that such an investigation claims to produce. 
There is a significant gap between the plethora of suggestions for what the Genome Project's 
final knowledge bank might mean for us as individuals in the future, and what, in fact, tax-
payers' money is spent on now . 4 5 
Secondly, it is possible to look at many of the important philosophical positions and puzzles 
about science from the point of view of practice. Throwing aside our Humean prejudices—as 
Nancy Cartwright advises in the context of understanding science as a process of measure-
That experiments are complicated and very diverse is an important consideration, but stating this 
is not to prejudge an answer to the question What is an experiment9.' merely an informed obser-
vation 
4 4 1 am closely following Pickering's own reasoning in the Introduction ('From Science as Knowl-
edge to Science as Practice') to Science as Practice and Culture but with additional arguments and 
examples. 
4 5 For a cogent account of what the researchers in the project are actually investigating see Kitcher, 
P. (1995) 'Who's Afraid of the Human Genome Project' PSA 1994 Volume Two Philosophy of Sci-
ence Association. 313-321. Whatever the ethical difficulties that arise in the end, the funding gov-
ernments are not told that all the important information obtained in the short and medium term 
will be about the genomes of the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae and the nematode worm 
Caenorhabditis elegans. At current rates of progress it may w ell take a century to completely map 
the human genome. For a good overv iew of worries about the application of the information from 
the project and related gene technologies see. Kitcher, P. (1996) The Lives to Come: The Genetic 
Revolution and Human Possibilities Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 
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ment and quantification46—we see that agency can be made to work well in describing with 
considerable accuracy and with notable explanatory power, the causal connections and 
commitments that underpin our investigations of the parts of the world we find interesting. 
Connections have been made in the opposite direction too For example, Alan Franklin 4 7 has 
earned out a number of studies w hich apply a Bayesian analysis to experiments in high energy 
particle physics in order to demonstrate how rational decision making by experimenters can be 
reconstructed to reveal a path from theory and experimental set up to results and conclusion 
Thirdly (again I am following Pickering's discussion here), there is much to be said for a con-
sideration of practice as a point of dialogue where traditional discipline boundaries begin to 
dissolve Pickering argues this point in relation to philosophy, sociology and history, but I 
think it may also serve as a corrective w ithin philosophy of science itself. Too often it can ap-
pear that philosophy of science is becoming a kind of ''ersatz science" where philosophers are 
struggling to make a contribution to the actual sciences they investigate 4 8 Overly technical 
involvement with the theoretical problematic of a science can quickly lead one away from the 
central philosophical problems that emerge in higher level, more abstract discussions of that 
science This might seem to contradict what I have already said about a need for philosophers 
to get involved in the details of actual practice. There is, of course, no conflict here. While 
there may be a known quality to the kinds of technical problem that phy sics or biology throws 
up for the philosopher of science from the perspective of theory, there is no reason at all to 
suppose that an examination of practice will be most successfully carried out using any of the 
concepts familiar to the scientist So that, although details of experimentation may be the be-
4 6 See Cartwright. N. (1989) Nature's Capacities and their Measurement Oxford. Clarendon Press. 
4 7 See. for example. Franklin. A. (1986) The Neglect of Experiment Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. See p. 57 ff. below for an outline and discussion of his use of Bayesian methods in 
analysing experiments 
4 8 I am in debt to the History of the Philosophy of Science discussion group on the Internet for focus-
ing this thought. 
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ginning of a philosophical discussion, one very quickly runs out of resources without reference 
back to fundamental issues in epistemology. philosophy of mind and action, phenomenology 
and metaphysics This will help to revive what is becoming a fragmented area of philosophical 
research.49 
Finally, related to the previous point, the discussions that are taking place about practice are 
addressing some very deep matters that are of concern to any one engaged in contemporary 
thinking in its widest sense: how to comprehend and perhaps dissolve the relationship between 
subject and object, between nature (Nature), environment and society, between individuals, 
communities and institutions 
2 Hacking and scientific realism 
If a belief in the importance of experiments is my first premise, my second premise or com-
mitment is that talking about scientific realism is also meaningful and worth doing. My initial 
comments should make it clear that only later will I be able to present an acceptable defence 
of this position. But in one sense scientific realism just is the dull thesis that realists are al-
ways saying it is. That is, the scientific realist is simply affirming that when a scientist says a 
particular theory is a good description of the world, or that a particular entity or property of 
an entity in fact exists, we should initially interpret the scientist as literally meaning what she 
says. It is the responsibility of the anti-realist to make their case against this obvious interpre-
tation. This is just being a scientific realist in science.50 In this sense we can quite coherently 
accept that there might be any number of ways that science could get at the causal structure of 
the world, and even that a single discipline could contain within it a number of different scien-
4 9 1 am not suggesting that all philosophy of science is "ersatz science." of course, just that, at pres-
ent, the majority of papers at the philosophy of science conferences I attend seem to be of this 
kind! 
5 0 For the distinction between realism in science and realism about science see Hendry. R. F. (1995) 
'Realism and Progress: Why Scientists should be Realists' in Philosophy and Technology ed. Fel-
lows. R. (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement: 38) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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tific descriptions of an entity or phenomenon that need not be reducible to another Dupre's 
promiscuous realism provides such framework for realism about the entities described by bi-
ology and I shall look at his position in some detail 5 1 What is important is finding a way to 
defend scientific realism about science—that is, to say something about the way that science 
is conducted, something about method and its justification 
Since it will be important throughout the rest of the following discussion, let us lay out the 
commitments in Hacking's experimental realism 5" There are certain key distinctions to be 
drawn. The first is between experimentation and observation. Crudely put, "experimenting is 
not stating or reporting but doing—and not doing things with words/ 5 3 There is a basic non-
theoretical engagement with the material stuff of the world that separates experimentation 
from observation. A second important aspect of experiments for Hacking is that they are used 
to make new phenomena. In Representing and Intervening he says: 
One role of experiments is so neglected that we lack a name for it. I call it the creation of 
phenomena. Traditionally scientists are said to explain phenomena that they discover in 
nature. I say that often they create the phenomena which then become the centrepieces of 
theory.54 [My stress ] 
Far from this just being only one of the roles of experiment it soon becomes clear that Hacking 
regards it as a necessary condition for experiments: 
There is no more familiar dictum than that experimental results must be repeatable. On my 
view that works out as something of a tautology. Experiment is the creation of phenomena; 
phenomena must have discernible regularities—so an experiment that is not repeatable has 
failed to create a phenomenon. ... 
5 1 Chapter 3. p 88 ff.. 
5 2 Critical discussion will come later. See pp. 31 ff, 74 and 190 ff. in particular. 
S3R&I. 173. 
54 ibid 220. 
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To experiment is to create, produce, refine and stabilize phenomena. 
The refining and stabilising of phenomena are crucial here If there is no stability, there is no 
repeatability and hence no experiment at all But the creation of a phenomenon is not enough 
justification for the experimenter to believe in the reality of whatever entities are postulated to 
explain the phenomenon. According to Hacking the experimenter must use the entity in further 
experimental conditions to create vet more new effects. That is. the experimenter needs to en-
gage with the causal properties of the entity To repeat the quotation from earlier: 
Experiment work provides the strongest evidence for scientific realism. This is not because 
we test hypotheses about entities It is because entities that in principle cannot be 'observed' 
are regularly manipulated to produce new phenomena and to investigate other aspects of 
nature. They are tools, instruments not for thinking but for doing."'6 
Important in all this is Hacking s attempt to distance scientific realism from its 'traditional,' 
representational roots 5 7 What is interesting in his account of experimentation is that he claims 
that it is only by looking at w hat we do that a sense of the real can be gained. Roughly speak-
ing, he thinks that the attempts to extract realism from theory alone are always doomed to 
failure. He says. 
By attending only to know ledge as representation of nature, we wonder how we can ever es-
cape from representations and hook-up with the world The harm comes from a single-
minded obsession with representation and thinking and theory, at the expense of interven-
tion and action and experiment.58 
And that: 
ibid. 229. 
ibid 262. 
The whole Representing part of RAI is a about the failure of philosophical discussions about the 
truth of scientific theories considered only as theories. 
ibid. 130-131 
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There is an important experimental contrast between realism about entities and realism 
about theories Suppose we say that the latter is belief that science aims at true theories. Few 
experimenters will deny that. Only philosophers doubt it Aiming at the truth is. however, 
something about the indefinite future Aiming a beam of electrons is using present electrons. 
There is in contrast no set of theories one has to believ e in If realism is a doctrine about the 
aims of science, it is a doctrine laden w ith certain kinds of values If realism about entities is 
a matter of aiming electrons next week, or aiming at other electrons the week after, it is a 
doctrine much more neutral between values. The way in which experimenters are scientific 
realists about entities is entirely different from ways in which they might be realists about 
theories.59 
So Hacking has already dismissed the possibility of salvaging realism from the wreck of the-
ory, and despite his warnings about obsessive behaviour, he is over-keen to tie scientific real-
ism solely to practice However, a simple divorce of scientific realism from its theoretical ori-
gins will require more argument and evidence than Hacking has offered to date—if it is pos-
sible at a l l . 6 0 
His more recent work has produced a detailed breakdown of the components, human and ma-
terial agency included, that go into making phy sics experiments work. For example, in 'The 
Self-Vindication of the Laboratory Sciences"6' he identifies fifteen different elements of ex-
periments which he lists under the headings 'ideas,' 'things' and 'marks.' He is concerned to 
demonstrate the extent to which practice and theory are tailored to each other to provide a 
stable context for experiments to work at all. Having said this, he still insists that our ability 
to intervene in, and use parts of the world, to utilise the material agency of entities for our own 
ends, is as much an indication of that entity's reality as anything. However, the concept of 
manipulation/intervention that underpins his account of realism remains largely unexplained, 
5 y ibid. 263. 
6 0 See 190 ff. for my conclusions about this point 
6 1 Hacking. I. (1992) The Self-Vindication of the Laboratory Sciences' Pickering, A. (ed.)(1992) 
Science as Practice and Culture Chicago: Chicago University Press. 29. 
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except in so far as it requires a belief in a real causal nexus Since this is just the kind of 
larger philosophical issue with which I think philosophy of science should become engaged, I 
shall need to spend some time looking at this idea, with special reference to agency 
Furthermore, from this we also see two forms of scientific realism One from the perspective 
of theory that says we should support the scientists' claims for the truth of their theories or the 
reality of their entities as a starting position, and a second from practice that says we should 
accept the reality of entities that are regularly used and manipulated to produce new, interest-
ing or useful effects. 
3 History and further thoughts 
The history of how the state of affairs concerning experiments has been understood is not uni-
form. Philosophical analysis has varied greatly at different times since the sixteenth century,62 
and certain figures stand out for simply addressing the issue of how experiments are to be un-
derstood, when other thinkers and practitioners were happy to continue with their work with-
out reflection on the methods and tools they used. In raising the possibility of finding out 
about the world by direct question and intervention, Francis Bacon is significant. It is easy to 
discount the apparent superiority of experimentation over passive' observation as obvious, 
given the wealth of evidence now available to us that experiments are useful and insightful: 
Bacon had comparatively parlous accounts of the empirical advantages experiments could 
afford. 6 3 Similarly, Claude Bernard in the field of physiology and 'experimental medicine' in 
6 2 It is interesting to note, however, that Roger Bacon says in the thirteenth century : There are no 
lectures given in experimental science either at Oxford or at Paris and this is a shameful thing be-
cause experimental science is the mistress of the speculative sciences, it alone is able to give us 
important truths within the confines of the other sciences, which those sciences can learn in no 
other way.' The Opus Majus of Roger Bacon trans. Robed Belle Burke quoted in Ayer, A. J. and 
O'Grady. J. (1992) A Dictionary of Philosophical Quotations Oxford: Blackwell, 34. This suggests 
that the current history of experiments that is only now being explored will need to include analy-
sis that looks much further back than is usually assumed 
6 3 See, for example. Gower. B. S. (1997) op cit. chapter 2 
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the nineteenth century must be highlighted for his concern for the methodology of his field. 6 4 
However, it is beyond the scope of my aims here to trace these threads in detail 
There now also exists a growing body of literature about ihe philosophy and history of ex-
periments from late twentieth century writers Here, however, as suggested earlier, other mat-
ters are entangled with the debate; it is sometimes hard to separate talk about experiments qua 
experiments from the use of such philosophising for other means. One area of philosophy of 
science that has had a minor renaissance through experiments is confirmation theory and the 
analysis of probability—pace the Kuhnian revolutionaries This is largely a product of the 
apparent relativ e ease of access to the decision procedures and actions of scientists in experi-
mental situations. It would seem that the use of extremely complex (and expensive) apparatus 
in modern science requires the operators to specify at every stage of their work exactly what it 
is they are doing; the ubiquitous nature of modern research groups (and international groups 
of groups such as constituted the Human Genome Project at its inception) make this doubly 
imperative. 
From the contemporary literature it might seem that almost all of experimental work is re-
stricted to physical science. As soon as any attempt is made to examine 'real life" experimen-
tation one is overwhelmed with the diversity of experiments, not just in science but in our eve-
ryday talk and activity. It is necessary, therefore, to ask whether there is a single unified ac-
count of experiments available at all, and whether such an account is desirable. Doing this 
will help clarify and judge any general thesis about the unity of science; we will have a new 
focus, apart from the separate technical questions that arise from examination of theory alone. 
This generates further ripples into the metaphysical underpinning of our thoughts about sci-
ence in our culture, ripples which reveal some disturbing tendencies to misunderstand the 
6 4 Bernard, C. (1957) An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine New York: Dover. 
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power and possibilities for change that science can generate, particularly in the biological sci-
ences. 
4 Introduction summary: theory and experiments 
In examining the work of a selected range of thinkers on experiments I intend to follow two 
linked theses through different approaches to science and experiments The first is that inter-
vention/manipulation is a key epistemic tool that is embedded in science and explored in sci-
ence through experimentation. This picture is not unique, having antecedents in many thinkers 
some of whom will be discussed below. David Gooding says something similar when he 
writes: 
According to the received philosophical view, natural phenomena are bounded by theory. I 
shall argue that natural phenomena are bounded by human activity.65 
There are no revolutions here, only a weaving together of threads from recent philosophy of 
science that produce theories and perspectives of genuine contemporary concern. It may seem 
that this neglects, or at worst obfuscates, the more obvious questions about the direct relation-
ship between experiment and theory in science from which Hacking wants to move away. How 
does a scientist frame the questions she wishes to 'put to nature"9 Just how do experiments 
confirm or falsify theories? And so on. These questions are important, but they are questions 
that will have to be reassessed if content cannot be given to methodological unity that is sup-
ported by material from the philosophical examination of experiments. So it is worth looking 
at this notion's foundations first. In any case, it is partially from such questions and the vari-
ety of answers (and the diagnoses of neglect of other issues involved) now available that my 
current concerns have arisen. 
Gooding. D. (1990) Experiment and the Making of Meaning: human agency in scientific observa-
tion and experiment Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 9. I am not in agreement with 
Gooding on a number of points concerning what this might mean however. 
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Philosophical work more obviously dealing with the relationship between theory and practice 
has been used to provide a background to some of this chapter so that the shift away from the 
traditional view is visible and the outcome mapped Even the more abstract aspects of talk 
about experiments can be seen to have political and moral components and implications. 
Simply put. to begin weighing the merits of actions, knowledge is required of what, why and 
how. That knowledge is not inaccessible to our rational processes for understanding the world, 
but neither is that access necessarily neutral in the roles it is given for reasons that stem from 
what we think is going on. Producing a framework for how we can assess the goals and uses 
of science should be part of an examination of its more obvious and traditional theses. That 
framework should be one that allow s judgements to be made if it is to be of any value. 
Having highlighted these loci of interest we now need to clear some ground by looking at a 
more comprehensive account of experimentation. 
ii W h a t an e x p e r i m e n t i s 
Hacking's definition of experiments as the sites of phenomena creation in physics starts the 
discussion about experiments in the wrong place since there are many everyday cases of ex-
perimentation that are not scientific and do not create phenomena.66 Let us broaden the picture 
a little. 
1 Lexicographies 
In The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy Simon Blackburn says of'experiment': 
Alternatively, everything I do can be said to produce phenomena—even if it is the phenomenon of 
nothing changing, in which case the claim is vacuous 
38 
Experiments 
A controlled manipulation of events, designed to produce observ ations that confirm or dis-
confirm one or more rival theories or hypotheses To experiment is to put questions to na-
ture, and the experimental method is contrasted with the passiv e acceptance of whatever ob-
servations happen along. The method is characteristic of modern natural science. However, 
a discipline (such as history) may be pursued with greater or less objectivity and success 
without being able to av ail itself of the experimental method 6 
According to Blackburn, experiments involve control and manipulation of events (not things). 
They are essentially tied to the production of data or observations for the testing of theories. 
Their design presumes the priority of theory over action or accident. The definition excludes 
the possibility of just trying something new/ or the generation of situations where there is no 
formal way of stating which theories are under test, or even the lack of an agreed way of de-
scribing the phenomena observed. He speaks of the experimental method, and thereby implies 
a unity in the method of 'modern natural science,' since experimental method is so character-
istic of it in this picture. This seems to fit unexamined intuitions about experiment, even if 
some of the relativising effects of social constructivist theories of science are included in the 
outlook. 
Hacking directly questions whether this kind of description of the work of experimenters can 
be correct.68 He draws on several sources to show that it is possible to make observations and 
perform experiments without this clear framework of theory and hypothesis. He suggests, in 
6 7 Blackburn. S. (1994) The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy Oxford: Oxford University Press, 131. 
6 8 Hacking quotes Popper on the received v iew of the separation of theory and experiment: 
'The theoretician puts certain definite questions to the experimenter, and the latter by his experi-
ments tries to elicit a decisive answer to these questions, and to no others. All other questions he 
tries hard to exclude ... . It is a mistake to suppose that the experimenter [ ... aims] 'to lighten 
the task of theoretician', or . . . to furnish the theoretician with a basis for inductive generaliza-
tions. On the contrary the theoretician must long before hav e done his work, or at least the most 
important part of his work: he must have formulated his questions as sharply as possible. Thus it 
is he who shows the experimenter the way But even the experimenter is not in the main en-
gaged in making exact observ ations; his work is largely of a theoretical kind. Theory dominates 
the experimental work from its initial planning up to the finishing touches in the laboratory'. 
Popper. K. (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery London: Hutchinson. 107; quoted in R&I, 
155. 
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discussing a fundamental difference of opinion about the role of experiment in scientific in-
vestigation between Humphry D a w and Justus von Liebig, two great pioneering chemists of 
their time, that there are two versions of the theory dependence of experiments: a strong ver-
sion and a weak one. The strong version requires a clear and explicit statement of the theory 
under test and a complete account of the theory behind your apparatus 
The weak version says only that you must have some idea about nature and your apparatus 
before you conduct an experiment. A completely mindless tampering with nature, with no 
understanding or ability to interpret the result, would teach you almost nothing.69- 7 0 
However, it is obvious from what Hacking says that he deliberately intends to leave 'some 
idea about nature and [the] apparatus" as a loose notion. Elsewhere he has been more specific 
about the kinds of considerations that make up experimentation once the received view is dealt 
with. 7 1 Note, that although Hacking w ants to ditch the theoretical components from the justifi-
cation of belief in particular theoretical entities, he retains it, admittedly in this 'weak' form 
here. I do not think this is a contradiction as he presents it. 7 2 
6 9 Hacking R&I 153. 
7 0 One might believe that western industrial development has resulted in 'a completely mindless 
tampering with nature, with no understanding or ability to interpret the results,' it certainly seems 
to apply in the case of genetics and the claims made for the proposed tampering with the human 
genome: a future possibility that, despite current claims to the contrary from interested parties, 
looks increasingly likely through the commercialisation of the w hole process of gene research and 
the Human Genome Project in particular, despite the hidden time scale for the whole project. But 
this is to prejudge the meaning of both the experimental situation and the theoretical back-
ground—it is just not clear that even 'simple' analysis of behaviour to link behaviour to genetic 
makeup are going to produce contexts for manipulation. 
7 1 As already noted, Hacking talks about three elements to experimentation, 'ideas' (theories), 
'things' (entities and equipment) and 'marks' (output from equipment, laboratory notes, experi-
mental accounts, scientific papers) in The Self-Vindication of the Laboratory Sciences'. Franklin 
(1993) has, rightly, suggested that in try ing to specify the exact nature and role of'ideas' Hacking 
is in great danger of loosing track of the idea of experiments 'having a life of their own', inde-
pendent of theories, one of the central components of his argument in Representing and Interven-
ing. 
1 2 Once the criteria of what we can use and manipulate become apparent we will see that there is 
tension here. Experimental realism may not require a commitment to specific scientific theories, 
but that does not mean that there is an entirely neulral assumed background to what one does 
things to. 
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One merit of Blackburn's sketch does stand out. Even if something can be said about what is 
epistemically good in experiments on the world, there are ways of gaining knowledge other 
than doing things directly to the object of study History , astronomy, botanical taxonomy, 
pnmatology all make claims about know ledge gathering, without the need to intervene or ex-
periment as a central activity Linking intervention to science though experiments does not 
exclude other activities, including simple observation. ' from the canon of possibilities for 
gathering empirical information 
The Oxford Dictionary of the History of Science is a little more useful in stating that: 
An experiment, unlike an experience, is a designed practical intervention in Nature, its up-
shot is a socially contrived set of observations, earned out under artificially produced and 
deliberately controlled, reproducible conditions At an experiment's core is the notion that 
the conditions for producing a given effect can be separated into independently variable 
factors, in such a way as to demonstrate how the factors behave in their natural (i.e. non-
experimental) state. 4 
This definition introduces a role for the social organisation of experimental science—although 
I think we need to be very careful about what "socially contrived" means without being trivial 
(or just plain useless). This definition also mentions the need for experiments to produce ob-
servations that are reproducible, although this immediately needs adjusting to accommodate 
the fact many experiments are not repeatable (in principle or practically), pace Hacking for 
reasons that include: fundamental changes in natural conditions affecting the experiment; ethi-
cal considerations; and expense. Furthermore, if an experiment is acceptable, it is more likely 
7 3 In the philosophy of physics intervention has been a problem for the interpretation of quantum 
theory, in that observation can been interpreted as an intervention associated with the resolution 
of the inherent indeterminacy of the states in physical systems considered at the quantum level. I 
have deliberately not discussed this issue It is a separate matter for a particular part of philosophy 
of science and physics Later chapters will discuss matters relating to biology and medicine where 
the interpretation of quantum theory is materially irrelev ant 
14 The Oxford Dictionary of the History of Science (1981) Oxford: Oxford University Press. 136. 
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that the experiment will be changed in some way to help confirm the initial results—to what 
extent this is repetition of the prime experiment as such, is not obvious Taking the isolation of 
'independently variable factors' influencing a phenomena or effect as a necessary component 
for experimentation can be found in discussions elsewhere.75 and is a product of the three 
metaphysical theses underlying most contemporary philosophy of science, which Dupre at-
tempts to demolish in Disorder, viz. strong commitments to essentialism, reductionism and 
determinism.76 
2 What an experiment is not 
Both of these simple definitions share intervention and manipulation as the central feature of 
experiment—something is done to the world by the experimenter, research group or commu-
nity to gain knowledge. This feature explains, to some extent, the vast array of uses we have 
for talking about 'experimenting" both inside and outside experimental science Across a range 
of human activity we can find talk of intervention, manipulation, test and measurement—some 
examples: putting mayonnaise in the chicken soup recipe for a change; restricting the supply 
of money in the economy through a monitoring of the circulation of cash; building a Viking 
boat to test its seaworthiness and exploratory range; observing the effects of drought on the 
migration patterns of swallow s by a process of ringing and sampling; using a new drug to help 
stave off AIDS in people tested HIV seropositive; changing toothpaste brand to discover 
which keeps plaque to a minimum; creating and/or discovering a new particle in an accelera-
tor. But we need to be very clear about what these interventions are. Are they really all the 
same kind of thing9 Do they all involve the same commitment to what is existent, to what we 
7 5 Roy Bhaskar. in a somewhat obfuscating style, says that an experiment is. 'an attempt to trigger or 
unleash a single kind of mechanism or process in relative isolation, free from the interfering flux 
of the open world, so as to observ e its detailed workings or record its characteristic mode of effect 
and/or lest some hypothesis about them.' Bhaskar. R. (1986) Scientific Realism and Human 
Emancipation London: Verso. 35. 1 leave the reader to unrav el Bhaskar's prose! 
7 6 Chapter 3. below. 
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want to know, or to the methods involved in intervening ' Yet in each case we may speak of an 
experiment being performed It is not simply a matter of using a figure of speech that puts all 
these examples together, they all involve some form of action and seem to have informative 
consequences. Even if we restrict ourselv es to purely academic concerns, I do not believe there 
currently exist any clear ways of spelling out what the implications of this are, nor of saying 
how we are to fit experiments in the social, biological and medical sciences into the same 
epistemological framework. Perhaps a detailed framework cannot be constructed without do-
ing damage to these intuitions, but three theses can be recognised in this. 
Experiments necessarily involve intervention/manipulation which is an important 
epistemic tool. 
The growth of interest in the practice of science is paralleled by a growth of interest in human 
practice in philosophy generally. With naturalised epistemologies77 comes the general suppo-
sition that there is no obvious point where the things that we do to find out about the world 
stop and justification of those things begins. What we do can be understood in different ways, 
for example, sociologically, politically and psychologically, but it can also be understood as 
an expression of a belief in a rational order (or several sorts of order) that can be explored. 
My claim is that intervening and manipulating can be understood in this way, that is, as ra-
tional and having epistemic value Sometimes more can be found out by doing things, by act-
ing on the world, than not doing things Of course, the big question is why this is so It is pos-
sible to say how this acting on the world fits rationally into a set of epistemic goals believed to 
have real value, and without the notion of intervention there can be no notion of experi-
ment—intervention is wider than experiment and contains it 
7 7 See. for example. Kitchen P. (1992) The Naturalists Return' Philosophical Review 101, 53-114. 
There is now a wealth of literature on naturalised epistcmology. which I shall not list here 
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There are, of course, experiments and experimental situations that involve only minimal inter-
vention in the world For example, an experiment in the use of a new statistical model in an 
ecological study of the distribution of newt species in England and Wales does not seem to 
involve any intervention or manipulation of anything other than the mathematical model used. 
However, that is exactly what is being experimented on. not the newts themselves—again this 
does not seem to be the creation of any new phenomena in the way Hacking discusses it. This 
shows that intervention/manipulation can be applied as a conceptual tool to things other than 
material objects, entities or events involving such entities, which accounts for the value of 
such a tool and its diverse applications. But it means we have to look more carefully at Hack-
ing's claims. 
Intervention/manipulation is the exercise of agency. 
There could of course be great difficulty, even an impossibility , in rationally deciding when 
one should intervene and when only make an observation. For example, to read the motto that 
runs round my mug, I can pick it up and turn it round—thereby intervening in the world with 
the intention to move the mug's position in space relative to myself—or I could get up and 
move myself round to the other side of the desk to get a better view. Moving the mug is not an 
experiment, but it is an intervention/manipulation It is an action informed by my having the 
capacity for agency in the acquisition of knowledge. We are left w ith the remaining problem of 
what other criteria have to be fulfilled for an observation from intervention of this kind to be 
viewed as an experiment. One easy suggestion might be that experimentation involves the 
revelation of some hidden material agency.78 Unfortunately this will not do. Certainly some 
7 8 This turns Hacking's argument around. An experiment reveals aspects of the world to be real just 
because that is what an experiment is. The main argument for this claim is the coherence it lends 
to the whole of the position I am presenting here. 
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experiments are of this sort, but it is not clear that all could fit this model. What is clear is that 
all experiments involve some agent perspective description to be meaningful.79 
That there are no sufficient conditions for experimentation. 
This is part of my claim regarding the plurality of the ontology (ontologies) of world and our 
access to it, in partial support of Dupre's position The minimal consistency of experiments in 
their all being a revealing intervention of some sort, tells us little in detail about how this cate-
gory of intervention technique(s) is applied. Experiments need not be the same in anything 
other than this similarity The examples I discuss at the end of the section help to illustrate this 
point. 
There are obvious cases of rational intervention that are not experiments, as the examples of 
the mug and the new toothpaste demonstrate As the account stands scientific experiments are 
a form of rational intervention in a scientific context. This links the discussion to the problem 
of the demarcation of science from non-science.80 But on the whole the experiments do not 
seem to have a unique characterisation without further clarification of their context of appli-
cation. 
Let us now turn to how scientific experiments have been treated by philosophers in the past. 
Mi H i s t o r y and e x p e r i m e n t s 
According to Hacking, there were no good philosophical accounts of experiment between 
Francis Bacon and himself This claim is false. Although the history of philosophy of experi-
Again, this is one of Pickering s points in his (1995) op cit. 
See my reading of Foucault on this issue, p. 169 ff 
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ments is patchy, it is untrue to say that nothing was written about the nature of experimenta-
tion from Bacon's death in 1626 until Representing and Intervening in 1983. Hacking is right 
to stress that little was said about practice in the majority of twentieth century philosophy of 
science, and it is worth, for a moment, pursuing the reason for this silence. Hacking wrote in 
1984: 
No field of philosophy is more sy stematically neglected than experiment. Our grade school 
teachers may have told us that scientific method is experimental method, but histories of 
science have become histories of theory. Experiments, the philosophers say. are of value 
only when they test theory . Experimental work, they imply, has no life of its own. So we 
lack even a terminology to describe the many varied roles of experiment. Nor has this one-
sidedness done theory any good, for radically different types of theory are used to think 
about the same physical phenomenon (e g., the magneto-optical effect). The philosophers of 
theory have not noticed this and so misreported even theoretical enquiry.81 
Hacking almost seems to say that such neglect can only be understood through recognition of 
the profound stupidity of such philosophers This point of \iew is. of course, untenable; so one 
must look for other reasons for the neglect in this century The first thing to do is to see what 
lies this side of the Kuhnian revolutionary fire break that opens Representing and Intervening, 
to see whether the answer lies in different approaches to the traditional worries about meaning, 
change, rationality and reference. To begin with the revolutionary himself. 
1 Kuhn, experiments and history 
Thomas Kuhn8" has suggested that there is a tradition stretching back to early Greek thought 
in which a clear distinction may be drawn between the experimental and mathematical sci-
ences, born of the my stical conception of mathematics: that this distinction truly comes into 
full operation in the seventeenth century with the generation of Baconian sciences; that it con-
8 1 Hacking. I. (1984a) Experimentation and Scientific Realism in Leplin. J. (ed.) Scientific Realism 
Berkley: University of California Press 
8 2 Kuhn. T S.. (1976) 'Mathematical versus Experimental Traditions in the Development of Physical 
Science' Journal of Interdisciplinary History 7. 1-31. 
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tinues throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; and that it can be clearly marked out 
in the seventeenth century by Newton's supposed different strategies in The Optics and 777? 
Principia.83 
Even if the controversial claim about Newton could be resolved, this distinction w ill no longer 
fit into the naturalised philosophy of practice now emergent in philosophy of science. Kuhn's 
thesis is about supposed methodological concerns over how theories are to be put to the test. 
The line he draws divides the sciences into those which rely on trial-and-error. inductive. Ba-
conian procedures, and those with a more rigid deductive, aprioristic system. In other words, 
he is still concerned with examining how theories are considered testable within the two tra-
ditions he highlights, not how they are in fact tested and what this might reveal about these 
methods of testing, or the world He still submits to the view of his contemporaries and those 
he aimed to displace. Not only does he not take on board the variety of practices employed in 
theory testing, but implicitly allows that there would only be a simple single relation between 
theory and observation in any particular field of science, even though that relation may be 
paradigmatically determined. 
That scientists view different theories in only two ways is Kuhn's conclusion, but there seems 
nothing particularly enlightening or radical in that. Furthermore, Kuhn's distinction does not 
tell us why experimental practice itself is neglected in the philosophy of science of the early 
twentieth century and in his own writing Theory bias has dominated the philosophy of science 
to such an extent that the agenda set by logical empiricism was taken up by the more histori-
cally informed philosophy that superseded it. Kuhn's apparent attempts to talk about experi-
Newton. I. (1934) Mathematical Principles ofSatural Philosophy trans. Motte, A. Berkeley LA: 
University of California Press; (1979) Opticks. or A Treatise of the Reflections, Refractions, In-
flections and Colours of Light New York: Dover. 
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mental science fall short of what might be taken to be Hacking s bench mark of concern be-
cause o f this bias 
It may be thai a nod towards the dominance of theory in general philosophy, seen as the Ror-
tian targets of epistemology and mind as theatres for reference, wi l l help to resolve some o f the 
apparent difficulty in explicating the lack o f interest in experiment in modern philosophy. But 
perhaps this is putting things the wrong way round. It is explicit in Hacking's thesis that there 
is a gap to be filled by a philosophy o f experiment, and that the subject has always been inter-
esting and important. This is all very whiggish He is constructing a misleading history for the 
philosophy o f science. The conceptual work and logical analysis pursued by the logical em-
piricists was not mistaken, given their interests. Attacks on their lack o f insight into experi-
ment is short-changing the efforts o f past philosophy of science. Experiment as a topic for 
philosophical investigation was not pursued in this century because it was not interesting to 
the philosophers concerned. Carnap puts it this way in The Unity of Science: 
In the first place I want to emphasize that we are not a philosophical school and that we put 
forward no philosophical theses whatsoever. ... Any new philosophical school, though it 
reject all previous opinions, is bound to answer the old (if perhaps better formulated) ques-
tions. But we give no answer to philosophical questions, and instead reject all philosophi-
cal questions, whether Metaphysics. Ethics or Episteniology For our concern is with Logi-
cal Analysis. I f this pursuit is still to be called Philosophy let it be so: but it involves exclud-
ing from consideration all the traditional problems of Philosophy.84 
This bold statement of the Vienna Circle's aims has echoed through much later writing and 
work on the philosophy o f science, until quite recently, in fact The concern with theory was 
not an oversight—it was deliberate Practice itself does not open up to logical analysis in a 
pure form. It is only with the return of messy metaphysics—w ith the attendant problems of 
Carnap. R. (1934) The Unity of Science London: Kegan Paul. Trench. Truber and Co. Ltd 
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dealing with human ontologies—and untidy epistemology that the agenda o f appropriate ques-
tions for philosophy o f science can include experiments and experimentation. 
2 Histories! studies, science studies, instruments 
In the last fifteen years, along with these "untidy' interests, there has been an explosion in 
historical studies of experiments and their relevance to both the history and philosophy of sci-
ence. It is beyond this study to survey all the material available, but it is worth noting some o f 
the more interesting paths that these historical accounts have taken. The key to understanding 
these historical studies must be that of embracing diversity, at least in terms o f the uses to 
which these studies are put. Near the opening of their collection of essays Gooding, Pinch and 
Schaffer write: 
Our case studies include Galilean mechanics. Newtonian Optics, early Victorian electro-
magnetism, experiments on insects, on clouds and thunderstorms, on quarks and on the ac-
curacy of nuclear missiles. This sample hardly exhausts the fields in which experiment 
matters Generalisations across such a range are likely to be provisional and we do not im-
ply that there is some essential and unchanging activity called experiment. Yet there are 
some important lessons about the way this kind of human activity has developed and the 
uses it serves. These include human agency and skill, the role of persuasion and of rhetoric, 
and the significance of the site of experiment and of instrumentation both to learning and 
persuasion.85 
One feature o f their boasts about the size o f their editorial net is immediately obvious: except 
for 'experiments on insects' the whole selection is drawn from the physical sciences. This bias 
becomes more apparent from surveying the contents proper Echoing my earlier remarks, there 
must be a suspicion that i f diversity is so vast in the physical sciences, then even more signifi-
cant consequences could appear i f the biological (and medical) sciences are included. Further 
1 5 Gooding. Pinch and Schaffer (eds.)( 1989), The Uses of Experiment: Studies in the Natural Sci-
ences Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, xv. References marked with t are to this volume. 
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extension to the psycho-social sciences is another issue that I shall mention again later in con-
nection with Foucault 8 6 
Instruments and the acquisition of the skilled use of instruments have been one focus for dis-
cussion For example, in the Gooding. Pinch. Schaffer collection there are three essays on the 
co-development of instruments and techniques by Hackmann. 8 7 Schaffer 8 8 and Bennett 8 9 and 
there are other less direct treatments o f the role that instruments play in experimentation. The 
establishment o f the use and significance o f particular instruments is not simple, as Schaffer's 
discussion o f the Newtonian prism show s There is a dynamic interplay between the scientific 
theory that the instrument demonstrates and the development o f the instrument itself—and it is 
indeed demonstration that is the key here. Acceptance of theoretical claims, which can also be 
read as acceptance o f experimental results, depend, to some extent, on the experiment being 
seen to work and to be independently verified. This adds a further factor to any picture that 
tries to establish a rational, naturalised account o f science practice. 
One suggestion might be that the route is not rational, that the reconstruction o f the experi-
ment later is simply a construction through other pressures (market forces, psychological in-
fluences, authority) given that the experimental apparatus has already been embedded in the 
theory and has become "transparent" (Schaffer's term) Such a suggestion is too simple The 
apparent need to understand what a particular piece of apparatus is, before assessing the ex-
periment it is used for can be understood, or assessed, does not o f necessity exclude the pos-
sibility o f placing this transparency within a rational account of the experiment, even at the 
cost o f introducing some vagueness and ambiguity into the experiment, as talk o f agency does. 
8 6 See p. 190 ff. 
8 7 f Hackmann. W D 'Scientific Instruments Models of Brass and Aids to Discovery'. 31-66. 
881 Schaffer. S. Glass Works: Newton's Prisms and the Uses of Experiment', 67-104. 
891 Bennett. J A. A Viol of Water or a Wedge of Glass'. 105-114. 
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After all . talk of manipulation or intervention has remained unexamined in the literature, but is 
crucial to current phenomenological and naturalised theories and stories about experiments. In 
practice this means that acquisition o f skill in this regard remains unclear This does not mean 
that the procedure has no rational nature even though many reconstructions may take place to 
get to any coherence o f theory and practice. Thomas Nicklcs has argued otherwise. 9 0 a tactic 
that has much in common with sociological reconstructions of the practice o f science.91 
3 Sociology 
The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) programme has tried to show how science as 
practice, seen as the interplay o f the dynamic groups composing the scientific community , can 
and does generate knowledge. The highlighting o f neglected interests and o f the political and 
personal motivation for particular projects can only be for the good, since it is not always ob-
vious that science is the open, free and democratic enterprise that it claims to be. However, the 
stronger thesis that sociological relations are all there can be to science needs much more sup-
port than demonstrations that scientists have and are motivated by other interests apart f rom 
rational, objective knowledge seeking. Dupre correctly criticises this kind o f approach for its 
blanket inclusion o f all science under one theoretical framew ork: 
... being quite unrestricted in [its] scope, [it] provide[s] no motivation for questioning the 
specific epistemic credentials of particular scientific projects That is [it] typically assume[s] 
that the domain to which ... analyses apply is given in advance, tacitly presupposing some 
kind of scientific unity. ... By asserting that all scientific beliefs should be explained in 
terms of the goals, interests, and prejudices of the scientist, and denying any role whatever 
for the recalcitrance of nature, it leaves no space for criticism of specific beliefs on the 
grounds that they do reflect such prejudices rather than being plausibly grounded in fact. 9 2 
9 0 t Nickles. T. 'Justification and Experiment.' 299-334 
9 1 This agent perspective was discussed earlier, p 26 ff. 
9~ Disorder 12. 
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I t is exactly because nature is recalcitrant—that it resists certain manipulation and interven-
tion by humans in particular ways—that experiments can have any significance at all . as was 
noted in the quotation from Pickering 9 3 I f the reply is that science ultimately has no signifi-
cance, at least as "objective" knowledge, one may legitimately ask the critic why she should be 
believed more than the scientist. How is her position to be rationally jus t i f ied 9 To claim that 
she is merely engaging in a dialogue that we all participate in being culturally specific hu-
mans, a typically Rortian response,94 is not good enough i f one happens to be in a minority 
group and suffers because of the application of prejudices through science and technology. At 
least, it is not good enough i f one wants some aspect o f rational justification as part o f one's 
understanding o f science 
But this is a caricature and cannot stand as a fu l l analysis o f SSK. We need to take care to 
separate the general point that scientists are social beings—and that therefore their beliefs are 
a partial product o f this state o f affairs—from the stronger program that aims for a completely 
socialised epistemology o f science 9 5 Later, again in connection w ith discussions of Foucault, 
we shall see how 'sociological' issues are important when placed in a proper context, where 
there are a multiplicity o f interests. For now, let us carry forward the observation that the 
application o f sociological analysis to all parts o f science practice in all disciplines is ques-
tionable and ultimately incomplete This is as true o f current analyses o f experiments as it is 
o f other aspects o f science. 
See p. 28 IT. 
I admit that this does ov er-simplify Rorty 's position His overview of the place of rationality and 
philosophy wil l be discussed later in Chapter 5 
See Fuller, S. (1988) Social Epistemology Bloomington: Indiana University Press: Rouse, J. (1987) 
Knowledge and Power Ithaca: Cornell University Press: Lalour. B. (1987) Science in Action MA: 
Harvard University Press: Longino. H. (1990) Science as Social Knowledge Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
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So it is clear that the history o f the philosophy of experiment needs to be sensitive to the philo-
sophical interests of the time Hacking has not succeeded in showing that there is a missing 
aspect to past philosophical musing about experiments Similarly, attempts to reconstruct 
historical and present accounts o f experiments as only the product o f sociological interests 
lack many motivations that lie in philosophy Attempts to go beyond the common criteria for 
all experiments either result in frameworks that lack the power to assess the epistemological 
value o f particular experiments, or are not wide enough in their scope to include fields that we 
would want to assess as experimental. 
iv P r o b a b i l i t y a n d the d e t a i l of r a t i o n a l 
p r a c t i c e 
Putting socio-historical matters on one side for the moment, let us now look at what happens 
when rational considerations o f experiment are stressed. One of the most conspicuous ways 
that experiments have been used and analysed by philosophers o f science involves a re-
emergence o f attempts to characterise the rationality o f scientific practice. Unlike most other 
areas o f our intervention and manipulation of the world, experimentation is often recorded in 
detail, and the methods by which experimenters correct their procedures to minimise error and 
difficulties are usually open to inspection. Part o f this re-assessment is o f course related to a 
dissatisfaction with the over-emphasis on the socially constructed component in experimental 
work discussed above and wil l help to put back some o f the other missing elements o f interest 
to the experimenter (and the philosopher) 
1 Different perspectives — Kitcher's dynamic model 
To begin w ith let us look at the possibility of re-articulating a role for the concept o f rational-
ity in philosophy of science generally In Advancement Kitcher has tried to incorporate ra-
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tional and group interests into a coherent epistemology. One o f his claims is that the running 
down o f the possibility o f an epistcmology of science—through past implicit stress on the 
static nature o f rationality—has failed to show how a dynamic model o f rationality might be 
significant in such an epistemology Kitcher discusses this change o f model and its impor-
tance.9 6 He highlights how the rational status of single beliefs is not interesting or apposite in 
looking at how science is conducted in a modern context 
What is much more interesting is the rationality of belief change, that is, noting what evidence 
(and how it is weighted) is used to alter the understanding o f particular theories. Kitcher gives 
his own account o f how sense can be made of the inductive practice of scientists that ad-
dresses the fundamental issue o f underdetermination. one o f the key sites for Kuhn's criticism 
o f the earlier, highly logically structured picture o f science Kitcher calls this pie-Revolutions 
school o f philosophy 'Legend.' 9 7 Kitcher goes a long way to salvaging rationality from the use 
o f studies o f the social and political influences on scientists—stories that generate stories 
about science that exclude even the possibility o f the activities people engage in being expli-
cable and assessable through reasons—that fit the epistemic goals that they have as individu-
als or as part o f a community. He stresses that science is done by people with real lives and 
real histories embedded in traditions o f research, but points out that it is still open to us to un-
derstand the nature o f science in a philosophical way. involving analysis o f the epistemic rea-
Kitcher Ach'ancement. Chapters 6-8. 
Of Legend Kitcher says: 'Legend celebrated science Depicting the sciences as directed at noble 
goals, it maintained that those goals have been ever more successfully realized. ... Successive gen-
erations of scientists have filled in more and more parts of the COMPLETE TRUE STORY OF 
THE WORLD (or. perhaps, of the COMPLETE TRUE STORY OF THE OBSERVABLE PART 
OF THE WORLD). ... Inspired by the work of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, the architects 
of modern mathematical logic, logical empiricist philosophers of science proposed to uncover the 
logic of confirmation, the logical structure of theories and the logic of explanation, thus formulat-
ing with precision those canons and criteria that they took to be tacitly employed by scientists in 
their every day work References to logic reverberate like drumrolls through the classic works of 
logical empiricist philosophy of science, works that, because of their clarity , rigor, and attention to 
a range of considerations, belong among the greatest accomplishments of philosophy in our cen-
tury.' Ach'ancement 3-5. 
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sons people as scientists have for their beliefs in the area o f science in which they are work-
ing. 9 8 He says 
I conceive of rationality as a means-ends notion. Concepts of rationality are generated by 
thinking of entities (people, groups of people, science as a whole, science and its relations to 
society) as meeting some criterion of good design (maximization of expectation, expectation 
of positive modification, high expectation with respect to rival entities) relative to a set of 
goals (epistemic goals, practical goals, both.) 9 9 1 0 0 
He recognises that this characterisation o f rationality could well be criticised from a number 
of positions. Traditionally there could be no way o f taking goals/ends, into account when 
drawing up epistemic rules for rationality because of their supposed psychological source.1 0 1 
Given his account o f what we ought to be doing in examining the rational procedures o f sci-
ence, it is no surprise that Kitcher considers "apsychologistic" epistemologies of science to be 
'f lawed. ' Only by the introduction of such notions as the epistemic goal(s) o f the subject (the 
scientist, or research group) can a destructive relativism be avoided and the study o f episte-
mology have any purpose.1 0" This accords w ell w ith my earlier sketch o f experimentation that 
urged that we recognise the human agency involved in rational intervention in the world, and 
hence in experimentation. Kitcher's analysis o f rationality in science is part o f his wider pro-
9 8 Perhaps this is the actual difference in strategy employed by the opponents on either side of the 
SSK break. Those obsessed with the sociological aspects of science practice discuss the reasons for 
belief change from the perspective that we must examine scientists as people,' in the sense that 
people are prone to all sorts of 'irrational' influences; w hereas there is always the possibility of at-
tempting to grasp people as scientists.' which allows for the fact that people are also rational and 
can make decisions based on reasoned judgement. 
99 Advancement 179. 
1 0 0 There is an issue, a very large issue, about how to reconcile the tendency to generate big pictures 
about know ledge and the world w ith the local details of rational practice. Again, we shall encoun-
ter this again in connection with Bachelard and Foucault. and Putnam and Rorty. 
Kitcher notes Strawson. P. (1952) introduction to Logical Theory London: Methuen; and Car-
nap. R. (1951) Logical Foundations of Probability Chicago: Cambridge University Press, in this 
context. 
1 0 2 Richard Rorly has argued that there is nothing left for epistemologists to do, perhaps most notori-
ously in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature ((1979) Oxford: Blackwell), esp. chapters V l l and 
VII I . 
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gram that gives a role to philosophy, and avoids many o f the past problems o f trying to draw 
lines around the good/ rational. Legend-like theories and the "bad." irrational, social con-
structivist theories about science, exclusively.' 0 3 Again, this seems to be another indicator that 
the Kuhnian revolution has been completed and absorbed back into issues that are genuinely 
important in trying to say anything coherent about science. 
However, despite Kitcher's stress on the rational practice o f scientists, he does not go too far 
in looking at that practice in experiments and experimenting Although experiments can be, for 
him, the crucial point where theories really are put to the test, altered, rejected, constructed 
and so on, and a number o f different ways of doing this could be devised and considered, the 
'how * o f this testing is left somewhat vague Scientists can be rational, even in their attitudes 
and interactions with each other over acknowledging authority in their field, but there is a gap 
in what Kitcher says about the rationality of the actual practical measures that experimenters 
take in the performance o f complicated experiments with complex equipment; how, for exam-
ple, experimenters distinguish artefacts from genuine results As with the logical positivists, 
this is not because he is missing something, but that his analysis is operating at a more general 
level. But it is disappointing that he does not take his analysis further because the detail o f 
experimentation might provide very good evidence o f the kind o f dynamic rational processes 
he wants to highlight. 
Let us now look at work on the details of experimentation by philosophers with some similar 
aims as Kitcher, the re-articulation o f philosophy o f science that gives robust content to no-
tions such as rationality, rational theory change, expectation, prediction and success where the 
details o f experimentation have been central Work has been done here that focuses on the use 
of Bayesian probability analysis, that is, the conversion o f statements o f degrees of belief into 
103 cf. Newton-Smith. W. H. (1981) The Rationality of Science London: Routledge. 
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statements of probabilities for these beliefs, and the treatment o f them through Bayes's Theo-
rem and the probability calculus. Kitcher notes the apparent potential of pursuing this kind o f 
approach: 
Bayesianism has many virtues It offers a unified account of the confirmation of hypotheses 
that can resolve some issues of underdetermination, can yield solutions to traditional logical 
puzzles about confirmation, and can explain the differential force of different types of evi-
dence in some historical cases of scientific reasoning . Bayesianism is clear, precise, and 
unified: there are results about proper reasoning and there is a single perspective from 
which these results f low. 1 0 4 
He does, however, have a number o f reservations about Bayesianism that include the observa-
tion that there is evidence that people do not in fact reason probabilistically.' 0 5 There are other 
criticisms too that w i l l arise from what we have considered so far, but before looking at these 
in more detail it w i l l be useful to lav- out some of the work o f Bayesian analysis o f experi-
ments. Whatever objections can be raised to Bayesianism. in some o f its forms it is, to date, 
the most structured thinking on experiments. Furthermore, the unity o f practice it presents wi l l 
have to be examined i f any claims about disunity o f method in science are to be assessed thor-
oughly. 
2 Bayesian analyses 
A t the beginning o f The Neglect o f Experiment Alan Franklin raises two questions about ex-
perimentation: 
1. What role does, and should, experiment play in the choice between competing theories 
or hypotheses or in the confirmation and support of hypotheses? 
104 Advancement 291-292. 
1 0 5 Kitcher notes Tversky. A. and Kahneman. D. (1973) 'Availability: A Heuristic for Judgement 
Frequency and Probability ' Cognitive Psychology 5. 207-232: (1974) "Judgement Under Uncer-
tainty: Heuristics and Biases' Science 185. 1 124-1131: Nisbett. R. and Ross. L. (1980) Human In-
terference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgement Englewood Cliffs. NJ: Prentice Hall; 
and Goldman. A (1986) Epistemologv and Cognition Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press, 
chapter 15 
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2. How do we come to believe rationally in the results of an experiment, or how do we 
separate results, obtained by use of apparatus to measure or observe a quantity, from an 
artefact created by the experimental apparatus''1 0 6 
The first is not a neglected question It has been the s tuff o f Legend for a long time and con-
tinues to exercise many thinkers However, it is the second question that has become a locus 
for much contemporary work for probability theorists Franklin admits, ' I do not have a gen-
eral answer to the first question concerning the role o f experiment in theory choice. ' 0 7 He goes 
on to describe in quite involved detail three 'episodes" in physics that required the use 
(discovery and refinement) o f difficult experimental techniques These are experiments on the 
non-conservation of parity , the discovery o f CP (combined space inversion and particle-
antiparticle interchange) violation and the experiments carried out by Millikan to determine 
the size of e. the basic unit o f electric charge, and its quantum nature. He says that this is a 
varied survey o f experimentation, a claim that seems hard to support given the narrowness o f 
the field from which all three studies are drawn, namely phy sics (and a limited part o f it at 
that). Nevertheless, within his own Bayesian outline, there are differences between the experi-
ments in the sense that different strategies are employed in the conduct o f the experiments in 
calibrating the equipment, grasping the significance o f the output of the equipment, determin-
ing the relevance o f the results so obtained, and so on 
Bayes's Theorem can be expressed by the identity 
P(h\e) = , where P(h), P(e) > 0 
108 
Franklin. A. (1986) The Neglect of Experiment Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. 
ibid 5. 
8 The notation used is standard logic and probability notation The majority of the formulae used 
here are taken from Franklin (1986) op cit. and Howson and Urbach (1989) Scientific Reasoning: 
the Bayesian approach London: Open Court. 
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CP(h)' is the probability o f the hvpothesis under test. 'P(e)' the probability o f the evidence, 
'P(h\e)' the probability o f the hypothesis given the evidence under consideration, and 'P(e\hY 
the conditional probability of the evidence given the hypothesis ) 
This is easily obtained from basic axioms in probability theory 1 0 9 Simply put. Franklin be-
lieves that we can successfully isolate strategies by which the validity , the acceptability o f ex-
perimental results are tested and evaluated, and demonstrate that they are justifiable through 
the use o f the theorem He highlights nine such strategies: 
1. Experimental checks and calibration, in which the apparatus reproduces known phe-
nomena 
2. Reproducing artefacts that arc known in advance to be present. 
3. Intervention, in which the experimenter manipulates the object under observation. 
4. Independent confirmation using different experiments 
5. Elimination of plausible sources of error and alternative explanations of the results. 
6. Using the results themselves to argue for their validity. 
7. Using an independently well-corroborated theory of the phenomena to explain the re-
sults. 
8. Using an apparatus based on a well-corroborated theory . 
9. Using statistical arguments."0 
Each o f these strategies does have an immediate appeal and examples can be found for their 
application to actual scientific practice For example, strategy 5 is called the "'Sherlock Ho l -
mes" strategy' by Franklin: Holmes once remarked to Watson. "How often have I said to you 
that when y ou have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must 
1 0 9 See Howson and Urbach op cil. 
1 1 0 Franklin. A. (1990) Experiment, right or wrong Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 104. 
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be the t ru th . " ' 1 " He proposes that there is a rational analysis in formal Bayesian terms for the 
elimination o f plausible sources o f error in the obtaining o f experimental results. Thus this 
gives a measure to their validity It seems that this is a key strategy for checking this validity, 
and provides a stronger criterion than some of the others he lists. It could, I suggest, subsume 
strategies 1-3. in that they are themselves only specific strategies for the removal o f potential 
sources o f error in the apparatus used. I f there are no results, or wild results, one source o f 
error in your experiment is that the apparatus is not working properly. As with the whole of 
this approach there is a built-in sense o f expertise The experimenter must be able to say be-
forehand which processes and events are possible and then must assign a prior probability to 
them. ' A Bayesian approach shows quite clearly why this strategy works.""' 1 
I f H = the hypothesis believed to be the explanation for e. 
e = the results obtained, 
h, = the 'plausible sources o f error" (a possible explanation for e). then, 
I f the experimenter then obtains further information that eliminates h}, that is, she effectively 
falsifies the theory under test, h, -> -><?] so that P(e\ \ hs) = 0, then. 
' " i n fact the nearest I can find to the quotation Franklin gives is 'Eliminate all of the factors and 
the one which remains must be the truth"' Conan Doyle. A (1985) The Sign of Four' Sherlock 
Holmes Selected Stories Oxford World's Classics. Chancellor Press. Oxford University Press: 
Oxford. 73 
" : Franklin (1990) op cit. 109. 
P(H\e) 
P(e\H)P(H) 
P(e) 
P{e\H)P{H) + £ P(e\h,)P(h.) 
P(e\H)P(H) 
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P(H\e/\e,) = 
P{eAei\H)P(H) 
P(e A e\\H)P{H) + £ P{e A e\\h,)P(h,) 
gives the result that. 
P(H\eAe\)>P(H\e). 
This result say s that the probability of the hypothesis (H). given the evidence to support it and 
the evidence that eliminates the competing hypothesis, is greater than the probability of the 
hypothesis given the supporting evidence alone Thus the strategy is seen to provide an in-
creased probability validity to the hypothesis Franklin goes on. [w]e can continue this proce-
dure, acquiring additional pieces of information e2. e} es. which eliminate all the compet-
ing h, with any significant prior probability, the plausible sources o f error and alternative ex-
planations. ': 
P{H\ e A e\ A eif\.,.Aes ) = 
e A e\ A ei A es H)P(H) 
P{e A e\ A e:A.. .A<?y| H)P(H) + /? 
Franklin say s that ]i is 'the very small remainder o f the sum' so that, 
P(H\e A e\ A ez.. .ev) * 1. thereby giving large support to H. 
There are some technical objections to this procedure that need not be examined here." 3 How-
ever, there are obvious ones that have immediate consequences for my argument. The Baye-
sian technique rests on the ascription o f prior probabilities for hypotheses that are corrected 
by the evidence collected. In this case, the prior probabilities are a measure of the perceived 
1 1 3 Sec Glymour, C. (1981) Theory and Evidence Chicago: Chicago University Press. Of course, 
Glymour's objections to Bayesianism are more than just technical 
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significance o f particular 'sources o f error' in the experimental set up. It incorporates the 
possibility that fi does not become vanishingly small, that there are other errors that have not 
been given any significance by the experimenter, that is, that experimental work is fallible, 
while still allowing a dynamic assessment of the hypotheses. 
As the work of elimination proceeds, the Bayesian apparatus can record just how the for-
tunes of the rival hypotheses are changing. ... thus supporting the view that actual scientific 
reasoning is a fumbling approximation to something clearer and more sophisticated.'14 
However, considered alongside the Bayesian objections to the competitor theories derived 
from Fisher's notion o f objective probabilities, there is alway s the option o f denying that Bay-
esianism has the natural rational grounding it claims. Consider: 
Fisher envisaged an experimental design which would permit reliable inductive inferences 
to be drawn, whatever unknown extraneous influences happened to be operating. ... unless 
these possible influences could be assessed as to whether they are likely to have a significant 
effect. Fisher's recommendations would be ineffective, for they would require infinitely 
many randomizations."" 
Consequently, there is a continuing difficulty with assessing exactly what is to be a 
'significant, ' problem, a diff iculty that only seems solvable by sacrificing whatever immedi-
ate intuitive appeal Bayesianism has o f a description of the practice o f experimenters to fur-
ther technicalities. In either case, the Bayesian project looks diff icult to complete. Kitcher also 
notes difficulties in the Bayesian programme. The first of which matches this objection. 
114 Advancement 292. 
1 1 5 Howson and Urbach op cit. 152-153. 
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Given the absence of constraint on prior probabilities, it is quite possible that the Bayesian 
arrives at some extremely unintuitive initial assignment, with the result that, when his col-
league has come to accept the last remaining candidate, the Bayesian still assigns that hy-
pothesis a very low probability To be sure, there are convergence theorems about the long 
run—but as writers from Keynes on have pointedly remarked, we want to achieve correct 
beliefs in the span of human lifetimes The root difficulty is that one ought not to parti-
tion the space of candidates in vast numbers of the ways for which the Bayesian allows. ... 
having recognised this, one can also see that any Bayesian partitioning of that space im-
poses an arbitrary and unmotivated structure Only in special cases can responsible assign-
ment of probabilities be made 1 1 6 
He also points out that Bavesianism is only genuinely useful in the assessment o f 
"epistemically perfect situations." which once again points us towards the very limited number 
o f contexts where we have such situations and the application of ceteris paribus criteria. 
Conflict in the statements generated by different researchers and genuinely open questions 
cannot be taken account of. This can be made into a finally damning criticism of the applica-
tion of Bayesianism to experiments, as follows. 
3 Epistemology and practice 
In Gooding's analysis o f actions and agency in experiment he speaks o f the ambiguity o f the 
entities and events in experimental science He says: 
. the ontological ambiguity of manipulated objects is essential to the construction of new 
phenomenal possibilities. The ambiguity of what is manipulated is crucial to the creative 
stages in the development of thought—and real—experiments because it enables free 
movement between possible (mental) and actual (material) entities."7 
The 'ontological ambiguity' Gooding is referring to is between models, hermeneutic tools, ap-
proximations, descriptions, objects and so on, between the mentally real and the materially 
real. This adds to the account of experiment I offered earlier by making the relationship be-
1 , 6 Advancement 292-293. 
1 1 7 Gooding op cit 13. 
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tween material and human agency dynamic Let us suppose, for the moment, that this is cor-
rect The amount of ambiguity may vary greatly from experiment to experiment, for example, 
the more the scientist thinks he already knows, the lower the ambiguity in similar experimental 
situations where novelty is less significant—Gooding's talk of ambiguity applies to 'the con-
struction of new phenomenal possibilities.' and not all experiments are at this level of novelty 
For example, the genetic manipulation of traits in the manipulation of commercial crop 
yields"8 does not of necessity involve the use of phenomena and entities that are new to the 
experimenters, and trying out new toothpastes seems not to create anything. How ever, if once 
again we grant Gooding the philosophical context of his investigation, the philosophical inter-
est in experiments in science seems to rest on how they create new phenomena and novelly add 
to theoretical claims, even when the focus is chiefly on instruments and skills In any case, if 
these novel situations are not understood in art examination of experiments it would make any 
theory that could only account for non-novel experimentation seem suspect in the extreme. 
From Kitcher's work, a dynamic epistemology is now seen to provide a model with superiority 
over one that regards science as w orthy of discussion only in so far as the static status of sin-
gle theories are considered. 
The movement and development of science in theory and practice, while at the very least ap-
pearing to track something about the world, is exactly one of the reasons that make science 
philosophically interesting. In including the creation of new phenomena among the features of 
experiments, Gooding is more sensitive to variety of experiments than Hacking. Although, like 
Hacking, he also seems to suggest that without novelty nothing interesting takes place in ex-
periments. I have already suggested that there is an available definition of the necessary con-
ditions of experiments that does not include novelty. What I am taking from Gooding is the 
Described below, p 82 IT. 
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idea that whilst manipulating even known parts of the world to produce an effect, perhaps in 
checking something one is only a little unsure about, one need not be committed to the status 
of the entities involv ed For example, if there is an unpleasant squeak when I play a particular 
music C D . 1 may be unsure about whether the squeak is on the C D as a fault, a result of a 
fault in the equipment I am using to replay the music, or. more importantly part of the music 
that I am not hearing as such Sorting out what is going on max involve my being undecided 
about what is music and what is not for some time as I experiment with different aspects of 
the C D and the player, altering volume and frequency play-back settings, and so on 1 1 9 
The question is. how could Bayesianism possibly begin to say what is happening when scien-
tists shift and change their attitude, even fail to have an attitude, towards the things with which 
they are experimenting when they are in this state of ambiguity'7 To put this in the terms I 
have already used, how can a Bayesian probability measure be given to the revelation of ma-
terial agency when it is unclear what the relation between material and human agency is until 
after the fact? This is not a matter of there being different h\potheses that explain the phe-
nomena, that each is eliminated by careful consideration of the plausibility of each of these 
and the evidence collected to carry out this elimination. That requires the epistemic purity that 
Kitcher mentions In such experiments the Bayesian can be neither normative nor descriptive 
without doing damage to the history of what was actually done. Gooding states: 
... the self-evidence of the mental (conceptual) or material (real-world) status accorded to 
entities to which language refers is conferred through reconstructive processes. Judgements 
about the reality or necessity of an entity and about the directness of an observation are 
therefore retrospective.'2" 
1 1 9 On a related point, in the days of vinyl LPs. in the 1970s. there was much discussion amongst 
sound purists over the status of the 'hum' that resulted from the electronic recording equipment 
used, and which was subsequently transferred to the record Some took it to be part of the record-
ing itself, others as an additional interference to be filtered out 
1 2 0 Gooding op cit. 13 
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So for Gooding what is done, the procedures employed, the techniques and their rational 
placing in an account of the experiment, can only be comprehended after a reconstruction of 
the experiment through notebook entries, demonstrations to other scientists, the publishing of 
journal papers, conference reports, internet notices1" and so on Thus, if Bayesianism has an 
application in such experiments it cannot be to the raw experimental situation as Franklin 
claims it does—it is not about what experimenters do. nor could it be. 
The question is now whether Gooding is right to talk about this ambiguity of entities in ex-
periments that generate new phenomena. This also must wait until we have further evidence 
from an examination of the biological sciences and their application, where it will emerge 
there is in some cases more ambiguity than in the physical sciences However, it connects with 
difficulties in understanding what science and experimentation tells us about the metaphysics 
of the world and its relation to us as human subjects There is more than one way of doubting 
the status of objects. Gooding speaks of the combining of material and mental attitudes to en-
tities that embeds them in a community's multi-layered accounts of experimenting. There is a 
further ambiguity to consider, that of the status of the categories to which even common sense 
entities are ascribed. But at what level of our metaphysics do we have ambiguity? We need to 
be quite sure w hat we are unsure about, that is. about w hat features of the world we are tak-
ing as providing the weak, minimal background to our being able to perform any experiment 
without complete blindness. I need to say much more on what kind of metaphysical order sci-
ence works with before this can be resolved. 
1 2 1 Gooding docs not note the growing importance of the Internet to the dissemination of information 
amongst the scientific academic community—this is another site for the reconstruction of experi-
ments. See. for example http://olis.msfc nasa.gov/fiml. iml Use html; 
http://wwvl cem.ch/CERN/cxperiments html: http://ww\vjmstec go jp/index-e html. 
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v U n i f i c a t i o n : i n t r o d u c i n g the d e b a t e 
The Bayesians construct epistemologics that allow parts of Legend (rational justification) to 
re-enter into discussions of science and a naturalised account of science practice Generally 
they are looking for (at least) a minimal unity in that method so that science can be taken as a 
whole when considered as an epistemically significant (or superior) part of our culture. I 
would now like to introduce the second theme of this thesis, that of disunity. 
The twentieth century has seen various attempts to provide a unified methodological account 
of science in much greater detail. Popper s long term programme was such an attempt. I shall 
not re-analyse the problems that falsificationism still faces However, unity of methodology 
across the fields of science (across the sciences) is only one form of unity. Metaphysical unity, 
that is, a units of the kinds of things science investigates and supposedly reveals is a presup-
position of much contemporary philosophy of science. It is still a common feature despite the 
fragmentation of the field into problems arising from specific matters in each of the special 
sciences. The most obvious growth in these areas is in philosophy of physics and philosophy 
of biology . 1 " 
In The Disorder of Things Dupre has argued against such unity. He uses a combination of 
metaphysical analysis and theoretical evidence from biology and psychology to dismantle the 
notion of a cosmic order. In terms of understanding the rational practice of science his aim is 
not entirely different from Kitcher's: he believes that: 
, 2 : For interesting, recent examples see the following books, both published in the same Dimensions 
of Philosophy Scries' (general cds Norman Daniels and Keilh Lehrcr). Sklar. L. (1992) Philoso-
phy of Physics: Sober. E. (1993) Philosophy of Biology: both Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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"good" science involves inseparable elements of the epistemically good and the socio-
political^ good My overall thesis is that there is a lot of good science and a lot of bad. 
Neither the uniform reduction of science to the noncpistemic, nor the concession of all 
epistcmic matters to those who choose to call themselves scientists, can adequately pursue 
this insight ! "3 
It should be noted that Kitcher firmly believes that there is a way in which science can be uni-
fied, that is through explanation.1:4 Indeed Kitcher has often argued for the view that progress 
can be characterised by an increase in the scope of scientific explanations 1 2 5 As Dupre points 
out, whatever attraction this theory has at a local level, there is not of necessity an extension to 
the global unification of all the sciences: 
Progress in ... biology could go on indefinitely instantiated by a sequence of theories able 
to explain ever more biological facts, but would do so by achieving ever-more-powerful un-
derstandings of the same domain of phenomena. Kitcher's argument implies that / / a theory 
were introduced that explained in approximately the same way ... a large range of both 
chemical and biological phenomena, it would be accepted over a theory that explained only 
biological phenomena But there is no reason to believe that such theories are generally 
available, and much reason to doubt it. 1 : 6 
Telling the good from the bad is going to be aided by precisely the kind of framework for as-
sessment of practice I have been considering here. But there seems to be only a minimal notion 
of experimentation available So what is the relationship between metaphysical unity and 
methodological (experimental) unity ? To answer this question Dupre's notion of disunity will 
have to be unpacked carefully since it is an extended argument about metaphysical disunity 
and is, I believe, a persuasive one. Some preliminary thoughts may help to guide this analysis. 
123 Disorder 13. 
1 : 4 For discussion of the relationship between explanation and other issues raised here see p. 89 ff., 
below. 
1 : 5 See. for example. Kitcher. P. (1981) Explanatory Unification' Philosophy of Science 48. 507-
531. 
126 Disorder 228. 
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As noted earlier, 'intervention' does not mean the same as experiment," it has a wider appli-
cation Now Hacking thinks that intervention and manipulation can be part of a theory about 
what the world contains, it can be part of defence of realism But realism about what? If the 
world consists of different sorts of things does intervention vary, and in what ways 9 But in 
completing such an investigation we will need to bear in mind that it is possible to do things to 
something without being immediately required to specify what it is one is manipulating. To 
put this less clumsily, intervention can take place in an ambiguous context, as we have noted. 
Part of the commitment to the nature of the thing comes exactly from w hat can be done to the 
thing, entity, or object without plumping' for the right definition There is no predominance of 
theory over practice, or practice over theory—the two are defined and changed together. This 
is the 'ambiguity" of Gooding's epistemology What I have not yet done is say how 'deep' this 
ambiguity can be before we lose any sense of coherence in the analysis of experiment given. 
Consider, for a moment, how we investigate things that we know very little about. Perform a 
thought experiment.127 In the near future NASA sends astronauts back to the Moon. On the 
Moon an object is discovered that is not a naturally occurring lunar feature nor something left 
by the original Apollo human visitors, and which has a complexity and appearance that sug-
gests it cannot be given a simple physio-chemical explanation 1 : 8 How would we try to work 
out what it i s 9 We observe it, measure it, weigh it. turn it round, poke it, probe it, expose it to 
different environments, note its colour, its texture, its composition and structure, ... and at the 
same time wonder whether it is an artefact, a life-form, a fossil, or a weapon, a joke, a toy, a 
sculpture, a scientific instrument ... The theories are tested, but the general investigations are 
1 : 7 Although I do not address thought experiments in this thesis in order to keep the range of topics 
covered at least minimally manageable. I have attempted to keep them in mind in all my discus-
sion of experiments. 
1 : 8 If this example is little too rich, consider a personal item, a watch for example, on an open moor 
where there should be none . 
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not necessarily governed by these theories, it seems we would just do things to the object to 
see what happens I would like to suggest however, that although the theories and the inter-
ventions and engagement with the object evolve in a loose and ambiguous way, we cannot 
really just do anything without some metaphysical commitment to the object's status. AH the 
suggested descriptions above are for it being a singular, individual object. It may equally well 
be a city or a whole civilisation, and I submit, it would not be discovered to be such without a 
prior metaphy sical commitment to its being a composite object that is more than the sum of its 
parts. Indeed, would we really just do things in the same way if we thought it may be alive, as 
when we believed it to be inanimate9 
The point is that although talk of agency and ambiguity help to make some sense of interven-
tion in experiments, they need to be properly analy sed to do any work. The whole issue is tied 
in with how we might explicate experimental realism, for Hacking assumes that kinds of 
things are not manipulable at a l l . 1 2 9 
It is for this reason that I am focusing on biology for my own approach Looking at a different 
science than the usual problems in phy sics, especially a science for which arguments support-
ing an ontological break with physics are not too hard to find, helps to clarify our understand-
ing of practice at the experimental level and the supposed epistemological and metaphysical 
consequences claimed for experiments. Evolution through natural selection reveals a biologi-
cal world of flux and change, and we shall have to look at the ambiguity of the kinds of the 
biological world. Once disunity of order at the metaphy sical lev el is introduced, it may become 
impossible to support order in the methods used to experiment, because there is no obvious 
block to the thought that some kinds of things might be 'quirky* enough to require different or 
1 : 9 In Chapter 4 I discuss some important reasons for doubting this thesis, and the whole of Hack-
ing's approach to experimental realism, except in so far as it highlights the doing' aspect of sci-
ence and the epistcmic role for action in science Let us note, for now that only the entities of theo-
retical physics are covered by his theory as it stands 
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special treatment.'30 The elimination of psychologically influential factors in experiments us-
ing sensitive laboratory rats need be nothing like the elimination of factors influencing a sensi-
tive mass spectrometer.'31 
Dupre also sees a direct relationship between method and metaphysics in a wider context; 
hence he states: 
Since science does, presumably, presuppose some kind of pre-existing order in the phenom-
ena it attempts to describe, limits to prevalence of order may entail limits to the applicability 
of science. Some areas of science may fail because the subject matter is inhospitable to sci-
entific methods.13" 
What is presupposed here is that the methods of science define what are to be its limits. This 
is coherent with the evidence so far examined: the emergence of possibly more than one ac-
count of experimental method (or experimental method with no single list of sufficient fea-
tures) and the generation of scientific methods does not damage the idea that these methods, 
although disjointed, can be justified rationally in context to be appropriate for investigation of 
a part of the w orld, in the w ay that common sense, 
Cartwright has questioned whether there needs to be a complete picture of the physical world cov-
ered by laws: 'Covering-law theorists tend to think that nature is well-regulated; in the extreme, 
that there is a law to cover every case I do not I imagine that natural objects are much like people 
in societies Their behaviour is constrained by some specific laws and by a handful of general 
principles, but it is not determined in detail, even statistically. What happens on most occasions is 
dictated by no law at all This is not a metaphysical picture that I urge My claim is that this pic-
ture is as plausible as the alternative. God may have written just a few laws and grown tired. We 
do not know whether we are in a tidy universe or an untidy one. Whichever universe we are in, the 
ordinary commonplace activity of giving explanations ought to make sense ' Cartwright (1983) op 
cit. 49. This idea can be extended, the untidiness may apply to the kinds of things there are as 
well, categories may not stack neatly into law abiding hierarchies as philosophy of science sup-
poses Things arc still real and explanation is still possible. 
1 3 1 I can find no research involving such a comparative study. 
I 3 : Disorder 11. 
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... imposes order on the buzzing, blooming confusion of phenomena not by unifying them 
under a relatively simple structure of fundamental concepts, but by a piecemeal extension of 
knowledge.'33 
But it does not follow that this is going to be the only possible conclusion. As yet, the bones of 
this argument require more flesh, although for the moment only a sketch will be given. Not 
only is Dupre's work called into question, but the exact relationship between (scientific) inter-
vention, in the form of experiment, and realism needs to be analysed further An outline of 
Dupre's ideas first. 
1 Science and (dis)unity, T h e D i s o r d e r of T h i n g s 
Dupre's thesis is this: 
... the disunity of science is not merely an unfortunate consequence of our limited compu-
tational or other cognitive capacities, but rather reflects accurately the underlying ontologi-
cal complexity of the world, the disorder of things.'34 
The conception of an ordered nature and a unified science belong naturally together. If there 
is some ultimate and unique order underlying the apparent diversity and disorder of nature, 
then the point of science should be to tell the one story that expresses this order. If ... we 
reject the assumption of any such systematic and universal underlying truth, not only should 
we give up the specific version expressed by contemporary materialism or physicalism, but 
the motivation for any unified account of science becomes questionable.'35 
The thesis breaks down into three parts concerning essentialism, reductionism and determin-
ism, respectively. In describing the status of natural kinds and essentialism in science, Dupre 
claims that there is no requirement that we see the things that science describes as belonging to 
only single kinds that define the essence of that thing He does not deny the existence of natu-
ral kinds, only that they have an order to them that categorises the world neatly for (and by) 
ibid 19. 
ibid. 7. 
ibid. 221. 
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science into one scheme His argument draws heavily on biology and ecology to show that 
there may be good grounds for classify ing particular organisms, processes and populations in 
a number of different ways. He argues that there are many way s of classify ing the (biological) 
world that can be shown to have validity, and to be real "And that these may often cross-
classify one another in infinitely complex ways. ' 1 3 6 This picture of a promiscuous realism' 
(Dupre's label for his position) of natural kinds is supported by . and supports his second the-
sis that inter-theoretical reductionism in science is untenable No strategy can be constructed 
to reduce the terms of one field of science to a more fundamental one because of the plurality 
of the entities at each supposed level. He shows how the reductionist project fails in genetics, 
ecology and physicalistic theories of the mental. This anti-reductionism depends on a particu-
lar view on determinism and causality in which he insists on a rejection of the notion of causal 
completeness and a specific understanding of probabilistic causality Much of his argumenta-
tion draws heavily on biology, because, as he says: 
Biology is surely the science that addresses much of what is of greatest concern to us bio-
logical beings, and if it cannot serve as a paradigm for science, then science is a far less in-
teresting undertaking than is generally supposed.'3 
Even if this is granted, his view of biology could seem a restricted one The reliance on dis-
crepancies in taxonomic practice and common sense that is the major source of support for the 
first part of his argument where taxonomy is made to appear a central task for biology, pres-
ents a picture of biology that is at odds with other contemporary philosophical accounts.1 3 8 
However, if these problems of evidence are solvable, and (at least as far as the theory of natu-
ral kinds and reductionism is concerned) I believe they are. then we are left with the begin-
136 ibid. 18. 
137 ibid. 1. 
1 3 8 See. for example. Rosenberg. A. (1985) The Structure of Biological Science Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press. 
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nings of a theory from science and philosophy that undermines the supposed ontology of much 
philosophy of science I say the beginnings of a theory because there are gaps in Dupre's ar-
gument that can only be filled by exploring further some of the consequences of this disunity 
This examination of biology and experiments will go some way to completing the picture and 
gives additional support to some of Dupre 's claims. 
2 Metaphysics and method, metaphysics and epistemology, 
scientific realism 
Dupre calls himself a realist. By which he means that he 
. .. can see no possible reason why commitment to many overlapping kinds of things should 
threaten the reality of any of them. A certain entity might be a real w hale, a real mammal, a 
real top predator in the food chain, and even a real fish 1 do not see why realism should 
have any tendency to cramp one's ontological sty le 1 3 9 
This definition only goes so far. What he says I take to be correct, but we learn nothing about 
what sort of realism he is articulating. This becomes clearer when we also consider thoughts 
about the nature of the relationship between realism and our ability to make things up with 
descriptions (as opposed to just discovering those things).'*' He does make a passing approv-
ing reference to Hacking's entity realism in experiments, which ties some of what he says 
about ontology to Hacking's discussion on experiments and realism. However, I suspect that 
this is a commitment only to the notion of manipulation described here. Significantly, at the 
point where ontology meets methodology in the sketch that has been presented here, that is, 
over the nature of scientific realism, there is extreme difficulty in extracting a clear under-
standing of realism This is the point where the wondering about metaphy sical disunity can 
play a role in understanding methodological disunity. because it is the kinds of things that are 
' 3 9 Disorder 262. 
1 4 0 Susan Haack has identified a number of attitudes to scientific realism, a number of different real-
isms (Haack. S. (1987) '"'Realism'" Sythnese 73. 275-299). Hacking's distinction between realism 
about theories and realism about entities is not discussed 
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taken to exist and present resistance' to our activities in informative ways that will, philo-
sophically speaking, give us the starting point for saying what it is we do to find in that resis-
tance and interpret it One way of taking this point of view seriously is just to say that this 
kind of scientific realism is derived from the general metaphysical realist approach that as-
sumes a priority for the world, that is ontology, over other issues of semantics or epistemol-
ogy. This does not require an aphoristic first philosophy, or foundationalism. Michael Devitt 
describes the objective existence of entities so: 
To say that an object has objective existence is not to say that it is unknowable. It is to say 
that is not constituted by our know ledge, by our epistemic values, by our capacity to refer to 
it, by the sy nthesizing power of the mind, by our imposition of concepts, theories or lan-
guages. 
Now obviously Hacking's position is not much like this, and Gooding looks not like a realist 
at all by these lights. Pickering has claimed that considerations of practice resolve these old 
questions; he says: 
There is no mystery of empirical access, to put it another way—facts and conceptualizations 
(and many other elements of scientific culture) are built together along the lines Gooding 
and Hacking lay out—and no special scientific realism is needed to explain it. ... the ex-
amination of scientific practice promises to undermine entrenched positions—here realist 
and antirealist alike—in the philosophy of science-as-knowledge.142 
But can this be correct? Certainly there is a sense in which the position of the scientific realist 
as simple ontological realist becomes difficult to maintain without damage from analyses 
containing slogans like ; i f you can spray them then they are real" and 'natural phenomena are 
bounded by human activity,' but it is not obvious that other forms of the realist debate are 
dispensed with. Again, these are issues we will return to as the discussion proceeds. 
1 4 1 Devitt. M. (1991) Realism and Truth Oxford: Blackwell. 15. 
U 2 Pickering. A. (cd.)(I992) Science as Practice and Culture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
11 
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In Realism Rescued Aronson. Harre and Cornell Way have begun a reconstruction of scien-
tific realism that criticises the simple ontological theories.'43 They claim that taking on board 
analysis of practice can actually help revive an epistemic form of scientific realism. I shall 
return to a couple of their less dubious insights right at the end of the next chapter. 
vi I n t e r l u d e 
We have a lot of questions then. So far I have presented a series of linked sketches about ex-
periments, philosophy of experiments and philosophy of science These have been selective 
and of necessity somewhat brief. In summary: 
• Experiments are an essential component of many sciences To date, however, there has 
been a lack of clarity about the nature of experimentation in general. I argued that while 
the idea of manipulation to uncover some "hidden" aspect of the material agency of the 
realm of enquiry is a central concept in experiments, it becomes a matter of general and 
deep philosophical concern to state the relationship between our being material beings able 
to manipulate the world in certain ways and our using that for epistemological purposes. I 
suggested that there are no sufficient epistemic conditions to specify what experiments are 
beyond this observation. 
• From an initial analysis Hacking's notion of experiment was seen to be flawed since it 
placed too great an emphasis on the creation of new phenomena, which need not be part of 
a general strategy of manipulation, even in a scientific context, and appears to lack wider 
application beyond theoretical physics However. Hacking's highlighting of the epistemic 
value of intervention is the basis of the current approach. Hacking's entity realism sup-
M 3 Aronson. J. L . . Harre. R. and Cornell Way. E (1994) Realism Rescued London: Duckworth. 
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poses that it is clear how we draw a distinction between theory and practice Only entities 
are proved to be real by experiments. Again, this poses great difficulties in spelling out 
what kinds of things can be seen to be real in this was , since some entities could be thor-
oughly embedded in theoretical descriptions of the world and be used in experiments. 
It was suggested the current concerns for experimentation are not necessarily because of 
the expansion of research into the metaphysics and epistemology of science, but a product 
of a change in philosophical perspectives. One such change is reflected in Kitcher's dy-
namic approach to the epistemoiogy of science However, combining dynamism with the 
idea that scientific experimenters might not decide the status of the things they are investi-
gating until after the experiment is completed and recorded, leaves us with some difficulties 
with the notion that something must be taken to be the metaphysical basis for asking 
"questions of nature" in the first place. This seems true even when the traditional idea of 
having a fixed theory to test is rejected. This becomes especially troublesome when taken 
with the suggestion that there may be no one privileged ontology, but many well-founded 
ones in different scientific disciplines. 
Sociological, historical and Bayesian perspectives are inadequate for understanding ex-
periment alone. SSK lacks any mechanism for assessing the epistemic component of any 
experiment (or theory). Bayesianism. formal problems aside, is inflexible and inappropriate 
to many contexts of experimentation 
The disunity of science can be understood to reflect a disunity in the world. There is a 
natural sense in which one would expect there to be an epistemic and methodological out-
come from this, but resolution of this issue requires a better understanding of the kind of 
realism extractable from science practice. 
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» Work to date on experimentation and the philosophical lessons that can be learned from 
such work has concentrated, almost exclusively, on the physical sciences, and that this is a 
serious problem in trying to resolve the problems encountered. 
v i i E x a m p l e s 
Having looked at general features of experiments and the philosophical issues that they can 
reveal, it is now time to turn to look at experimentation in biology specifically. In this section I 
shall look at a series of contemporary case studies in a range of biological fields They will 
help to draw out some similarities and differences between the phy sical and biological sci-
ences 
Biology has a tradition of 'great' experiments that can compete with the history of physics' 
own famous practical investigations and demonstrations Certain experiments stand out for 
their contribution to biological knowledge—Mendel's peas are perhaps the most discussed 
vegetables in modern history . Harre's Great Scientific Experiments^ contains accounts of 
seven experiments that have direct bearing on biology and the related fields of medicine, psy-
chology and physiology including Stephen Hales' investigation of the circulation of plant sap, 
William Beaumont's grizzly observations on the digestion of food substances in the stomach 
of an injured army porter, and Pasteur's work on vaccines. Harre uses these to support some 
general claims, picking out various uses of experiments in the context of discussing scientific 
method. There can be no doubt that if we abstract the method of any tw o practical procedures 
far enough we could pick out similarities of conduct and form something I have already done, 
of course. Care must be taken in ensuring that the similarities that are extracted by such a 
1 A A Harre. R. (1983a) Great Scientific Experiments: Twenty Experiments that Changed our View of 
the World Oxford: Oxford Univ ersity Press 
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method are significant enough to carry the philosophical load that is placed on them, and it is 
not clear that uses of experiment that Harre discusses constitute a complete method at all 
Certainly they could not give us a method that is susceptible to change, progress and develop-
ment since he draws on experiments from Aristotle to Otto Stem in the 1920's. More work is 
required to complete the project of extracting a binding method from experiments as Harre 
presents them, even when other general observations about inductivism and realism are added. 
What we need to ask is: to what extent do experiments in biology share the epistemological 
aims and consequences of the phy sical sciences and w hat does this tell us about the status of 
biological knowledge'' To this end I would like to look at three experimental investigations in 
contemporary biology to avoid accusations of anachronism. The first, specific uses of X-ray 
microanalysis, has many similarities with the H E P experiments discussed with reference to 
Franklin's Bayesianism1 J 5 and highlights how biology in a modem context certainly can in-
volve the use of complex, difficult (and expensive) apparatus, and the manipulation of unob-
servable entities. The second addresses some of the issues I later discuss in connection with 
Foucault and realism 1 4 6—I shall look at recent work on the genetic factors involved in human 
sexuality, specifically human sexual orientation Finally , I shall turn to the work on plant 
breeding and selection where observable and unobservable traits have been manipulated and 
used, but without allowing us to come to the conclusions that Hacking draws about realism. 
See p. 57 (T. 
Chapter 3 below 
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1 Experimental apparatus and techniques: X-ray Microanalysis147 
The basic technique for determining the dispersion of diffusible ions and the elemental com-
position of specimens with electron probe X-ray microanalysis was invented in 1951 1 4 8 and 
has been used in the biological sciences for approximately thirty years In 1988 the Biological 
X-ray Microanalysis group was founded in Britain so that techniques and innovations could 
be more formally compared and shared 
There is considerable interest in the application of X-ray microanalysis to the study of bio-
logical specimens since this is one of the few techniques w hich allows the study of diffusible 
elements at a subcellular level.'49 
There have been main developments in the equipment involved in the technique, which I shall 
outline below, but since, 
[bjiological specimens are many and varied with their own special problems for quantifica-
tion ... perhaps the second most important development in X-ray microanalysis for biolo-
gists has been the commercial availability of software for carry ing out quantitative rou-
tines.150 
A great deal of development of the technique in terms of the mathematical analysis behind 
such software was carried out by T. A. Hall who has also recorded the history of the uses of 
X-ray microanalysis.151 which I shall not cover here. 
All references in this section are to X-ray Microanalysis in Biology: Experimental Techniques 
and Applications [(1993) eds. Sigee. D., Morgan. A. J., Summer, A. T and Warley, A. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press) unless otherwise stated. Individual papers will be referred to 
directly with page references to the collection with the abbreviation XRMB. 
M 8 Castaing. R. and Guinier, A. (1949) "Application des Sondes Electroniques a 1*Analyse Metal-
lagraphique' in Proceeding of the I" International Conference in Electron Xlicroscopv Delft. 60-
3. 
M 9 Warley. A (1993) Quantitativ e X-ray microanalysis of thin sections in biology : appraisal and 
interpretation of results' XRMB 47 
]-('XR\/B 1 
1 5 1 Hall. T. A (1986) The History and Current Status of biological Electron-probe X-ray Micro-
analysis Micron andMicroscopia Acta 17. 91-100. 
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I wish to draw the attention of the reader to this variety of experimentation in biology for a 
number of reasons In the introduction to Section A of XRMB. "Detection and Quantification 
of X-rays." the editors note: 
The living biological specimen typically consists largely of water, which needs to be re-
moved or stabilised before examination and analysis in the electron microscope can take 
place This removal of water and/or its replacement by resin can lead to some uncertainties 
in the interpretation of data. It is. essential that all results are viewed w ith a cautious eye.1 5 2 
Here in the heart of biological research we have the same philosophical problems faced by the 
physicists working on the problem of parity in HEP that Franklin discusses, viz. the rational 
interpretation of data from complex procedures using unobservables. the elimination of ran-
dom fluctuations and artefacts, and the degree of acceptability for the interpretation of data. 
Furthermore, we find the kind of uses and manipulations that Hacking discusses, although the 
reality of, say, potassium ions is not called into question in the same way that the entities of 
H E P are. 
X-ray microanalysis is basically a form of electron microscopy using highly sensitive (and 
specifically tuned) equipment based on the use of x-ray penetration of the subject matter A 
vast array of variable factors have to be manipulated and controlled. For example, organic 
tissues can potentially suffer damage under x-ray bombardment. Consequently the specimens 
used have to be fixed and prepared in a similarly tight range of controlled method. These in-
clude freeze-drying and resin embedding along with the use of a host of cryogenic techniques. 
So there have to be checks not only on the radiation damage from the microscope itself, but 
also on the preparation techniques b 3 The use of any form of x-ray analysis or electron prob-
ing includes a number of skills and practical decisions to maximise the expected outcome. In 
>52XH\fB 1. 
I ? 3 Zglinicki. T. von (1993) Radiation damage and low temperature X-ray microanalvsis' XRMB 
117-13.1. 
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the following passage the author is clearly outlining practical adaptations based on decisions 
taken in an experimental context exactly as in HEP experiments: 
There are applications in which the rapidity of sample preparation by the frozen-hydrated 
bulk technique outweighs the limited resolution Ho\ve\er. there are many cases where 
quantification at high resolution is required. The answer is to use a transmission microscope 
in which the beam passes through a section whose thickness can be determined. Thin sec-
tions can. however, only be prepared from resin embedded plant material and usefully ana-
lysed provided care has been taken to preserve the mineral content of cells: this can be 
achieved by freeze-substitution The freeze-substitution procedure, together with dry section-
ing, has been showii to be a satisfactory method of cell preparation in that there is little re-
location of ionic solutes during preparation procedure ' M 
What I think is clear is that, as already suggested, there are no grounds for not applying what-
ever analyses are needed to track the rational decision procedures involved tn HEP experi-
ments to biological experiments of this sort. The appropriateness of the same kind of analysis 
demonstrates that there are techniques that we employ for gaining knowledge that are not lim-
ited by the sorts of things under investigation. In cases where we are using such complex set-
tings for our empirical enquiries we are attempting to get the experimental set-up as mecha-
nistic and machine-like as possible.'"" At the level of method this tells us little about the meta-
physical assumptions we need to make about the sorts of things investigated. More will need 
to be said about this later.1"6 
2 Plants Under Stress 
A different sort of manipulation of organisms can be found in the range of breeding experi-
ments carried out on plant populations Here there are a large number of unknown and uncon-
Hajibagheri. M. A. (1993) Ion localisation in plant cells using the combined techniques of freeze-
substitution and X-ray microanalysis' Xfli/B 227 
s Perhaps, simply, because the specimens are all dead and the technique is one for the measurement 
of fixed properties. 
5 See, pp 153ff . 1901T and 202IT 
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trolled factors. For example, in a paper discussing how plants are bred for drought resistance 
we find that complex statistical models have traditionally been used to determine the best 
condition in which to test the crops and the yields expected. 
The intricate statistical and biometrical designs necessary for this approach are required for 
two reasons. First, the inheritance of yield, which is the major selection criterion in such 
programmes, is complex' as it is determined by a multitude of physiological, biochemical 
and metabolic processes, whose genetics are largely unknown. Even their exact association 
with plant productivity is unclear. Secondly, the various environments under which geno-
types are tested and under which stability is measured are largely undefined in the biological 
sense.15 
Notice the use of terms and properties that are specifically biological such as 'yield,' 
'inheritance' and 'genotype." The question of whether such properties and terms can be re-
duced to purely physical terms will be discussed in the next chapter. Blum goes on to suggest 
that in determining the resistance of plants to stress, yield is an inefficient criterion. He argues 
that it is better to measure certain physiological factors and use them in combination with 
yield measurements. 
Although drought-resistant varieties have been developed by the use of empirical breeding 
methods that employ yield as a selection index, these methods are too costly and require a 
long period of testing and evaluation. ... Therefore breeding for drought resistance must de-
part from the use of yield as the exclusive selection index A direct reference to some 
physiological attributes in the selection for drought resistance would allow us to address the 
underlying factors of stability, to the same extent that selection for. say, disease resistance 
addresses the specific plant interactions with the pathogen rather than yield. 1 5 8 
In other words, because the yield of a crop is not a good measure of resistance to damage 
during drought nor an adequate indicator of recovery, physiological features that have impact 
1 5 Blum, A. (1989) Breeding methods for drought resistance' in Jones. H G., Flowers. T J. and 
Jones. M. B. Plants Under Stress Society for Experimental Biology . Seminar Series 39. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press. 198 
159 ibid 199. 
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on water systems in the plants must also be considered and selected for by the breeder. We see 
that this means that the breeder must pick out plants and select on the grounds of root growth 
rates and root dispersion in the ground, osmoregulation processes in cells, canopy temperature 
and leaf rolling. Magnesium chlorate is used in a 4% solution as a desiccant to simulate 
drought condition for crops during selection experiments. The details are not important to the 
point I w ish to make 
In cases like these, what is being' manipulated in the experimental context is not individual 
plants, but particular properties of generations of plants—even though selection is of indi-
viduals. Now. if Hacking's argument for experimental realism has any bite we need to see 
whether it can include cases where we manipulate and use properties as well as entities.159 
While selecting for good root growth rates, for example, the breeder could use the property 
'has new root growth rate greater than n mm/day " This is used in the experiment to under-
stand the property of drought resistance Indeed, the argument can be pushed further Drought 
resistance is used by breeders to develop new varieties of crops, w hich are themselves manipu-
lated for other purposes to produce further new varieties. Does this then give us an experimen-
tal proof of the reality of these crop varieties as kinds'1'6 0 
This last question might seem easy to answer in the affirmative. But it presents us with a 
problem in drawing lines between those kinds which are real, those we construct and are real, 
and those we construct and are not real. If we take the above example as a demonstration of 
the construction of kinds because we can construct a model of the properties of varieties of 
crops under different conditions and test it. what are we to make of the search for a biological 
basis for homosexuality in humans9 Could a testable model demonstrate the existence of gay 
1 5 9 If it cannot, then we need some good criteria for the scope of the realism he advocates. 
1 6 0 Again. I ask for the reader's patience In Chapter 4 I shall address how best to deal with Hack-
ing's thinking here. 
84 
Experiments 
people per se? I shall now outline recent research in the attempts to do just that, in this case 
the search for hereditary factors and the hunt for a "gay gene." 
3 Gay genes 
On 16th July 1993 Science published an article titled 'A Linkage Between DNA Markers on 
the X Chromosome and Male Sexual Orientation.'161 which presented evidence intended to 
show that a genetic marker labelled Xq28 was statistically similar in gay men compared with 
other straight male relations. Xq28 is a region of the X chromosome The study that was con-
ducted was fairly simple A survey was used to determine the prevalence of homosexuality in 
families where there was a living gay male. As Hamer and Copcland put it: 
We simply traced back the lineages of gay men. looking for signs of homosexuality in all the 
twigs and branches of their family trees. We drew orchards of these tress, going back as far 
as anyone could remember and stretching as wide as possible to include second cousins and 
great uncles.162 
Discovering 'far more gays on the mother s side of the families' 1 6 3 suggested to the experi-
menters that there is a sex linked genetic factor tied to the X chromosome. So they conducted 
a study involving gay brothers only and discovered that indeed there was a significant correla-
tion between the similarity of their Xq28 regions. I do not w ant to trace the whole political and 
social issues that are involved in even needing to look for such a genotypic trait And, again, I 
do not want to explore all the details of the experiment I call this an experiment because there 
were a number of factors in the model that was used to find the "gene" that had to be changed 
and manipulated That is, although people themselves were not manipulated, a whole series of 
1 6 1 Hamcr. D. H , Hu. S.. Magnuson. V. L . Hu. N and Patteratucci, A M. L. (1993) 'A linkage be-
tween DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and Male Sexual Orientation' Science vol. 261. 321-
327. 
I 6 : Hamer. D. and Copcland. P. (1994) The Science of Desire: The Search for the Gay Gene and the 
Biology of Behaviour New York: Simon and Schuster. 20. 
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self-reported properties had to be modelled and the model adjusted to construct the category of 
'gay male' with a profile of expected properties 1 6 4 To put this crudely, this kind of thing was 
then used to demonstrate the correct reading of a further measurement—the correlation of 
Xq28 in brothers falling under the same category 
To restate the issue 1 am try ing to get. the range of experimental contexts in the biological sci-
ences is vast. In many cases we can find obvious similarities between experiments in the 
physical sciences (x-ray microanalysis) show ing the underlying epistemic virtue of experimen-
tation in science. But we can also find experiments that create entities and kinds of entities that 
undermine a simple reading of realism from experiments Indeed as we approach' the human 
sciences and human concerns all sorts of other issues come into play, and dealing with these 
has had a past tendency to threaten the very rational basis of science. 
In Chapter 4 we shall see how Hacking has attempted to deal w ith these kinds of problems 
For now thev remain unresolved. 
The survey questions included: Have you ever been sexually abused9' and 'Have you ever had a 
problem w ith drug use0' the relevance of which I find incomprehensible 
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June rain drips from leaves— 
Shake the branches and create 
Flying water worlds 
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3 The M e t a p h y s i c s of a 
P l u r a l i s t B io logy 
[T]he realist can quite coherently accept the pluralist conception of scientific categories 
even within a single scientific discipline ... the realist could acknowledge that for every 
particular scientific program there is an infinite plurality of appropriate conceptual 
schemes that fit the causal structure of the world equally well and between which the 
choice is arbitrary.]6> 
he supposition that every thing is real, or unreal in some way is superficially attrac-
tive as a fundamental belief in this regard: one does not have to say how it is one 
can tell what is real, or unreal, or state simply which bits are real and which bits are not. 
The history of philosophy is littered with abandoned forms of this doctrine There is 
something unsatisfactory in any absolute theory that ascribes the same general metaphysi-
cal status to Prospero, The Tempest, the copy of the complete w orks of Shakespeare on my 
desk, the theatre in which I saw the play, the light that lit the stage, the genetic history of 
the actors, and the storm that raged outside The nature of the world, its status, structure 
and internal coherence is the oldest of philosophical problems Questions about how par-
ticular parts of our contemporary knowledge and practice are to be understood with regard 
to claims about the real world are manifestations of one of the oldest mysteries, what is 
there? 1 6 6 But as James notes, 'impressionistic philosophizing, like impressionistic watch-
making or land-surveying, is intolerable to experts."'67 
1 6 5 Boyd. R. (1990) Realism, conventionality and "realism about'" in Boolos. G (ed.)(1990) 
Feshschrift for Hilary Putnam Cambridge: Cambridge Univ ersity Press. 189-90. 
1 6 6 It seems to me in moments of reflection that there is really only one mystery: why there is 
anything at all. Worries about consciousness, theoretical scientific entities, moral values and 
i I n t r o d u c t i o n 
T 
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Pluralism about the kinds of things there are, how they might be related and how they in-
teract is less attractive because it is untidy and can also requires the rejection of founda-
tionalism and certainty One can never be sure that everything has been included, or that 
this is best way to describe the nature of things—this is how it should be We are not gods 
In this chapter I shall set out an account of only one way that we understand ourselves and 
our relationship to the rest of the natural world: the beginning of how we understand our-
selves as biological beings. 
The study of life and its environment has reached a turning point, a transmutation that is 
the product of no single theory or individual scientist s work, but the splicing together of 
many fields of enquiry . New Age musings about a technologically informed, ecologically 
sensitive future where the human spirit finally converges with the Earth, (with Nature, with 
the goddess'7) after millennia adrift are dim metaphorical reflections of emerging biological 
and environmental theories; theories that have wide ranging conceptual and philosophical, 
consequences.168 Big changes in grand schemes almost alway s have unforeseen fall-out. 
1 Explanation 
Let us for the moment accept that the world has some kind of thought-and-word independ-
ent structure, and that, in theory at least, we can conceive of ways of generating descrip-
tions of what that world is like—even while we also accept the potential for failure in all 
the like (choose your favourite troublesome category) are only forms of this question. Philoso-
phy can clarify the question and also aid in the unending pursuit to solve the puzzle; sometimes 
it seems closer to the heart of the solution than at other times, but the discipline of philosophy 
always pushes me on by presenting fresh ways of thinking about this mystery . 
' James. W. (1909M Pluralistic Universe New York: Longmans. Green and Co , 52. 
8 For one such New Age claim about the ability of the biosphere to reproduce through technol-
ogy see Sagan. D. (1990) Biospheres: The Metamorphosis of Planet Earth Harmondsworth: 
Penguin. Arkana. I am intrigued by Sagan's argument and do not want to dismiss all ideas that 
employ an explicitly metaphorical mode of expression—analytic philosophy's metaphors are 
just better hidden 
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our current best theories.169 Should we envisage that the best explanation of any event or 
phenomenon in our limited experience of the universe at any particular time is one that 
'fits' that event into an expanding, single and unified description, model or theory? Sup-
posing 1 want to understand why my cat suckles her live-born young whereas this fly lays 
eggs and abandons them Of little value is a total theory with no discrimination between its 
parts—God made things that way But the entirely specific accounts of the individual life 
histories of my cat and the fly tell me nothing if they make no attempt to fit the individuals 
into some larger picture of the kinds of things they each are. An account of the evolution-
ary history of mammals and insects as a whole would seem better Better still would be a 
theory that could show how these kinds evolved from common ancestors that themselves 
shared a history , taken together with a rigorous presentation of the mechanism(s) behind 
natural selection and the accidental environmental changes in the history of Earth, and so 
on. Unfortunately at this level of explanation there are of course all sorts of debates about 
how much a role adaptation has to play in determining the cat s and the fly's current forms 
and behaviour. A clear understanding of what life is. and what the relationship between 
biology and chemistry might be. then seems an added bonus. And yet how exactly would 
this level of general abstraction contribute to the resolution of my original concern and cu-
riosity? 
It would seem that there is an intimate relationship between explanation, realism, plural-
ism/unification and reductionism. A thorough-going scientific realism about the possibility 
of many correct and diverse ontological schemes describing the contents of the world, sup-
ported by the very sciences they are used to underpin seems to run against the idea that 
explanation of events and phenomena should aim to unify our understanding of the world 
See p. 210 IT for my account of what this means 
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in an increasingly comprehensive picture. Kitcher' 7 0 has promoted an approach to explana-
tion that stresses unification, seeing it as the underlying theme of earlier, more formal, ac-
counts of explanation. This fits with a background and history of thinking on explanation 
well entrenched in philosophy and philosophy of science in particular, as Herbert Feigl 
noted, 
The aim of scientific explanation throughout the ages has been unification, that is, the 
comprehending of a maximum of facts and regularities in terms of a minimum of theo-
retical concepts and assumptions.1 ' 
With the increasing complication of accounts of the relationship between theories and ex-
planation, the ontological components and commitments involved in this general aim for 
explanation have become more significant.1 7 2 In many cases we can see that it is in grap-
pling with explanations that metaphysics and epistemology are combined, providing a good 
testing ground for the coherence of any philosophical theory about the special sciences. 
Making sense of (or revealing as unnecessary) the apparently intuitive pull towards unifi-
cation would seem to be a key feature of any attempt to construct a philosophy of science 
that supports the independence of the special sciences in a non-trivial way.' 7 3 Obviously 
' 7 0 See, for example. Kitcher. P. (1981) Explanatory Unification' Philosophy of Science 48, 
507-531. 
1 7 1 Feigl. H (1970) 'The "Orthodox" View of Theories: Remarks in Defense as Well as Critique' 
in Radner, M. and Winokur, S. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science vol. IV Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 12. 
1 7 2 A glance through recent collections of papers on explanation confirm this. See, for example, 
Pitt, J. C. (ed.) (1988) Theories of Explanation, and Ruben, D-H. (ed.) (1993) Explanation, 
both Oxford. Oxford University Press. The problem of what ontological commitments in theo-
retical accounts of explanation one is prepared to make is highlighted by the old debate over 
the role of causation in science, see Salmon, W. C. 'Scientific Realism and the Causal Struc-
ture of the World' in Ruben (1993). See also Salmon, W. C. (1989) Four Decades of Scientific 
Explanation Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
1 7 3 Defending the notion that explanation is a central aspect of any field of science would be too 
much of a digression from my main argument to be considered in any depth here. However, the 
support I give to a realist philosophy of science and to supporting the operation of rationality, 
at least in abstractions about the spheres of human interest in which science operates, gives 
confirmation to the idea that science has many roles in the articulation of an order in parts of 
the Universe that matter to us. One of these roles can be assumed to be explanation of the par-
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there are some very complicated issues here. What kind of units is being argued for by the 
supporters of explanatory unity? And if one is a pluralist about ontology does it follow that 
one must be a pluralist about method and reject explanatory unificat ion? Docs explanatory 
unity even make sense9 The relationship with reductionism is curious and subtle If total 
explanations are vacuous why would anyone want to have a single explanatory story and 
ontology9 
One way that the unificatory pull of explanation can be understood is as the expression of 
a mechanistic picture of the Universe as a whole. Small parts of the Universe have to be 
understood to explain the large parts—and not vice versa. The mechanistic model has a 
long and fairly distinguished history But it is no longer a useful metaphor. The following 
examination of biology and ontology should help to show why. 
I mention all this by way of an introduction to this section for two reasons. Firstly , to make 
it clear that in looking at biology and juggling the philosophical problems it generates, its 
status and relationship to science as a whole and the other special sciences, I am trying to 
keep many balls in the air I do this deliberately. I do not suppose that any single philo-
sophical starting point can be given priority over the others. Secondly, I have raised all 
these issues in recognition of the fact that the consequences of taking up particular posi-
tions on epistemology and metaphysics are always larger than perhaps anticipated.'74 At 
the end of the last chapter there were a number of issues left unresolved These included 
how we might understand the role of experimentation in biology, given that there clearly is 
ticular events and phenomena that make up this experience. Having said this, I shall assume 
that explanation is reasonably clear for the discussion below 
1 1 4 As already noted, this is not a thesis about explanation, and I shall not discuss explanation per 
se in much detail, but I am sensitive to the challenge that there is a real need to work out some 
sort of stance on explanation that is coherent and consistent w ith the rest of my philosophy of 
science 
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an epistemic value in performing experiments. I want to change tack a little on these ques-
tions to examine biology itself. 
In this chapter 1 want to explore some important issues in philosophy about biology— 
rather than philosophy of biology—particularly how we might see biology as an exemplar 
of the ontological and epistemological unity or disunity of science My aim is to examine 
and articulate a pluralist account of biology working from the discussion of such an ap-
proach given by Dupre in Disorder, whilst retaining the methodological insights of the 
previous chapter. In order to do this I shall look at reductionism first, and examine its rela-
tionship to the unity of science To facilitate this I shall sketch out a minimal" approach to 
unity through explanation and reduction in order to test the challenges of Dupre's thesis 
against something that is not so strong as to be absurd. Then 1 shall turn to essentialism 
and the nature of natural kind terms in biology. Finally . I shall explore some of the criti-
cisms raised by Rosenberg to the claim that biology. once appreciated in all its complexity, 
can still be treated as realistic science. This leads me to an examination of a realistic theory 
of natural kinds that is detailed enough to support realism for biology, which in turn helps 
answer some of the problems at the end of the last chapter 
2 What i s biology? Philosophy, biology and physics 
The last chapter concluded with three examples of different biological investigations. They 
covered a range of biological research. So far I have spoken as though there is an obvious 
way of picking out what are biological issues from other concerns. Is this in fact an easy 
matter, one of convention, or natural kind analysis, or explanations of a particular sort? 
This question is not as simple as it may at first appear, and I shall touch on it again later 
when discussing the emergence of biology from natural history in Foucault's characterisa-
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tion of the science's development 1 7 5 To begin with I want briefly to look at what are taken 
to be the central philosophical issues for biology to see if they might illuminate the issues 
at stake here Amongst these issues are some important epistcmological and metaphysical 
problems that are of direct relevance for adv ancing the discussion about experiments. Ro-
senberg say s that, 
[bliology is not a physical science Is this statement merely a truism, reflecting a bit of 
nomenclature? Does it mark merely an administrative boundary between scientific dis-
ciplines0 Or arc the life sciences different from physics and chemistry in respects impor-
tant enough to turn the truism into an important conclusion about the nature of the dif-
ferent subjects of these disciplines and the different means appropriate for studying 
them? This is the central question of the philosophy of biology.1 6 
Rosenberg regards the uniqueness, or otherwise, of biological enquiry as the key issue in 
philosophy of biology. Interestingly , no-one ev er suggests that the central question in the 
philosophy of physics is whether and how phy sics might be distinguished from other sci-
ences. There are several possible reasons why one might take biology's difference to be the 
starting place for an examination of its fundamental conceptual content. One is a simple 
insecurity, reflecting a worry about the possibility of the elimination of biology as a special 
science through a crude wholesale reduction of its laws, theories and observations via 
chemistry to "fundamental' physical laws 1 7 7 However, since naive reductionism is not as 
healthy a programme as it once was, 1 7 8 other motivations for such an understanding of 
philosophy of biology should be sought. 
1 7 5 Seep. 172 ff. 
1 7 6 Rosenberg. A. (1985) The Structure of Biological Science Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge. 13. 
1 7 Is the key question in the philosophy of chemistry 'How do we distinguish chemistry from 
physics?' I suspect not. 
1 7 8 See p. 99 ff 
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A second reason is that the parent discipline is philosophy of science. The fact " ... phi-
losophy of science has been too driven by physics . 1 7 9 does not need to be argued for 
anymore. In a symposium on The History of Evolutionary Biology" at the 1995 Annual 
Conference of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science1*" Jonathan Hodge argued 
that there was no longer any need for philosophers with an interest in biology to fear that 
they were committing intellectual suicide; that the subject was in a healthy and rapidly 
maturing state; that epistemic and metaphysical problems raised by the theory and practice 
of biology presented genuine and deep philosophical issues which are in need of greater 
appreciation and careful consideration. This must surely be correct And from a contempo-
rary, politically aware perspective recognition of the current sophistication and potential of 
biology and biotechnology is now a necessity Philosophy cannot exist in a vacuum. The 
picture of biology as a local, terrestrial study lacking the universal appeal of the physical 
sciences in our total world comprehension is a prejudice for platonic tidiness. The imping-
ing of biology on our lives, requires more of us than this quiet desire for order. That is, 
biology is interesting and relevant in itself. But this does not answer the question of why 
we should be concerned to distinguish biology from other sciences—if biology generates 
such interesting issues all of its own. why be worried about it not being physics? One an-
swer should be obvious from what I have already discussed We now have a burgeoning 
philosophical literature about the role of experimentation carry ing forward debates about 
scientific realism in physics and we want to know whether the same arguments work else-
where. 
7 9 Sterelny, K (1995) Understanding Life: Recent Work in Philosophy of Biology '. British Jour-
nal for Philosophy of Science June 1995. 155. 
8" University of Leeds. 1-3 September 1995. 
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A third reason for looking at biology's relationship to other disciplines can be extracted 
from the second. By looking at biology it is just possible that we may learn things that can 
be applied elsewhere—even if the philosophical lessons are just that we should avoid ap-
plying unsuitable and irrelevant models from one science to another That is. we may learn 
some things of more general positive philosophical value from the philosophy of biology. 
To this end Ernst Mayr can state that. 
... the activity in the philosophy of biology has led to a new look at the core meaning of 
philosophy. For many reasons, the philosophy of biology is more than an exercise in 
logic. It has shown . .. that there is a broad area of overlap between science and philoso-
phy. Nothing characterizes this area of overlap better than the realm of concepts. Con-
cepts, like cause, selection, species, evolution, development, hierarchy, reduction, 
emergence, to mention only a few. are of equal interest to the philosopher and the scien-
tist. ... [Philosophers coming from logic and physics must realize that the physical sci-
ences are ... just as provincial as is biology, and that some of the standard principles of 
the physical sciences are only partly—or not at all—applicable to other branches of sci-
ence, including biology.'8' I S" 
This helps us see that we cannot straightforwardly answer our original question about what 
biology is. Earlier I used a definition from Collins English Dictionary^ which defined 
biology as "the study of living organisms, including their structure, functioning, evolution, 
distribution, and interrelationships." For philosophical purposes this will not do since it 
" Mayr, E. Foreword' to Wolters. G.. Lennox. J. G. (eds.) with McLaughlin. P. (1995) Con-
cepts, Theories, and Rationality in the Biological Sciences: The Second Pittsburgh-Konstanz 
Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh. October 1-4, 1993 Kon-
stanz/Pittsburgh: UVK - Universilatsverlag Konstanz/Universily of Pittsburgh Press, i.x. 
L I would add that just what the overlap' might consist in is open to debate. Clearly the inter-
ests that philosophers and scientists have in looking at conceptual issues like those Mayr lists 
may well be very differently motiv ated, leading to a complex and perhaps nev er well-defined 
form of overlap. Of course this does not diminish the point that philosophy of biology has been 
tackling matters that are also of interest to philosophy of science as a whole, and in philosophy 
generally. 
1 3 See p. 20 ff 
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tnird reason for looking at biology's relationship to other disciplines can be extracted 
the second By looking at biology it is just possible that we may learn things that can 
applied elsewhere—even if the philosophical lessons are just that we should avoid ap-
ing unsuitable and irrelevant models from one science to another That is. we may learn 
~e things of more general positive philosophical value from the philosophy of biology 
ihis end Ernst Mayr can state that. 
. .. the activity in the philosophy of biology has led to a new look at the core meaning of 
philosophy. For many reasons, the philosophy of biology is more than an exercise in 
logic It has shown ... that there is a broad area of overlap between science and philoso-
phy. Nothing characterizes this area of overlap better than the realm of concepts. Con-
cepts, like cause, selection, species, evolution, development, hierarchy, reduction, 
emergence, to mention only a few. are of equal interest to the philosopher and the scien-
tist. ... [Philosophers coming from logic and physics must realize that the physical sci-
ences are . .. just as provincial as is biology, and that some of the standard principles of 
the physical sciences are only partly—or not at all—applicable to other branches of sci-
ence, including biology.'8' I 8 : 
_:s helps us see that we cannot straightforwardly answer our original question about what 
-iogy is. Earlier I used a definition from Collins English Dictionary^ which defined 
iogy as 'the study of living organisms, including their structure, functioning, evolution, 
iribution. and interrelationships.' For philosophical purposes this will not do since it 
Mayr, E. 'Foreword' to Wolters. G.. Lennox. J. G. (eds.) with McLaughlin, P. (1995) Con-
cepts, Theories, and Rationality in the Biological Sciences: The Second Pittsburgh-Konstanz 
olloquium in the Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, October 1-4, 1993 Kon-
sianz/Pittsburgh: UVK - Universitatsverlag Konstanz/University of Pittsburgh Press, ix. 
: would add that just what the overlap' might consist in is open to debate. Clearly the inter-
ests that philosophers and scientists have in looking al conceptual issues like those Mayr lists 
may well be very differently motivated, leading lo a complex and perhaps never well-defined 
:orm of overlap. Of course this docs not diminish the point that philosophy of biology has been 
uckling malters that arc also of interest to philosophy of science as a whole, and in philosophy 
generally 
see p. 20 ff 
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only pushes us back to an investigation of what life and organisms are. 1 8 4 But of course 
saving what the proper study of biology should consist in. and what the output of biology 
should be—what forms its knowledge production should take—is to presuppose answers to 
some of the difficult philosophical questions with w hich I am attempting to deal here 
At present, however, a great deal of philosophy of biology is only concerned with expand-
ing, interpreting and refining concepts in evolutionary theory and the details of natural se-
lection For example. Sober s Philosophy of Biology begins with the sentence: 'This book 
concentrates on philosophical problems raised by the theory of evolution.*'8" And when 
Kim Sterelny claims to be surveying contemporary philosophy of biology he mentions the 
work of Dupre and Rosenberg on biology, realism and scientific unity only to say: 
Admirable though this work is. I shall focus on philosophy of biology proper, most es-
pecially evolutionary theory, which continues to dominate the philosophy of biology 
agenda.186 [My stress ] 
However, as emerges from Sterelny's survey article, getting to grips with the kind of meta-
physical framework that taxes Dupre and Rosenberg could help resolve some of the diffi-
culties that confront writers struggling with evolutionary theory, genes, species and groups. 
So let me briefly mention some of conceptual problems currently encountered in evolution-
ary theory in order to move on. 
3 Philosophy of biology—some contemporary problems in 
evolutionary theory 
Debates about evolution fall into two broad divisions: 
As already indicated (footnote 14) I believe that AL research can help in this respect by at-
tempting to model some of the necessary conditions for life by creating other theoretical life 
systems independent of the contingencies of the history of life on Earth. 
' Sober, E . (1993) Philosophy of Biologv Oxford: Oxford University Press, xvii. 
'' Sterelny (1995) op cit. 155 
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• external questions about the theory's relationship to religious beliefs about the origins 
of life on Earth and its status as a scientific theory, and: 
e internal questions about interpretation, what should count as the component parts of 
the theory and about the consequences of its correct application to understanding a 
broad range of biological and other phenomena 
The external issues are well known. My views on the dangers of creation 'science* would 
certainly obscure any attempt to present a neutral account of the debate so I shall simply 
direct the reader to Kitcher s Abusing Science.187 
The internal issues are what Sterelny refers to as "philosophy of biology proper 1 8 8 Here 
we find much discussion over how fitness should be characterised,189 adaptationism,190 
classification and systematics,'9' what the units of selection should be, l 9 : and how 'species' 
1 8 7 Kitcher. P. (1983) Abusing Science: The Case Against Creationism Milton Keynes: Open 
University Press. 
1 8 8 Of necessity, the references I give here are limited. For an extensive bibliography of work in 
the philosophy of biology on both external and internal problems see Ruse, M (1988) Philoso-
phy of Biology Today New York: State University of New York. For a range of papers on 
philosophical issues in evolution and related topics see Brandon, R. N. (1996) Concepts and 
Methods in Evolutionary Biology Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Hull, D. L. (1989) 
The Metaphysics of Evolution New York. State University of New York Press; for a more wide 
ranging, less deep selection from classic texts which also covers some of the external' issues 
raised above see Barlow, C. (ed.)(1995) Evolution Extended: Biological Debates on the 
Meaning of Life Cambridge. MA: MIT Press 
1 8 9 See, for example, Rosenberg, A. (1983) "Fitness' Journal of Philosophy 80: 457-473 and 
(1985) Chapter 6: Sober. E (1984) 'Fact. Fiction . and Fitness' Journal of Philosophy 81: 372-
384 and (1987) "Does "Fitness" Fit the Facts?' Journal of Philosophy 84: 220-223; Mills, S. 
and Beattv, J. (1979) 'The Propensity Interpretation of Fitness' Philosophy of Science 46: 263-
288. 
1 9 0 See, for example. Dupre. J. (1987) The Latest and the Best: Essays on Evolution and Opti-
mally Cambridge MA: Bradford Books/MIT Press. 
1 9 1 For a discussion of philosophical issues by a zoologist see Panchen. A. L. (1992) Classifica-
tion, Evolution and the Nature of Biology Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
I 9 : Famously in the 'popular science' market Richard Dawkins has promoted the idea of genes as 
the fundamental unit of selection, see. for example. Dawkins. R. (1986) The Blind Watchmaker 
London: Longman. Sec also Brandon. R. and Burian. R. (1984) Genes, Organisms, and Popu-
lations Harvard MA: MIT Press: Wimsatt. W (1980) "Reductionistic Research Strategies and 
their Biases in the Units of Selection Controversy' in Nickles. T. (cd.) Scientific Discovery vol. 
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should be characterised as a general term The last of these issues will be part of my dis-
cussion below. None of these problems can stand in isolation from the general metaphysi-
cal and epistemological questions I have raised It is a pity that these general points are 
seen as peripheral since, as Mayr points out. biology can play a potentially informative 
role in all areas of philosophy of science. 
The most obvious, and well discussed problem that confronts any examination of the bio-
logical sciences' relationship to physical science is over the philosophical and practical 
consequences of theoretical and explanatory reductions of various sorts This is where I 
shall begin 
ii R e d u c t i o n s , e x p l a n a t i o n s a n d ( d i s ) u n i t y 
1 The middle way 
To be sure, reductionism is a conviction that long antedates the discovery of the chemi-
cal mechanism underlying genetic phenomena. Its appeal is based on an assessment of 
the history of science as one that reflects progress in our understanding of nature. Since 
Galileo the natural sciences have encompassed more and more phenomena; their theo-
ries have become deeper and more accurate in description and prediction; these theories 
have been bound together more and more closely; and their technological applications 
have enabled us to control more and more of our environment.'93 
Reducing the poorly understood to the better understood is a good way of explaining 
things. Unfortunately, sometimes reduction can be inappropriate It often seems that there 
is no procedure for determining when the reduction of one description of a phenomenon, 
2 Dordrecht: Reidel: Brandon. R. (1990) Organism and Environment Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. Hull. D. (1980) Individuality and Selection' Annual Review of Ecology and 
Systematics 11, 311-322. 
' Rosenberg. A. (1985) The Structure of the Biological Science Cambridge University Press, p. 
69. 
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entity or event to another is correctly applicable that does not beg the question over the 
nature of the subject matter to be explained. This I take to be the problem that is faced in 
the debates that erupt from time to time in philosophy and science about reductionism, 
whether this is about genes, minds or society To say that reductions are never useful or 
appropriate is to abandon the general nature of explaining anything, that is, say why the 
newly encountered parts of our experience fit the pattern of the old and already described 
world Any move from the particular to the general just docs involve a reduction of sorts; 
information is lost; irrelevant facts disposed of; possible levels of description ignored. 
Sometimes this is helpful, sometimes it is not. 
I have no intention of arguing against all reductions. I only wish to show why there are 
now good empirical and philosophical grounds to see it as inappropriate and detrimental to 
scientific progress to pursue it as a central tool for grasping biological phenomena—that 
is, the hope, the belief that the life sciences will one day be eliminated in favour of a com-
prehensive understanding of the physical (and mathematical processes) that govern such 
complex systems is vain, out of date and a block to understanding biological phenomena. 
This thesis I take to be fairly well supported in any case. The days of extreme reduction are 
long past. And we are all physicalists or materialists in the widest sense: 
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Adopting a physicalislic view of the domain of biology simply means that one accepts 
the idea that living things are physical objects. It is important to realize that this thesis 
does not say what the relationship is between biological explanations and explanations 
in physics. Even if living things are made of matter and nothing else, the fact remains 
that the vocabulary of biology radically differs from that of physics. Physicists talk about 
elementary particles, space-time, and quantum mechanical states; evolutionary biologists 
talk about phytogenies, ecosy stems, and inbreeding coefficients Even though the domain 
of biology falls within the domain of physics, the vocabulary of biology and the vocabu-
lary of phy sics have little overlap Explanations in biology are produced in the distinc-
tive vocabulary of biology : explanations in phy sics use the distinctive vocabulary of 
phy sics. The question is how these two kinds of explanation fit together.19'1 
Fitting the explanations together is indeed a difficult problem. I shall begin with one such 
attempt that results in a picture that purportedly supports a minimal conception of scien-
tific unity as "explanatory interfacing." This will serve as a test case for arguments against 
unity, in favour of disunity . I then follow this with a sketch of specific arguments by David 
Hull which have formed the backbone to anti-reductionist accounts of genes and molecular 
biology1 9 5—Hull has shown that there can be no possible match between the parallel read-
ings of 'genes" as molecular entities, parts of an organism's chromosomal DNA, and as 
units of heredity and selectable traits. Rosenberg has shown some important consequences 
of Hull's position and Dupre has drawn on it too. and I examine their different arguments 
here Dupre has further strengthened anti-reductionism in biology through an analysis of 
ecology and its relation to population dynamics. I sketch out and consider this argument 
too. This leads on to my stating a clear position about reductionism and biology that incor-
porates some of the arguments employ ed in Dupre's characterising of the discussion. F i -
1 9 4 Sober, E. (1993) Philosophy ofBiologv Oxford. Oxford University Press, 24-25. 
1 9 5 My understanding of how contemporary researchers in molecular biology view this debate has 
been greatly enhanced through e-mail conversations with Dy lan Sweetman, a doctoral research 
student in this field at Warwick University. It interested me to note that, as one might expect, 
our interests in what genes are and how they can explain things differed. What surprised me 
was that a researcher in the field of genetics did not see the potential political and economic 
difficulties that his work could generate. 
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nally, I shall look at how this supports and is supported by the rest of my discussions on 
the metaphy sics and epistemology of biology 
It should be clear by this stage that an anti-reductionist stance underlies many of the points 
1 have raised about the biological sciences, but it does not negate the possibility of meth-
odological unity From what follows it will emerge that my defence of this anti-
reductionism does not stand entirely alone, separate from the other elements of my argu-
ment. Scientific unity need not collapse with a pluralistic approach to the metaphysics bi-
ology. 
2 'Explanatory interfacing' 
Reductionism has been characterised in a number of different ways. In one sense it is 
rather a tame thesis—Peter Smith describes it like this 
Reductions in this 1 9 6 very general sense are evidently always good things to have, and 
are often mandatory. If we can explain why theory T2 holds (or at any rate, holds as well 
as it does) by appeal to theory 7",, then that is by any standards a worthwhile theoretical 
achievement. And if theory T2 makes claims about some domain for which some more 
inclusive theory T\ already purports to give reasonably comprehensive causal account, 
then maintaining both theories together will indeed require that the applicability of T2 
can be explained in terms of 7V19'' 
In a similar opening definition, Dupre says, '[rjeductionism, in its broadest sense, is the 
commitment to any unificatory explanation of a range of phenomena.'198 He goes on to 
state that reductionism is a commitment to giving structural explanations of phenomena 
Smith is referring to Ernst Nagel's account in The Structure of Science Reduction ... is the 
explanation of a theory or a set of experimental laws established in one area of enquiry , by a 
theory usually though not invariably formulated for some other domain." Nagel. E (1962) Lon-
don: Routledgc & Kcgan Paul. 338 
Smith. P. (1992) Modest Reductions and the Unity of Science" in Reductions, Explanation 
and Realism Charles, D. and Lennon. K (eds.)(1992) Oxford. Oxford University Press. 20. 
8 Disorder 87 
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and that 'it is debatable and debated whether such structural insights imply anything like 
derivation of the behaviour of those objects whose structure is elucidated.'199 Here he is 
addressing something stronger than the kind of explanation that could be called 
'unificatory' in a broad sense, claiming that structural explanation lies at the heart of the 
forms of reduction that are most questionable "Manx of the greatest achievements of sci-
ence depend essentially on insight into the structure of objects But the significance of this 
fact is very unclear. 2 0 0 
There are different forms of reduction then Smith characterises a deeper reductionism in 
this way, saying that from the general form. 
[t|here is no necessary implication ... that the mode of explanation in question has to 
involve type-type correlations or identifications between kinds recognized by the two 
theories Nor is there any necessary implication that explaining the applicability of T2 in 
terms of an underlying theory h must mean that T\ absorbs, supersedes, or eliminates 
the reduced theory 7V 2 0 1 
These stronger forms aside, the general pattern of explanation that Smith describes he calls 
'explanatory interfacing.' That is, 'an explanation in terms of theory T) of why theory T2 
works as well as it does' is 'an explanatory interfacing of 7*i to 7 V ' Z f ) 2 Let us explore this 
idea a little further, since Smith argues that explanatory interfacing, taken in a very open 
sense is enough to secure a general unity for science 
How strong is explanatory interfacing? Smith points out that in most cases arguments 
against reductionism are aimed at the kind of reduction he finds in Nagel That is, the tar-
i99ibid. 89 
2 0 0 ibid. 
M l Smith op cit. 22. 
2 0 2 ibid. 
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get for anti-reductionist critiques is mostly one that assumes that reductions are carried out 
v ia a DN model of explanatory connection between theories 
reduction' has come 10 be reserved for strong reductions, i.e. explanatory interfacing 
where one theory simply subsumes the ontology and explanatory resources of another (so 
that T2 is revealed as just a special application of 7"i).:"3 
What Smith has in mind for the general notion of explanatory interfacing is not nearly so 
strong He takes explanation to be more generally structured than the DN model allows: 
Explanation is contrastive: the fundamental form of an explanation is that p (rather than 
<7i. q2. ... ) explains why r rather than (s\. s2. ... ). and explanatory frameworks are in 
part constituted by the taxonomies of relevant contrasts that they acknowledge.:w' 2 0 5 
Consequently, there may well be cases where the same things are addressed by the two 
theories. That is, the same patterns are explained and the same ontologies used so that, as 
we would want. 
. the pressure to provide an explanatory interfacing between a theory 7"; and some more 
sweeping theory T\ does not arise, in the general case, because Tt already explains what 
is explained by T2 (if that means that T\ already explains the same contrastive patterns as 
However, this is not the problem What Smith wants us to accept is that science connects 
theories that contain differing ontologies and which explain differing contrastive patterns. 
Smith's strategy rests on the possibility that explanatory interfacing is intuitively appeal-
2 0 3 ibid. 27. 
2 0 4 ibid 22-23. 
2 0 5 For further explication of contrastive explanation see also van Fraassen, B (1980) The Scien-
tific Image Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chapter 5: and Lipton. P. (1991) Inference to the Best 
Explanation London: Routledge. 
2 0 6 Smith op cit. 23. 
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ing. He does not think that the reduction it involves is based on anything more than the kind 
of basic physicalism outlined above 
If there is a driving prejudice at work here, it is not radical physicalism but a principle. 
P. to the effect that the behaviour of wholes is in general causally produced by the behav-
iour of the parts, so that our explanatory stones about wholes must be consonant with 
our stories about the causal mechanisms constituted by their parts. :o7 
P is also assumed to be intuitive. We shall need to return to this later If P is acceptable, 
then Smith believes that explanatory interfacing best captures all our intuitions about re-
duction and explanation. Apparently strong reductions are very rarely Nagelian in form. 
And even when we seem to have strong, strict cases of Nagelian reduction only explanatory 
interfacing can in fact capture the core of the explanation involved."108 
Only the most extravagantly formalistic conception of scientific theorizing could sustain 
the thought that basic principles are everything, and all else is mere mathematics: but if 
this absurd formalism is abandoned, there is no route from the claim that the basic as-
sumptions of some area of science are (near enough) explanatorily reducible by Nagel's 
formal criterion to the conclusion that we have thoroughgoing theoretical supersession 
or absorption. So, we do need to divorce the ideas of such absorption from the core sense 
of reduction, i.e. the explanatory interfacing of theories.209 
Now the point of all this is that Smith believes he has done enough to secure a general 
unity for science. Modest reductions are enough to maintain that unity: 
ibid. 25. 
' Smith uses a number of examples to make these points. On the whole these are taken from 
mechanics and thermodynamics—I shall not repeat them here 
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The demand to provide at least such modest reductions may often be compelling, for in 
many cases it is arguable that we need to be able to see. given the 71 facts, how some 
other theory T2 can hold good of the domain in question Moreover ... modest reductions 
can still subsume the old programmatic aim of demonstrating unity, i.e. of showing how 
science hangs systematically together, with higher-level theories being shown to have 
application in virtue of lower-level facts 
We need to ask what sort of unity this is Can it really be the "old programme"' Well, in 
the sense that it leaves a form of reduction in place, it is Any systemic demonstration of 
high-level theories" applicability based on more basic principles would fit the bill But how 
systematic can Smith's explanatory interfacing be'1 Since he has loosened the criteria for 
being the kind of explanation and reduction he wants, w e are left with intuitive appeals to P 
as a substitute for a formal system. P is defended, and it is particularly sensitive in its 
calling upon causality to secure the connection between parts and wholes, since this in turn 
rests on an assumed asymmetry of causal relations It is assumed that parts can bring 
about changes in the wholes they make up, but not vice versa, at least not in a way that is 
epistemically valuable for science. That is, explanations of the world by its smallest parts 
that only contain partial descriptions of larger scale behaviour are, generally, to be pre-
ferred over explanations that include partial accounts of the smallest parts, which ade-
quately describe large scale systems.2" For example, as I type this sentence the index fin-
ger of my left hand is moving over the keyboard It is made up of molecules that are mov-
ing. The prejudice is to prefer an explanation that gives an account of the movement of the 
molecules in terms of their behaviour and the forces acting on them alone as complete. But 
this obviously is a prejudice The possibility that my typing could be a cause of the move-
ment of the parts of my finger has to be ignored to make this assumption work. Once re-
2U>ibid. 36. 
2 1 1 Where 'adequate' is taken to mean being accurately descriptive and predictive within reason 
able limits 
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ductionism is rejected the grounds for ignoring causes that are not based in micro-theories 
seems shaky and greatly in need of further argument 
Whatever difficulties there are with Smith s position—and we shall return to them 
shortly—I am going to assume that it does represent a fairly coherent defence of scientific 
unity with reductionism in place. It would be easy to set up a straw-man on these points, 
but that would be of little value for the points I am trying to make. It can look as though 
Dupre is attacking such a straw-man He outlines the strongest form of reduction in the 
following way: 
Assume . . . a hierarchical classification of objects in which the objects at each level are 
complex structures of objects comprising the next-lower level. ... The investigation of 
each level is the task of a particular domain of science, which aims to discern the laws 
governing the objects at each higher (reduced) level from the laws governing the objects 
at the next-lower (reducing) level. Such reduction, in addition to knowledge of the laws 
at both the reducing and the reduced levels, will also require so-called bridge principles 
(or bridge laws) identifying the kinds of objects at the reduced level with particular 
structures of the objects at the reducing level. Given the transitivity of such deductive 
derivation, the end point of this program will reveal the whole of science to have been 
derived from nothing but the laws of the lowest level and the bridge principles.212 
In Dupre's strong account there is no talk about theories superseding one another nor about 
the elimination of lower level theories, but simply a direct deductive derivation of higher, 
more complex levels from the lowest and simplest (together with bridge principles that re-
late the various parts and objects of the different levels through identity statements), that is, 
a Nagelian, DN explanatory connection. (Elimination is a further complication that does 
need to be kept separate.2'3) However, the strength of this position—Dupre goes on to re-
2 1 2 Disorder 88. 
2 1 3 Having said this, there are a number of w riters w ho do run these issues together. Paul 
Churchland. for example, in following his own brand of reductionism says: " ... a reduction lo-
cates the newer theory within the conceptual space currently occupied by the older theory. It 
provides the basic instructions, as it were, for the orderly displacement of the latter by the for-
107 
The Metaphysics of a 
Pluralist Biology 
fine it and examine other versions in any case—is not what is important for Dupre His 
challenge, ultimately is to the very assumptions Smith needs to make to get his account of 
reduction and unity up and running That is. that ontological priority must be accorded to 
the allegedly homogenous stuff out of which bigger things are made ' 2 1 4 Dupre points out 
that constructing any coherent and sensible account of monistic materialism runs up 
against the problem of making either that definition too flimsy to support what it is sup-
posed to. or so strong that it requires a robust defence of reductionism to support it. Com-
positionally defining materialism or physicalism2 1 5 as was done above is inadequate. Say-
ing that everything is made up of the same kind of stuff does not lead one to suppose that 
there is only one kind of things 
Provided the alternative is seen to be a pluralism based not on different kinds of stuff but 
on irreducibly different kinds of things, and prov ided we reject the false dilemma of 
materialism versus Cartesian dualism, this kind of materialism is irrelevant to the issue 
between monism and pluralism."16 
Now when we take on board the desire to have some sort of explanation of the kind of 
world we find ourselves in, the 'explanatory interfacing' of theories comes to the fore. As 
Dupre puts it in the context of discussing different concepts of ontology: 
mer.'—for displacement of the latter by the former' we can read elimination of the latter in 
favour of the former.' (Churchland, Paul M. (1979) Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of the 
Mind Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 81). Yet it is unclear why location of one theo-
retical claim in the conceptual space of another should imply displacement at all—why could 
the two theories not co-exist in such a space? 
2 , 4 Disorder 89. 
2 1 5 See Disorder p. 90-91 for why Duprc prefers materialism' over 'physicalism.' 
216 ibid. 92. 
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The idea ... is that we are "ontologically committed" only to whatever entities we need 
to appeal to in order to explain anything Prima facie, this conception will commit us to 
acknowledge all manner of diverse entities. However, if reductive materialism were 
true—that is. if we could explain everything by referring only to physical entities—this 
conception of ontology would provide a clear sense in w hich only physical entities need 
be admitted to exist.2' 
Smith's reductions require that there is a consistency with the various levels of scientific 
description that disciplines provide. That consistency is explanatory. And as I have already 
pointed out. 
[c|ertain v iews about the nature of causality suggest that only some kind of reductiv e re-
lation between higher and lower levels can achieve such consistency . 2 ' 8 
This is precisely what Smith is arguing, but with a thesis about causality smuggled in. Du-
pre picks this out as a thesis about causal completeness.2'9 It amounts the same issue I 
have highlighted, namely, that causal descriptions of the parts (especially at the micro-
physical level) of a thing or phenomenon will be preferred over descriptions of wholes, be-
cause they are taken to be entirely sufficient as an account of w hy any thing or phenome-
non is as it is. Principle P is a given for Smith's position but it is not unassailable. I do not 
intend to detail the particular view of determinism that Dupre puts in place as a critique of 
causal completeness, largely because I consider it enough for my purposes here that P is 
questionable. It is at this point that Cartvvright's observations on the limited nature and 
range of physical laws are apposite. Constitutive materialism is weak—it does not contain 
an explanatory commitment to universal, complete laws. The scientific laws that do all the 
explanatory work are phenomenological in nature, hedged about by ceteris paribus criteria 
drastically delimiting their application. 
21" ibid. 94 
2 . 8 ibid. 99. 
2 . 9 ibid. 99-102. 
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Reducing Mendclian genetics to molecular genetics was widely thought tantamount to 
reducing theories about living things to theories about inanimate phenomena. Once ac-
complished in genetics, the cat was out of the bag. the in-principle possibility of a fully 
physical account of all biological process was as good as prov ed 2 2 4 
The payoffs were thought to be important too: 
Not only was the unity of science vindicated at the critical juncture between physical sci-
ence and life science, but the metaphysical thesis of materialism was given powerful sci-
entific vindication. Here at last was factual proof, not merely philosophical argument, 
with which to confront the dualist and the antimaterialist in metaphysics.225 
Unfortunately, under analy sis from Hull it turned out that the actual mechanisms involved 
in translating an organism's material genes into real expression as traits of the organism, 
that is its phenotype. undermines that possibility " 6 There is no one-to-one unique correla-
tion of genes to phenotvpic properties in any significant way. 
Even if gross phenotypic traits are translated into molecularly characterized traits, the 
relation between Mendelian and molecular-characterized predicate terms expresses pro-
hibitively complex, many-many relations. Phenomena characterized by a single Mende-
lian predicate term can be produced by several different types of molecular mechanisms. 
Hence, any possible reduction will be complex. Conversely, the same type of molecular 
mechanism can produce phenomena that must be characterized by different Mendelian 
predicate terms. Hence reduction is impossible.227 
Rosenberg uses predicate logic to illustrate Hull's point that Nagelian bridge principles 
demonstrating the biconditional relationship between Mendelian predicates and their ap-
224 Instrument 19. 
2 2 5 ibid. 
~ 2 6 As ail good school children know, phenotype = genotype + environment. In this case the envi-
ronmental factors affecting the development and maintenance of an organism can be dis-
counted or taken to be ideal' and the argument still has force Shortly it will become clear that 
once the role of env ironment in determining when and how particular genes are active is taken 
into account a w reath is thrown on the coffin of reductions to the physical. I suspect that the as-
sumption that there are ideal conditions for the functioning of genes is where the problem lies. 
In real biological contexts this notion seems completely empty 
2 2 7 Hull. D. (1974) Philosophy of Biological Science Englewood Cliffs. NJ: Prentice Hall, 39. 
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parent expression would be effectively unlimited disjunctions on each side o f the bicondi-
t iona l . 2 2 8 Rosenberg holds that. 
This son of reduction is not methodologically useless, it is probably unattainable by 
agents of our cognitive and computational powers. Reductionism thus seems fated to cast 
little light on intertheoretical relations in biology. 2 2 9 
Note that Rosenberg ties this failure o f reduction to our cognitive and epistemological 
powers. 2 3 0 His reasons for doing so w i l l be discussed shortly. Rosenberg's solution o f how 
to get Mendelian properties to behave regularly in relation to their material components is a 
familiar one, and one that is amenable to the kind of explanatory interfacing Smith has in 
mind. Rosenberg believes that supervenience wi l l do as the relation between the two levels 
o f description. 
Mendelian phenomena are supervenient on molecular ones, given any two biological 
systems that are identical in all their molecular properties, they will have to be identical 
in all their Mendelian properties. Two biological systems with different Mendelian prop-
erties will have to differ in some molecular property or other, although two biological 
systems may be identical in Mendclian properties while differing in molecular ones.231 
That is, Rosenberg takes supervenience to be a way of retaining the general form o f reduc-
tion and unity that Smith discusses So we need to know how adequate the idea o f super-
venience is, and what commitments it involves. Something like principle P is assumed here 
too, along with causal closure. Question these and the prima facie attractiveness o f super-
" 8 Instrument 21-22. 
2 2 9 ibid. 22. 
2 3 0 The response of philosophers to the many-many' problem has been questioned and examined 
in Waters, C. K. (1990) 'Why Anti-Reductionist Consensus won't Survive: The Case of Classi-
cal Mendelian Genetics' PS.A 1990. Philosophy of Science Association. The observations he 
makes about refinements to the reductionist argument to accommodate Hull's general thesis are 
irrelevant i f one takes a general externalist' view of the information required to bring about a 
particular phenolype. 
231 ibid. 23. 
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venience collapses. And as Dupre points out. i f there are no general grounds for accepting 
supervenience we are thrown back on looking for evidence 2 3 2 o f it and. 
[e]vidence for supervenience. it seems, would have to be the kind of evidence necessary 
for reductionism. It would be evidence that higher-level phenomena are indeed deter-
mined by lower-level phenomena, or that identical (or sufficiently similar) lower-level 
phenomena do indeed produce the same higher-level phenomena 2 3 3 
Viz., evidence for P The problem for anyone trying to make the supervenience case for 
Mendelian genes" dependence on molecular genetics is that the evidence is in fact against 
the case. Simply put. in the vast majority o f cases, particular phenotypic traits are not de-
termined by genes alone—DNA is not stored as a simple list o f genes that are unique and 
genes do not function independently of the environment I f one assumes that there are real 
causal powers in the large scale of things, then building the kind o f loose asymmetric 
bridge laws needed for supervenience is also impossible. The facts involved include the 
shape o f amino acids (and hence proteins—a four levelled structuring) produced; the fac-
tors affecting the actual activation o f genes, that is, the conditions o f their expression; the 
actual form o f the traits' phenotypic expression: and the complexity, redundancy and inter-
action o f genes themselves."54 Unpacking the "many-many' problem does require accep-
tance o f actual natural biology, but it is straightforwardly clear that the 'information' con-
~ 3 2 For a discussion of a number of failed reductions and the nature of genes, see, Hubbard, R. and 
Wald, E. (1993) Exploding the Gene Myth: How Genetic Information is Produced and manipu-
lated by Scientists, Physicians, Employers, Insurance Companies, Educators, and Law Enforc-
ers Boston. M A . Beacon Press. 
233 Disorder 97. 
" 3 4 Famously, problems in how to explain many aspects of biological development w ithin a 
mechanistic, unified framework are the starting point of Rupert Sheldrake's hypothesis of 
formative causation.' Whatever the peculiarities of his metaphy sics might be, I always find his 
insights into problems in contemporary biology helpful in breaking expectations of 'scientific 
explanation' from the perspective of the mainstream science w riting See. for example. 
Sheldrake, R. (1987) A New Science of Life: The Hypothesis of Formative Causation (2 n d Edi-
tion) London: Paladin, Grafton Books, and (1989) The Presence of the Past: Morphic Reso-
nance and the Habits of Nature London: Fontana. Harper-Collins 
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tent o f an organism s phenot\pe has to be determined in an externalist way by an environ-
ment that affects the phenonpe directly, and also affects the expression o f the genotype. 
The sensitivity o f the genot>pe to changes in the environment is indefinite and complex 
Genes are phenotypically meaningless recipes for protein production without any built-in 
outcome when considered on their o w n . 2 3 5 The reduction o f the biological traits o f organ-
isms to the information content o f genes stops with this fact 
4 Ecology 
A further example of the failure o f reduction in the biological sciences can be found by 
looking at ecology Dupre uses examples from ecology to good effect and I shall follow his 
argument closely. 2 3 6 The examples also have bearing on the discussion o f natural kind 
terms to follow. 
Although gene-trait reductions are the most obvious kind for the philosopher's attention, 
biology covers a wide range o f descriptive levels o f organisation: 
These include, at least, genes, cells, organs, multicellular organisms, and groups of or-
ganisms ranging from family groups and demes. through populations and species, to 
ecosystems and higher classificaiory taxa. Since genes are generally assumed to belong 
simultaneously to the domain of chemistry, and cells to that of biology, it is worth men-
tioning also such things as viruses and viroids. which hover uneasily on that boundary. 
Given this array of structural levels, there are a correspondingly large number of possi-
ble reductionist projects/ 1 7 
And, given this range o f projects, it is no surprise that we find attempts to reduce ecology 
to lower structural levels. But given the discussion so far. it is going to be hard to find a 
1 5 I f any analogy is appropriate for describing genes, recipes are probably the best. Good food 
depends only in part on the recipes. A recipe is inert So much depends on the quality of the 
ingredients, the skill of the cook, the equipment available and even the weather! 
6 Disorder Chapter 5 
7 ibid 107. 
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way of showing that the content o f ecological theories are open to reduction to anything 
lower without the supposition that all the causal mechanisms are explicable in terms o f the 
lower level s causal architecture But this is not all that can be seen I f one is sensitive to 
what most ecology is there is a further issue about relating mathematical models for popu-
lations to actual populations 
Ecology can be characterised in the following way: 
Apart from a lot of purely descriptive work on the way organisms interact with one an-
other and their environment, the theoretical core of ecology is the construction of 
mathematical models, based on empirical observation and plausible biological assump-
tion, intended to reflect the development over time of interacting populations. : 3 8 
Dupre uses the example o f parasitic wasps that lay their eggs in live insects o f other spe-
cies. It is possible to construct mathematical models relating the numbers o f parasites to 
hosts where assumptions are made about the number of eggs laid in each generation, the 
survival o f each lava and irrelevance of other factors affecting the life and health o f both 
parasite and host. It is possible to construct any number o f similar models for populations 
interacting in a similar way. For example, one could model the dynamics o f thrush and 
snail populations in a woodland area. Here the assumptions would be about the predation 
o f snails (whether it was due only to thrushes), the diet o f the thrush population, the gen-
eral survival rates o f thrushes, climate changes, and so on. In this second example the as-
sumptions that are made are more restrictive on the model than in the first case in the sense 
that there we are dealing w ith single generations o f host and parasites—the parasites k i l l 
their hosts before the host can reproduce The point is that the models tend to be idealised 
mathematical predictive tools This brings us up against the issue o f how such abstract 
ibid. 108. 
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models can be appropriate to complex real situations 2 3 9 With reference to Cartvvright 2 4 0 
Dupre notes that. 
[wje need io ask ... to what e.xieni a is legitimate to apply such a model [wasp parasit-
ism] to real ecological systems Of course, the model was not derived as a random 
stringing together of sy mbols: it was constructed to reflect the actual interactions and 
behav ior observed in certain kinds of organisms On the other hand the model clearly 
embodies an idealization of such observ ations " J 1 
Such models are o f value They allow us to predict in general terms future populations and 
to adapt our models to include other factors—how would a drainage program for woodland 
close to farmland, known to affect the snail population, affect the thrush population , ? Du-
pre argues that the models could never reach a point of convergence with the real ecosys-
tems under investigation. 
A crucial explanation of its [the model s] limitations is in terms of the conflict between 
the taxonomic principles implied on the one hand by the abstract structure involved, and 
on the other by the practical demands of the concrete application. In the latter we have 
actual, countable populations of particular organisms, and in the former, theoretically 
defined terms such as parasite, prey, and competitor. It is hardly likely that these could 
ever be wholly extensionally equivalent. : j : 
This outcome is what we want to build up a picture of disunity in biology Models o f eco-
systems, be they simple or complex, wi l l be built around the kinds that are most significant 
in the situations under investigation, rather than those which match kinds generated for 
other purpose, such as phv logeny. Even within ecological models we may not always want 
The nature of realism and biology, as a science of the complex, is of interest here too. See p. 
133 ff. 
2 4 0 Cartwright. N. (1983) op. cit. 
241 Disorder pp. 110-11. 
242 ibid. 111. 
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information simply about abundance and distribution alone, but may wish to examine more 
complex relations between organisms. : 4 ? Consequently. 
... our interest in a kind of organism need not be restricted io those features lhat pre-
dominantly determine its abundance, and kinds of organisms that are highly similar 
with respect to features and interactions that determine their abundance may neverthe-
less differ in respects that are of crucial interest to us Thus, any attempt to develop 
models of ecological systems in terms of ecological natural kinds runs the risk of deliver-
ing information quite unrelated to the prev alence of organisms of Ihe kinds in which we 
are interested."44 
This position. Dupre argues, is likely to be met with resistance Technical objections might 
arise about the possibility o f 'maximizing the information content of a classification." 2 4 5 
That is. there wil l be an indefinite range o f possible properties that could be maximised, 
and hence there can be no robust account o f how they might be worked into a variety of 
interest based taxonomies o f different sorts. Whatever technical issues arise about classifi-
cation schemes—and as 1 shall suggest shortly, we can give an account o f schemes and 
systems o f classification that have a variety o f interest bases—Dupre points out that to 
argue that diverse human interest wi l l not be a limiting factor in taxonomies would be 
simply to run against the tide o f actual practice: 
But though variable, the condition of human interest or theoretical significance surely 
provides a very substantial limitation, or at least pragmatic ranking, on the range of 
properties of special relevance to taxonomy. The adjustment of classificatory practices in 
response to such more or less significant distinguishing properties, the significance of 
which deriv es from a diverse and pluralistic set of interests, cannot but be a central as-
pect of the evolution of taxonomy . 2 4 6 
2 4 3 Dupre uses a simple sketch of a model using lynxes and their prey (rabbits and hares) where 
phylogenetically insignificant features about the living habits of rabbits and hares have direct 
impact on the model Disorder 111-113 
2 4 4 ibid 112-113. 
2 4 5 ibid 113. 
246 ibid. 113. 
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Dupre also suggests that the prevalence of phylogenetic explanations in biology, although 
giving a large weighting to taxonomies of kinds based on phylogenetic interests, does not 
negate the tension that these taxonomies create in comparison with the ecological models 
we have been discussing.""17 
The point o f these observations is to demonstrate that the law s used to describe the behav-
iour o f populations wil l not be explicable in terms o f laws governing the properties of the 
individuals comprising those same populations That is. that there are properties o f popu-
lations that are not derived from properties o f the organism concerned. Now Dupre general-
ises the point to claim that this difference arises because at whatever level o f description 
we apply a taxonomy governed by laws we wi l l be using some ideal notion o f the kinds 
involved—models are always abstractions o f some sort. From this he also extracts an ex-
planation o f w hy sometimes we do look for micro-explanations: 
It is typically the observation that a certain property is quite consistently displayed in a 
certain group of organisms, at least under specifiable circumstances, that leads us to in-
vestigate the structural or other basis of this property in the individuals. On the other 
hand, when our interest in a property is extrinsically determined by its relevance to a 
macrotheory. we have no reason to assume that this property will be a stable feature of 
the members of the kind in question, and no reason, more generally, to expect that prop-
erty to be amenable to systematic investigation at the individual level. 2 4 8 
Dupre further secures his position, but I think we have seen enough here to support the 
general argument that given a range o f inquiry goals a w hole set of independent taxonomies 
can be generated based on laws that are not derivable f rom any other taxonomic system 
that describes the same organisms. Taken together with the observations about the failure 
o f genetic reductionism. w e see that not only is there no reduction of biology to parts of 
2 4 1 ibid 114. 
2 4 8 ibid. 117 
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chemistry', but there is no possibility of reducing biology to one simple account o f the tax-
onomy into which life could be fitted 
•5 A n t i - re d u c t i Q n and disunity 
The above discussions shows that principle P, understood in terms of explanation and the 
relationships between disparate theories, cannot be assumed as a given, and that there is 
evidence from examination o f biology to support a pluralistic picture o f explanations. 
There are good grounds for rejecting P and therefore dismantling even the modest form o f 
reduction that Smith puts forward as a model for unity for scientific explanations. He takes 
that model to show that there can be a w ay o f connecting inter- and intra-disciplinary de-
scriptions o f the world at different levels. Stronger forms o f reduction and explanatory in-
terfacing are therefore blocked too 
The consequence o f this is that we have no route from the explanatory success o f particular 
fields and disciplines to a complete or even potentially complete picture o f the world de-
scribed by science. We explain parts o f the world with theories that are appropriate to 
them. What has yet to be shown is that this implies that explanations above the supposed 
final grounding in physics should be read in a realistic spirit. That is, it is entirely possible 
that, similarities in method aside, biology does not reveal a real world in the robust way 
physics is taken to (by scientific realists at least). The success o f biological theories need 
only be pragmatic or instrumental. Such a position could incorporate all the points made 
above about the failure o f reductionism whilst simply qualify ing the failure with the rider 
that the kinds that are used in biological theories are not real Such a position, however, 
could not properly account for the causal properties o f biological kinds. 
Let us now turn to natural kinds terms This is a further aspect o f the assumption o f causal 
closure o f events at the micro-level The assumption about natural kind terms that supports 
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principle P is that natural kind terms can be fixed by definitions that make essential refer-
ence to the constitutional parts of the individuals o f that kind. This assumption too can be 
challenged. 
i i i N a t u r a l k i n d t e r m s a n d e s s e n t i a l i s m 
How are we to understand natural kind terms 0 Do natural kinds have essential properties? 
The prevalent set o f ideas about natural kind terms is rooted in Locke's distinction between 
nominal and real essence.249 Dupre observes that: 
The traditional view . . is that terms of ordinary language refer to kinds whose extension 
is determined by a nominal essence, and hence not ... to natural kinds. Optimists, at 
least, believe also that science, by contrast, attempts to discover those kinds that are de-
marcated by real essences. It is compatible with these two views that on occasion real 
and nominal essences might coincide.2 5 0 
To begin with a sketch. Locke was not an optimist Although we may aim at an articula-
tion o f real essences when trying to say what makes the natural kinds o f the world what 
they are—for Locke the microstructural composition o f each kind (famously gold)—this 
information is unattainable.2 5' However, in the twentieth century , probing and testing the 
microstructure o f stuff like gold (atomic no. 79, atomic weight 196.97 ... ) is possible. 
" Real essence is. according to Dupre (quoting Locke) " . . . whatever accounts for the character-
istic nature of things of a certain kind ("the being of anything whereby it is what it i s") . . . ,' 
and nominal essence. ' ... merely the feature or set of features that we use to distinguish objects 
as belonging to the kind ("the abstract idea which the general, or sortal ... name stands for.")' 
Disorder 20. 
2 5 0 ibid. 22. 
' 5 I There are many interpretations of Locke on his understanding of substance and essence. Since 
depth scholarship is not necessary here. I hav e followed the guidebook' remarks of Lowe, E. J. 
(1995) Locke: on Human Understanding. London: Routledge. Chapter 4. 
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Thus, Putnam 2 5 2 argues that through the division of labour we can have at our disposal, in 
our ordinary use o f language as a community of language users, a close mapping of the 
real and nominal essences That is. experts can tell me whether the heavy , bright yellow, 
malleable, ductile metal 1 have discovered in nuggets in the stream at the bottom of the 
garden really is gold; my ordinary competent use o f the word gold' can be checked against 
the complete definition that includes the properties o f gold s real essence, in referring to the 
stuff accurately, and corrected i f necessary. 
The detail of Putnam's theory is discussed by Dupre in the following way The meaning o f 
any natural kind term is composed o f four parts which he calls a syntactic marker, a se-
mantic marker, a stereotype, and an extension For mouse the sy ntactic marker is 'noun,' 
the semantic marker 'animal.' the stereotype could be 'small, furry creature with a long 
tail, hand-like paws, that squeaks, likes cheese and is eaten by cats, etc..' the extension is 
then whatever theoretical information (microstructural and otherwise) is available about 
mice. Thus, the nominal essence o f mouse' roughly corresponds to the stereotype and the 
real essence to the extension Dupre then points out that this picture does not require that 
everyone in a community o f language users should have know ledge o f the extension o f a 
term to be competent in talking about particular natural kinds. Experts can tell us what 
terms 'really' mean i f we have diff icul ty with the stereotype or need a finer judgement. 
However, this does seem to generate a problem for the ordinary use of language: 
Devotees of the so-called pessimistic induction on the history of science might find it 
particularly distressing to discover that the provisionally of science here threatens to 
undermine the intelligibility of our every day speech."53 
2 5 2 Putnam. H (1975) 'The Meaning of "Meaning"', in Mind. Language and Reality: Philo-
sophical Papers, vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. It is only an earlier Putnam 
that I am critiquing here Sec p. 210 f f for discussion of my support for the most recent Put-
nam. 
253 Disorder 24. 
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Although this comment is bracketed in Dupre's text it is an important observation. Put-
nam's theory attempts to show how the mapping o f stereotype onto extension can be 
achieved through a sameness relation" for any instance o f a kind to the key 'real essence' 
exemplar o f that kind The exemplar having been defined for the actual world (against 
other possible worlds, such as Putnam's "Twin Earth") Ordinary language becomes de-
pendent on science talk: 
It should be clear that Putnam's theory offers precisely a way of tying our ordinary lan-
guage classifications to those provided or eventually provided, by science Given Put-
nam's picture it is natural to suppose that as science adv ances, ordinary language wil l be 
adjusted ... to conform to these more accurate categories Categories that turn out to be, 
from a scientific point of view, wholly vvrongheaded may be abandoned. Or i f they are 
not. we can perhaps recognize that certain backwaters of ordinary language carry on 
outside the pale of orderliness described by science (perhaps as a resource for poets and 
the l ike) . 2 5 ' 
Dupre goes to some lengths to show that ordinary language, as it embodies common sense 
knowledge o f the world, is disorganised and disunified The ontology of common sense is 
highly pluralistic. , 2 ~ He uses many examples from biological taxonomy that show there is 
a mismatch between the categories that science picks out as significant and those that we 
use everyday to describe the natural world. For example, rabbits and hares are different 
species o f the same genus, Lepus, and in terms o f phy siology they are very similar. Yet 
there has been a tradition of regarding them as distinct in fairly clear ways. Dupre quotes 
Bewick on this point: 
2 5 4 ibid. 
2 5 5 ibid 19 
122 
The Metaphysics of a 
Pluralist Biology 
Notwithstanding the great similarity between the Hare and the Rabbit. Nature has placed 
an inseparable bar between them, in not allowing them to intermix, to which they mu-
tually discover the most extreme aversion. Besides this, there is a wide difference in their 
habits and propensities: the Rabbit lives in holes in the earth, where it brings forth its 
young, and retires from the approach of danger: w hilst the Hare prefers the open fields, 
and trusts to its speed for safety.256 
More interestingly, there is no mapping of the 'obvious' distinction between butterflies and 
skippers on the one hand and moths on the other. 
The order Lepidoptera includes the suborders Jugatae and Frenatae. It appears that all 
the Jugatae are moths. The Frenatae ... are further subdivided into the Macrolepidoptera 
and the Microlepidoptera. The latter seem again to be all moths But the former include 
not only some moths but (all) skippers and butterflies : ' ' 
It would seem on the Putnam scheme that either biological categories are not to be re-
garded as having the real essential properties o f natural kinds in the same sense as those 
natural kinds discovered by the physical sciences, or many of the natural kind terms that 
we do use in common sense talk about the world are literally meaningless, since their ex-
tension and stereotype seem too far removed from each other to be reconcileo!—butterflies 
would have to be taken to be a kind of moth Once one moves away from stock examples 
about simple substances like water and gold the pictures becomes complicated in the ex-
treme. Sometimes our common sense natural kind terms pick out individual species, neatly 
mapping onto the extension o f scientific classification, for example bottle-nose dolphin and 
field mouse, but more often the taxon to which to a common label refers varies widely: 
ibid. 29. 
ibid. 28. 
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Ducks, wrens, and woodpeckers form families Gulls and terns form subfamilies King-
birds and cuckoos correspond to genera, while owls and pigeons make up whole orders. 
The American robin ... is a true species, although in Britain robin refers to quite a 
different species/58 and in Australia . . . it refers to a genus of flycatchers.259 
Other classificatory differences between common sense and science are discussed by Du-
pre, and as he points out, common sense classifications are. "unsurprisingly, overwhelm-
ingly anthropocentnc.""6 0 The point is that we are presented with the following possible 
outcomes to the recognition of the failure o f extension and stereotype to even approximate 
to each other in important natural kind terms concerning the natural world: we reject any 
form o f taxonomic realism, taking biological terms to be instrumentally valuable 
only-—they are no longer taken to be the extension of natural kind terms, they do not repre-
sent the real essence o f these terms; we eliminate, by a Churchland-type reduction to the 
language o f science, our common sense terms; or we abandon the idea that the definition o f 
natural kinds need be via essences (of any variety ), and that the world that science de-
scribes is any more ordered than common sense accounts o f it. Now clearly the second op-
tion is ruled out by the failure of reductions of the t>pe needed. This leaves two options 
which are substantially different but which are consistent with the discussion up to this 
point. 
To begin addressing the question of natural kinds and realism we should note that Dupre's 
argument is towards an acceptance of a disordered scientific picture alongside the plural-
ism o f common sense. Rosenberg has claimed that it is 'remarkable*2 6 1 that Dupre does not 
2 5 8 Interestingly Collins English Dictionary (first edition) defines "robin" as 'a small Old World 
songbird. Eriihicus rubecula, related to the thrushes: family Muscicapidae ... [and] a North 
American thrush. Turclus migratorius ... [and] any various similar birds having a reddish 
breast.' 
2 5 9 Disorder. 33. 
2 6 0 ibid. 34. 
261 Instrument. 12. 
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take up the instrumentalism that he himself advocates to avoid the consequences o f episte-
mological pluralism that seem to follow from any combination o f realism and anti-
reductionism about the complexity o f biological phenomena However, it seems to me that 
Rosenberg is giving an over hasty reaction to Dupre's position 2 6 2 But before looking at 
this point more fully we need to be clear how Dupre makes his case against the definition 
o f natural kind terms through essences in science. 
I shall argue that Dupre is correct in his general assessment o f the disorder present in the 
natural kinds the biological sciences discover (indeed, present in any system more complex 
than molecules 2 6 3). His evidence need not entail a pluralism that reaches beyond ontology 
and epistemology in science. By this I mean, although we may come to a pluralism about 
different kinds of things that there are—and consequently to a pluralism o f different scien-
t i f ic realisms—we do not need to lose sight o f science as having a substantially unified 
grounding in rational practice based on the nature o f the kind o f beings we are 
Having introduced the realism problem, w hich wil l inform the rest o f the discussion, let us 
return to the argument against essentialism. We have seen how Dupre demonstrates a 
schism between common sense and biological terms for natural kinds. Biology's taxono-
mies do not match the kind terms of our intuitive division o f the living world into useful 
categories o f things—and they do not map onto each other. Consequently picking out es-
sential properties to define kinds is either question begging in terms o f picking out the 
'real ' world, or the w rong strategy- for natural kinds 
'" Admittedly. Rosenberg points out that in writing Instrumental Biologv or the Disunity of Sci-
ence he had no access to Dupre's The Disorder of Things until the manuscript was all but 
complete. 
3 Rosenberg neatly demonstrates the diversification of sy stems above the molecular level in In-
strument, chapter two. roughly through the distinction of structure and function which is in-
creasingly important in higher level sy stems. More on this below 
125 
The Metaphysics of a 
Pluralist Biology 
This general point can also be seen in the more abstract debate about the definition o f an 
apparently indispensable biological concept, species This is one o f the issues I mentioned 
earlier currently included in the cannon o f philosophy o f biology proper A problem arises 
in determining how the term species should be identified so that all the groups of individ-
ual organisms we want to be included are covered, while the concept still usefully excludes 
higher-level groups or sets of organisms based on arbitrary ' properties such as colour, 
mass or location. Hulls" work on this problem has been influential for decades: 
If characters" is taken to refer to evolutionary homologies, then periodically a biological 
species might be characterized by one or more characters which are both universally 
distributed among and limited to the organisms belonging to that species, but such states 
of affairs arc temporary, contingent, and relatively rare In most cases, any character 
universally distributed among the organisms belonging to other species, and conversely 
any character that happens to be limited to the organisms belonging to a particular spe-
cies is unlikely to be possessed by all of them 2 6 4 
So for any single species there is no defining characteristic The problem is further com-
pounded: 
The natural move at this junction is to argue that the properties that characterize bio-
logical species at least "cluster." Organisms belong to a particular biological species be-
cause they possess enough of the relevant properties or enough of the more important 
relevant properties. Such unimodal clusters do exist, and might well count as statistical 
nature.' but in most cases the distributions that characterize biological species are mul-
timodal, depending on the properties studied. ... To complicate matters further, these 
clusters of properties, whether uni- or multi-modal, change through time. A character, 
state (or allele) which is rare may become common, and one that is nearly universal may 
become entirely eliminated. In short, species evolve, and to the extent that they evolve 
through natural selection, both genetic and phenotypic variation are essential.265 
Hull, D. (1989) The Metaphysics of Evolution New York: SUNY Press. 11. 
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This presents the logical problem o f defining a set o f things without an intension and wi th-
out a fixed extension Hull s own approach has been to treat species as individuals for 
metaphysical purposes, but this does not solve the host of difficulties then arising about 
how to f ix which parts (organisms) belong to which species when, as observed, no charac-
teristics determine species in any useful way And this does not help us resolve the counter-
intuitive nature o f species as individuals Dupre suggests the solution to the status issue 
should be a pragmatic one: 
... to the extent that we take theoretical embedding as the correct way to consider the 
question of the ontological status of species, we are driven to a pluralistic answer: in 
some contexts species are treated as indiv iduals, in others as kinds."66 
Starting with this pragmatic position Dupre goes on to discuss the genuine difficulties o f 
specifying the criteria for species membership in any consistent way. He rejects Mayr 's 
'biological species concept."2 6 7 T h i s takes a species to consist of a group o f organisms 
connected to one another by actual or possible reproductive links, and reproductively iso-
lated from other organisms.' 2 6 8 This concept has been shown to have only limited appli-
cability. 
[I]t has no apparent application to asexual organisms ... Perhaps a more serious d i f f i -
culty is that in a great many actual cases, especially, but by no means only, among 
plants, reproductive isolation is fairly weak. 2 6 9 
The idea has been generalised by discussion o f the f low o f genetic material as the guide to 
the isolation o f a species. This too has faced many problems, as Kitcher has shown. 2 7 0 The 
"66 Disorder 44. 
2 6 Mayr. E. (1963) Animal Species and Evolution Cambridge. Mass: Harv ard University Press. 
2 6 8 Disorder. 46. 
2 6 9 ibid. 
2 7 0 Kitcher. P. (1989) 'Some Puzzles about Species' What the Philosophy of Biologv Is. Ruse, M . 
(ed.) Dordrecht: Kluvver Academic Press. 
127 
The Metaphysics of a 
Pluralist Biology 
transfer of genetic material within a population can only be used as a coherent definition of 
species membership via appeal 
... to epigenetic and homcostatic mechanisms that maintain ihc genetic unity of the 
species in the face of the insufficiency of gene flow to serv e this end. But such an appeal 
immediately raises the question whether these epigenetic mechanisms should not be 
taken as the decisive criteria of species membership. As Kitchcr points out, if it is these 
mechanisms that are in fact the explanation of the unity of the species ... even an addi-
tional requirement that the members of the species be connected by historical links 
would be no more than an ad hoc attempt to insist on the importance of reproductive 
connection." ' 
Dupre then addresses phylogenetic taxonomy where the definition of species is shifted to 
reflect evolution Thus a necessary condition for a group of organisms to constitute a 
species is that they should share descent from some common set of ancestors.'2 7 2 Discus-
sion of the further conditions that are required to spell out a sufficient criterion for species 
membership has generated a further set of difficulties. A strict cladistic approach calls for 
a convergence of genealogical and taxonomic mapping of biological taxa This presents its 
own problems leading to weakened versions, such 'that classification not be inconsistent 
with the genealogical tree."273 
The general motivation for such divergence from strict cladistics is the thought that 
judgements of similarity and difference should have some relevance to taxonomy inde-
pendent of the desirability of recording phytogeny. Such positions will thus require some 
appeal to criteria of speciation distinct from phviogenetic separation.274 
Finally, Dupre moves on to a pluralistic conception of species It is a radical pluralism that 
seems to deal best with all the difficulties encountered, whilst remaining true to the initial 
271 Disorder. 47. 
2 1 2 ibid. 48 
2 7 3 ibid. 
21A ibid. 49. 
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insights in biology on which the various species definitions are based. Dupre takes the idea 
from Kitcher 7 5 who. 
... argues that both historical (evolutionary) and siruciurai (or functional) inquiries 
should be accorded equal weight in biology , and that they may require different classifi-
catory schemes, the latter in some cases demanding a morphological classification. ... 
Nothing in evolutionary theory guarantees that genealogy will always provide us with 
the distinctions we need in order to understand the current products of evolution as op-
posed to the process by which they came to be." n 
That is. Dupre believes that the different results provided by examination of evolutionary 
and functional studies of species relations and membership, demonstrate the kind of onto-
logical diversity he is promoting, and that it is disingenuous to subordinate one or other 
approach in describing the (ontological) structure of biology: 
... I am inclined to suspect that the persistence and intractability of the species problem 
has much to do with a tension between the assumption that science is concerned with 
discovering the real and unique structure of nature and the only slowly dawning realiza-
tion that Darwin has bequeathed us a nature with no such structure.277 
However, embracing such a position does not in itself show that essentialism is a false 
doctrine for science, only that the concept of a biological species cannot be simple or open 
to obvious essentialist theorising. However, in biology there is no shortage of non-essential 
kind terms at all levels of discussion. Again, it is by looking at real kinds that play impor-
tant roles in biology that we move away from the original appeal of a Putnamesque ac-
count of natural kind terms in science. To this end Dupre turns a chapter over to sex. 
2 7 5 Kitcher, P. (1984) -Species' Philosophy of Science 51. 308-333 
2 1 6 Disorder. 50-51. 
2 1 1 ibid. 51. 
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By arguing that sex is indeed an indispensable concept for biology', but also that it ad-
mits no possibility of an esseniialist interpretation. I hope to support the idea that natural 
kinds themselves should be reconceived in a nonessentialist way." 8 
It is not necessary to follow through the details of Dupre's argument The main thrust of 
his argument is that biological sexes cannot be expressed in essential terms given their 
wide variety of expression in the natural world. He is not concerned to deny that, in a gen-
eral sense, we can pick out males and females in sexually reproducing species, only that 
there is no defining property which makes such a distinction 
Crucial for my argument against essentialism. is the observation that even if a kind is 
determined by a real essence, the discovery of such an essence presupposes the discovery 
of the kind. Only the most extreme reductionist could suppose that examining a particu-
lar individual would allow one to determine to what kind it belonged apart from the 
prior recognition and at least partial characterization of that kind. This simple observa-
tion should be sufficient to raise serious doubts about the empirical credentials of real es-
sences ... : 9 
Dupre urges us to take natural kinds as real but without instantiating them through essen-
tial definition: 
There is certainly no harm in calling a set of objects that are found to have substantial 
number of shared properties a natural kind. The discovery of such a kind, however, pro-
vides no basis for the supposition that some particular properties can nonarbitrarily be 
single out as essential. But there is no reason why'the term natural kind should be wed-
ded to essentialism—or. anyway, no more reason than an accident of linguistic history 
that could readily be rectified. :8u 
The upshot of all this is that Dupre uses the variation amongst the individuals of any set of 
biological categories at any level of abstraction to present a pluralistic picture of natural 
-'ibid. 61. 
2 1 9 ibid. 63. 
-80 ibid. 83. 
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kind terms. There is no unique account of how natural kinds are to be related to one an-
other in a fixed hierarchy of terms—an indefinite number of hierarchy relationships can be 
constructed depending on the interests motivating the questioner—an individual organism 
may indeed really be. a blue whale, a mammal, a top predator or a fish. : 8 i We end up with 
the possibility that natural kinds overlap and are disordered 
This is not to suggest, as Rosenberg does in his reading of Dupre, that an obvious conse-
quence is a pluralism of methodology or epistemology In fact. Dupre's insistence on the 
empirical content of his theory—that natural kind classifications cannot be discovered a 
priori—is consistent with a more traditional reading of scientific methodology as a whole. 
He goes so far as to wonder whether the physical sciences are open to the types of criticism 
he has constructed for biology: 
The only way that we could provide grounds for dispensing with this empirical stance 
would be if we were somehow to know what the members of certain kinds were com-
pletely homogeneous in all respects (or in some set of respects somehow distinguishable 
a priori) Many people seem to believe this to be true of the kinds distinguished by 
physics and chemistry, although I find this doubtful. If these doubts are unwarranted, 
physics and chemistry are. in an important respect, very different from biology. But even 
if this is the case, it is surely an empirical fact, not something that could be known a pri-
• 282 
on 
That is, the search for the epistcmologically valuable, however that is characterised, need 
not be abandoned in the face of ontological pluralism emergent from the practice of science 
itself. Later in The Disorder of Things he does argue for a more pluralistic approach to 
epistemology of science too. citing Fey crabend as a role model,2 8 3 but this is only to dem-
" And presumably butterflies are sometimes moths, and arc sometimes not. 
i : Disorder 83-84. 
13 Disorder 262-264. 
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onstrate that there is still a place for determining the good parts of science from the bad; 
that, [i]t is precisely the importance of recognising the disunity of science that it encour-
ages us to try to sort the scientific sheep from the goats." It is to Feyerabend's commitment 
to analy sing the social and political aspects of science that Dupre is appealing Recognis-
ing these factors in scientific enquiry does not lead to science studies, however, only to an 
increased sensitivity to the number of ways we can get the world right in the biological and 
social sciences, and also to how we make mistakes with disastrous consequences for our 
fellow human beings. ~S J 
The pluralism Dupre urges for epistemology is more like a spectrum of applicable epis-
temic values or virtues for a variety of problems. We have already seen how experimenta-
tion can be regarded as such a value when regarded as an agent perspective practice, but 
that its value is hard to specify without a picture of the general structure of science and 
(dis)unity. As things stand we can see an emerging general structure that supports the no-
tion that there are a number of rational scientific practices that we use to investigate a dis-
unified world—experimentation being a major one. In other words, positive liberation from 
the restrictions of reductionism and essentialism does not imply a negative liberation from 
rational, empirical practices."185 Although in the end I hold to an almost neo-Kantian ac-
count of rationality that I read in Putnam, 2 8 6 what is to count as a rational practice at any 
moment in history can only be discovered by looking at what we are doing (and thinking) 
to find out about things.2 8 7 In this case I would not want to put forward Feyerabend as a 
2 8 4 See the section on Foucault and his use of biology below, p. 175 ff. 
2 8 5 This does raise the question of whether picking out current methodological features of science 
as a whole is consonant with metaphysical disunity . See p. 200 ff. for discussion of this ques-
tion 
2 8 6 See p. 210 ff. 
2 8 7 Having said this, the point I have been urging is that I cannot sec how we could ever escape 
from the idea that manipulation is epislemologically valuable because of our being embodied 
beings in a phy sically changeable world with epistemological interests of our own. 
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champion of the kind of position I am advocating, because I want to support a way of 
separating good science from bad that does not throw aside the possibility of demonstrating 
the value of one practice over another. 
iv N a t u r a l k i n d s a n d r e a l i s m 
As already' noted, what Dupre does not address in any particular detail is how this picture 
of ontological pluralism"88 is to be reconciled with a specific form of scientific realism. He 
say s that: 
Certainly I can see no possible reason why commitment to many overlapping kinds of 
things should threaten the reality of any of them ... I do not see why realism should have 
any tendency to cramp one's ontological sty le. 2 8 9 
But what this could mean for realism is not explored in any detail in Disorder. This issue 
must now be addressed, because I have been urging that a realist and non-reductive ac-
count of the ontology of biology is tenable. More specifically . I want to present a way that 
natural kind terms can be understood as real. 
What is scientific realism? In Chapter Two I discussed some issues raised in connection 
with experiments and realism, and while some of Hacking's claims have an intuitive appeal 
through the treatment of some philosophically neglected aspects of science. I have already 
For further discussion of the nature of promiscuous realism see Wilson, R. A. (1996) 
'Promiscuous Realism' British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47, 303-316; Dupre. J. 
(1996)'Promiscuous Realism: Reply to Wilson' British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 
47. 441-444: Wilkerson, T. E. (1993) Species. Essences, and the Names of Natural Kinds' The 
Philosophical Quarterly 43. 1-19; Daly. C. (1996) 'Defending Promiscuous Realism about 
Natural Kinds' The Philosophical Quarterly 43. 496-500. Dupre's and Daly's responses to the 
technical problems raised against promiscuous realism about natural kind terms seem to me to 
be convincing. 
' Disorder 262. 
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said enough to call into question the application of Hacking's experimental realism to 
anything other than a falsely idealised notion of the physical sciences What the discussion 
of experimentation showed is a need to move beyond the current discussion of realism in 
terms of truth or verisimilitude of simple propositions, sentences or statements. 
The traditional picture of scientific realism 2 9 0 gives us a three part account of a theory's 
ability to refer, its truth value status, and the conditions for its acceptance. That is, the 
terms of the best current theories in any (mature) science refer to the external world; those 
theories are true in a correspondence sense (or approximately true, within a specific read-
ing of approximate truth ); and acceptance of those theories involves spelling out the 
grounds for a belief in this truth291—the ontology, semantics and epistemology for theories 
as linguistic entities with a propositional structure (or at least one that is open to proposi-
tional analysis). 
Whole forests have been pulped to carry debates over scientific realism with regard to the 
physical sciences.29" There is a further problem when we try to make the debates fit the 
biological sciences. It is that biological phenomena and entities seem far more complex 
than those picked out by physics or chemistry . The whole discussion of natural kinds and 
" I deliberately simplify the variety of realist theories here in order to demonstrate a common 
error in dealing with science practice In this section by 'practice' I do not mean to draw a 
sharp distinction between theories and experiments, but to include thinking and acting for 
specific epistemological goals (however these are characterised) in a scientific context. 
2 9 1 See, for example, Bas van Fraassen's characterisation of realism in his (1980) The Scientific 
Image, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 2. where he says 'the correct statement of 
scientific realism' is (for his purposes) that: 'Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally 
true story of what the world is like: and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that 
it is true.' 8. Also see. Putnam. H. What is Realism7': Boyd. R. The Current Status of Scien-
tific Realism'; Laudan. L A Confutation of Scientific Realism' and Leplin. J 'Introduction', 
all in Leplin. J. (ed.)(1984) Scientific Realism Berkeley: University of California Press. 
" 9 2 As the use of electronic communication increases, it is likely that more of the debate about 
living entities will rely on the use of silicon and fibre optic technology , than trees and paper. 
This does not diminish philosopher responsibility to make sure they are using resources for de-
bates that really have a purpose! 
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essentialism is the product of this complexity. When we turn to biology the possibility of 
grasping a realist understanding of a pluralistic overlapping, naturally evolving arrange-
ment of categories and things, can seem extremely remote This leads Rosenberg to claim 
that the criteria for accepting theories in a realist way are not fulfillable by the biological 
sciences. Biology, he says, is limited in a far stronger way by our current values and inter-
ests than the physical sciences—the same range of values, interests and theoretical starting 
points that motivate the pluralism Dupre describes Rosenberg puts it like this: 
[bjiology is more of an instrumental science than physics and chemistry in this sense: if 
our cognitive and computational powers were vastly greater than in fact they are. bio-
logical theory would be much different from what it is. while physical and chemical 
theories would not be so different from what they are ... There are interesting generali-
zations embodied in biological theory that we would miss if we eschewed the descriptive 
vocabulary of biology—its "natural kinds"—but these are generalizations in part about 
us and our epistemic resources, as well as generalizations about the world.2 9 3 
The complexity of the biological is, according to Rosenberg, so great that an extension to 
biology of the kind of realist interpretation we give to the physical sciences is beyond mere 
humans. The consequence is that only the physical (the micro-physical) objects of the 
world are real And as already seen, this has consequences for how we might conceive 
unity in science. 
Instrument 5. 
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... we understand why the smooth reduction of biological theory to physical theory is not 
on the cards. Our understanding is compatible with, indeed rests on. a materialist and 
mereological determinist approach to biological systems: they are. as we thought, 
"nothing but" physical ones, even though we cannot sy stematically derive the biological 
from the physical. We also understand . .. why the doctrine of the unity of science must 
be qualified. Its epistemological requirements need no qualification. Biology fully hon-
ours the requirement of empirical evidence But its demand that we systematize theory 
needs to be qualified, and the goals set for the unity of science need to be restricted above 
the level of phy sical theory 2 9 4 
This notion of complexity in biology emerges from Rosenberg s accounts of natural selec-
tion for function. It is the result of a sharp distinction between the one case where a single 
molecule has one function (DNA carrying heredity information) and all other biological 
functions, which are multiply instantiated in many cases This is an extension of the 
'many-many' problem: 
... at apparently every level above the polynucleotide, physically distinct structures are 
frequently found with some identical or nearly identical functional properties, different 
combinations of different types of atoms and molecules, that are close enough to being 
equally stable and equally likely for purely physical causes, to foster the appearance of 
more instances of the kind they instantiate. So far as adaptation is concerned, there are 
frequently ties for first place in the race to be selected. As with many contests, in the 
case of ties, duplicate prizes are awarded. The prizes are increased representation of the 
selected types in the next "reproductive generation."295 
This is one of the reasons why we, with our limited abilities, w ill never be able to describe 
the complex biological world without importing our own interests and schemes to structure 
the description—the multiple realisation of biological functions in physical systems is just 
too dense a network of relations that we could hope to properly say what is going on. 
294 ibid. 55. 
295 ibid. 27. 
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In principle the dispute between realism and instrumentalism should be neutral on the 
question of whether nature is simple enough for us to discov er regularities about it. If we 
can discover such regularities, the instrumentalist and the realist will fall to disputing 
whether such regularities prov ide knowledge beyond the sequence of sensory data to 
which we are subjected My thesis, however, is not neutral on the simplicity of nature, it 
claims that nature is sufficiently complicated that we cannot hope to discover regularities 
that operate at the level of biology . Thus in biology we must content ourselves with heu-
ristic devices, useful instruments.296 
So the question about how to properly explicate the realism that could support ontological 
pluralism is brought to the fore, otherwise there is no means to choose between Rosen-
berg's instrumentalism and Dupres realism—at least about the ontology of the world biol-
ogy appears to reveal. This returns us to natural kinds and taxonomy If it were possible to 
show just how natural kinds can be related to each other in a complex, pluralistic way and 
how we would want to find theories about that world acceptable, then there would be 
grounds to favour a realist picture of biology Such an account is available and is sensitive 
to the dynamic epistemological models already mentioned in the previous chapter. 2 9 7 
Rosenberg's fears about the consequences of pluralism are very like Smith's. Their moti-
vations for trying to secure unity for science are based on the fear that without unity in 
methodology and epistemology gaps wide enough to allow in such offensive 'sciences' as 
astrology and creationism are opened in the framework of the rest of our best scientific 
theories. As I have stated already, and shall continue to demonstrate, these fears are ill-
founded. 
' ibid. 7. 
291 p. 53 ff. 
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1 Kinds and laws 
Recent work by Aronson. Harre and Way"" provides an interesting combination of insights 
into work in artificial intelligence, epistemology and metaphysics Their aim is to articulate 
a form of scientific realism that by-passes some of the problems that have beset old at-
tempts to relate the ontological. semantic and epistemological components of real-
ism—basically by trying to avoid talk of'degrees of propositional truth." 
The unique feature of our treatment is the way in which we have substituted a model 
world serving as a knowledge-representation system for the traditional idea that all 
knowledge/world relationships must be discussed in terms of a wholly propositional way 
of representing knowledge.3™1 
Although their theory is developed for the phy sical sciences, their solution to how theories 
relate to the world as models of type-hierarchies of natural kinds has application to the 
biological sciences, thus demonstrating the possibility of an articulated account of realism 
for biological kind terms.3 0 1 Their argument is as follows. 
The key is to see scientific knowledge as a model that relates to the world, not principally 
through truth, but through similarity They refer to sets of things in the world as 'kinds' 
and in models as "types." Types are ordered in type-hierarchies, to be discussed below. 
Aronson, J. L. , Harre. R.. Way. E C. (1994) Realism Rescued: How Scientific Progress is 
Possible London: Duckworth. 
Interestingly , in discussing their account of type-hierarchies Aronson et al. refer constantly to 
biological classification problems and intuitions for examples and counter-arguments to alter-
native positions 
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It is worth addressing the kind of causal mechanisms that are being imputed by Rosenberg. 
In an unpublished response to Rosenberg. Dupre characterises Rosenberg's position in the 
following way: 
On Alex's picture it is by virtue of being a certain aggregation of physical particles that 
the object [a bear] has the causal consequences it does Perhaps most of the aggregations 
of physical particles that would succeed in constituting a bear would have the relevant 
causal consequences, and perhaps there is even a selective explanation for this happy 
coincidence—an explanation that might even explain why an ontology of bears is one 
that serves my reproductive interests well enough. But for all this, the ontology , or per-
haps the mythology of bears, lions, snakes, and so on is one forced on us only by our 
cognitive limitations If we were smart enough we would identify things as just the pre-
cise aggregation of physical particles that they w ere and predict their behaviour from the 
law s of physics: we would not shackle our thinking to the physically heterogeneous cate-
gories of biology ."98 
Dupre goes on to remark that Rosenberg's characterisation of theorising about biological 
kinds as 'empiricist' is odd. given his acceptance of the reality of only unobservable physi-
cal particles. Rosenberg is trapped by the belief that there will be complete causal descrip-
tions of the objects in all our other ontological schemes obtainable from a finished physics. 
This gives priority to physics that is justified only by arbitrary choice and a seventeenth 
century obsession with atoms. However, it remains to be seen whether we can be clearer 
about the reality of ontological schemes in biology . Having exposed the assumptions of 
Rosenberg's argument for instrumentalism we are certainly in a position to say that there is 
no reason not to take biological kinds as real—the grounds for each case will be as good 
(or as bad) as you like—but I think it is possible to be more positive in saying how we can 
understand natural kind terms to fit with disunified pluralism of real kinds. 
Private communication of a v erbal response to Rosenberg. 2 Marked J hereafter. 
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The basic idea behind our point of view is this in the real world there is just one set of 
objects, each of which has its own cluster of properties Instead of attempting to repre-
sent our knowledge of this world primarily in propositions or in terms of sets which are 
defined only by their members, we propose to represent that knowledge in a model 
world In our treatment the relation between the multiplicity of properties of one set 
of objects that constitutes the real world is represented in the model world by splitting 
the ontology of the model world into a hierarchy of sets of entities, each set distinguished 
by the properties common to the members, where the multiplicity of properties of an 
entity in the real world is represented by the multiplicity of sets of ordered pairs of enti-
ties each with just one property in the model world 3 0 : 
Ultimately they believe that scientific theories are an expression of the metaphysical struc-
ture of the world, which is. I take it. a reasonable form of scientific realism. They survey a 
number of different ways that kinds have been understood in philosophy and else-
where—that is, the way s in which kind terms have been seen to get their meaning and have 
been related to one another—dismissing simple accounts of the use of similarity to group 
individuals together. The main objection to these theories is that any two objects can be 
seen to have an indefinite number of similar properties 3 0 3 This leads them to acceptance of 
an 'open texture' account for scientific discourse, based on Waismarm's 3 0 4 modification of 
Wittgensteinian 'family resemblance": 
12 ibid. 16. 
1 3 It is this that Dupre is trading on. in part, in his criticisms of traditional accounts of natural 
kinds. Aronson et al also note some problems with robins: 
"Keil (1979. 1981) has pointed out that many commonplace categories such as robin' and 
squirrel' collect up diverse entities that share many important properties that almost never 
show up in people s listings of attributes for a category . For example, has a heart, breathes, 
sleeps, is an organism, is an object with boundaries, is a physical object, is a thing, can be 
thought about, and so on." Disorder 21. 
14 Waismann. (1968) How I See Philosophy London: Macmillan 
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According to Waismann the structure of a scientific terminology is such that there is al-
ways an open question as to how our ways of describing a new instance are to be fitted 
into an existing type-hierarchy No hierarchy is so complete that it is predetermined how 
we should use it to deal with marginal cases. ... Type-hierarchies are sensitive to the 
state of our empirical knowledge and the articulations of our theoretical concepts.305 
This is consistent with the empiricism at the heart of Dupre's theory of natural kinds 
Similarly, Aronson. Harrc and Way dismiss accounts of kind meaning that refer to 
'prototypes' and cores* for reasons that appear to accord with Dupre's. 'The prototype 
seems to function like the nominal essence, while the core sounds suspiciously like real 
essences."306 There is a difference here, however. Dupre. following CartwTight, limits the 
application of laws to restricted cases as ceteris paribus laws, whereas Aronson et al em-
brace the notion that natural kind terms operate as they do because of fixed laws: 
... the idea that the extension of ... natural kind words ... are not fixed by a set of 
criteria' laid down in advance, but are. in pan. fixed by the world. There are objective 
laws obeyed by multiple sclerosis, by gold, by horses, by electricity, and what is rational 
to include in the classes of entities constitutive of these kinds w ill depend on what those 
laws turn out to be.3" 
Aronson et al are more committed to there being a discoverable, objective and regular or-
dering to the world. The question is, does this entail a commitment to an essentialist defini-
tion of natural kinds, one that would put this theory in conflict with Dupre? I do not think 
so. What these considerations reveal is a distinction in Dupre's account of realism for 
natural kinds that needs to be appreciated with care. We need to return to the distinction 
Dupre makes between a strong and weak reading of natural kinds. His thesis is that natu-
Aronson et al op cit. 24. 
ibid. 26. 
ibid. 40. 
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... realism vis a vis nalural kinds does not commit one to the belief that there is a 
unique best taxonomy in terms of natural kinds' The belief that there are many orders 
of natural kinds is perfectly compatible with the claim that natural kinds are objective 
and carve nature at its joints What type-hierarchy we choose to work with may depend 
on the type of problem we are try ing to solve, the nature of the phenomenon under in-
vestigation, and so on.3" 
This can be made consistent with Dupre's pluralism. Disagreement over the nature of laws 
might well be problematic if one were to accept the whole of Aronson's et al theory of sci-
entific realism, since they insist that dispensing with the semantic and epistemological parts 
of realism about science has been a failing of past theorising under the rubric of scientific 
realism.3'2 However. I see no reason for one not to support the idea that scientific laws are 
far more restricted in scope and are also the structure behind the natural kinds we find it 
useful to describe: Dupre notes, 
... the fact that physicists are doing something very well doesn't imply that they have the 
most sophisticated grasp of w hat they are doing so well. (If it did there would surely be 
no use for philosophers of science . . . ) 3 1 3 
In any case I am not proposing that all of the theoretical position of Aronson et al is taken 
up, only that their analysis of natural kind terms can be used to support the disunified plu-
ralism discussed.3'4 
Where we need care is in reading what follows from this interpretation. Aronson et al want 
to argue that natural kind terms understood in this way reveal (and are revealed by) the 
311 ibid. 42. See also Boyd. R. (1990) op at. 
3 1 2 ibid. Chapters One. Six and Nine. 
3 1 3 Dupre \ 4. 
3 H I am aware that I leave myself open to criticism by using the material from Realism Rescued 
in this way. It is possible that Aronson et al have made some fundamental errors that I uncriti-
cally incorporated into my account here. However. 1 feel that as an attempt to articulate certain 
difficult problems with natural kinds that does not fall back on positivist formalism, their posi-
tion, whilst itself using older theories and discussions, does advance the debate about how we 
might take natural kinds to be real to a considerable extent 
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nomological structure of the world The only alternative to their form of realism about 
natural kind terms is conventionalism—which they take to be the view that categories and 
kinds do not exist independently of their description by human beings. They allow for in-
terests and conventions to enter into their theory of kinds, but only in a limited way and 
they leave unanswered questions that we might raise about the ontological status of kinds 
found in the social sciences: 
The principle that any classification scheme must pay homage to the actual causal pow-
ers in nature does allow for a measure of convention to enter into the way we classify 
things but not in the way the conventionalist intended. Choice between competing 
schemes may be a matter of conv ention to the extent that each system is compatible w ith 
the causal structure of the world. If the choice between two conceptions is arbitrary. ... 
then they reflect the causal structure of the w orld equally well (or badly).3' ' 
They point out that many of our every day categories and kinds are the result of a mixture 
of conventional and natural (causally independent) choices And they also note that there 
are a wide variety of cases that are a combination of natural and artificial classifications.3 1 6 
However, what their notion of conventionality implies is that there are limits on what is to 
be classed as natural. '[T]he naturalness of kinds.' Dupre also observes, 'will turn out to 
be a matter of degree: some kinds will turn out to be a good deal more natural than oth-
ers.' 3 1 7 Obviously there are categories of things that are made by human beings having 
particular interests. 'Surfaces that are good for use as an artificial football pitch' is one 
such category. We may ask: what makes them good as artificial footballing surfaces? what 
property(ies) do they have that allows us to identify them and thus leads us in pursuit of 
other such surfaces? And the answers may point to an 'open textured" (family resem-
3 . 5 ibid. 43-44. 
3 . 6 ibid. 44. 
3 P Disorder 61. 
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blance) response, there being no single property that all such surfaces share. But once 
again, it does not follow f rom the idea that there are no essential properties picking out 
kinds that there is no real kind o f surfaces good for football matches independent of human 
beings classify ing them as such 3 1 8 But neither does this position imply that all kinds are 
real. Before I say any more on this, let me f i l l in the Aronson et al account of natural kind 
terms. 
2 Hierarchies 
It is important to bear in mind that we are not primarily concerned with the question of 
how we decide whether an individual belongs to a kind, artificial, conventional or natu-
ral. Rather our project is to give an account of what it means to say that it does.319 
Types are ordered into a hierarchy—types, y ou wi l l recall, being representations of kinds. 
These are related via a semantic network, an idea developed in A I , for the representation o f 
how types are ordered in a hierarchy of increasing complexity (a taxonomy). In this order-
ing (taxonomy) types are nodes in a network. Higher types that include one or more lower 
types are sometimes called supertypes and the lower types are called subtypes. For exam-
ple, 'b i rd ' is a supertype that includes the subtypes 'duck" and 'goose.' This results in a 
shift away from dealing with individuals represented in propositional form: 
The issue of whether and how we might draw a line between the entirely made up human 
constructions and real kinds wil l have to wait for the next chapter 
3 1 9 Aronson el al op cit. 15. 
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Instead of speaking of isolated substances and their properties, we speak of systems 
where the internal relations among properties determine the system as being of a particu-
lar type, captured by giving it a specific location in the type-hierarchy ... It is the very 
same location in an ordering of natural kinds that enables systems, in the above sense, to 
serve as models. In other words, ontological atomism is replaced by global-ontological 
relationalism. And here we ... learn one way in which this particular metaphysical doc-
trine has serious ramifications for the epistemology of science We cannot make cate-
gorical or counterfactual predictions ... until we first determine the specific nature of the 
sy stem with which we are dealing.3 : 1 1 
We are returned to one of the questions from the end o f the last chapter—how deep wil l 
our ambivalence about the kind of things that we manipulate in experiments reach? Once 
we understand a little more ful ly the sy stem being described here, we shall be closer to an 
answer to this question. In fact Aronson et al are aware o f the need to include material 
agency as part of their account (although they do not use this term) 
It has been customary for philosophers to take science" as something made concrete as 
discourses: that is. as journal articles, text books, monographs and lectures. ... 'Science' 
also takes concrete form in models and experimental procedures. Models are real or 
imagined representations and analogues of naturally occurring entities, structures and 
processes. Experimental procedures not only lead to observable results but involve the 
manipulation of substances and entities which human beings are unable to observe.321 
It is modelling that is crucial to the type-hierarchy representation o f natural kind terms. 
Models are indispensable parts of our descriptions o f the world Indeed for Aronson et al 
type-hierarchies just are models o f parts o f the world. As I pointed out with explanation, 
universal answers to specific questions that include everything, are of no value—a model 
o f the Universe that includes everything in it (including all models) would be valueless. So 
we need a procedure for determining which models are better than others in picking out 
important analogies between the model and the world, analogies that wi l l do work for us in 
3 2 0 ibid. 6. 
321 ibid 3. 
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explaining other phenomena and entity behaviour More basically we also need a way o f 
characterising the connection between the nodes o f our models— that is. capturing the re-
lationship between types that actually does model the kind o f relationship between kinds in 
the world. 
Looking at the basic issues first. Aronson at al point that defining hierarchy relationships 
in terms o f class inclusion (and modifications thereof) fail because o f problems in distin-
guishing between classes that have co-extensive membership To use a well worked exam-
ple, all organisms with a heart also have lungs, so simply defined extensionally 'organism 
has a heart* w il l be just the same t\pe (node) in the t\pe-hierarchy (network) as 'organism 
has a lung." This is unacceptable since, obviously, we want to make a distinction between 
having a heart and having lungs for modelling and explanatory purposes in real science 
contexts. Adding an account o f meaning, intension to the class inclusion relation does not 
solve the problem. 
The fact is that i f we use class inclusion to order the nodes of the hierarchy, then the 
nodes still have to denote classes. For even intension that is a corresponding extension. 
Thus, although we have a sense or meaning for the concept dog', it also will have an 
extension, which is all the actual (and possible) dogs. By introducing the notion of a 
class intension, we are able to distinguish two classes in our intensional network by vir-
tue of their members having different defining altributes ... . 3 : : 
But where two categories are again co-extensive, any subtype wil l have the supertype o f 
both classes. That is, 
... i f the relation between these intensions is class inclusion, then what we really have 
are two classes whose members are identical and. as a result, whose subtypes have mul-
tiple parents.323 
3 : : ibid. 30 
3 : 3 ibid. 31. 
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For example, has a four chambered heart' is a subtype of 'has a lung' as well as 'has a 
heart." From these considerations Aronson et al conclude that, despite the apparent power 
and formally well established benefits of class membership as the defining relationships 
between types, 
... it is inadequate to the task of representing the relation between the nodes of a hierar-
chy in a way which naturally motivates the actual arrangement of subtypes and su-
pertypes that we find in hierarchical sy stems in use in science and elsewhere.324 
So they use the notions of determinate and determinable to define how one type falls under 
another This gives them a way of pointing out the specificity of the relation—'the deter-
m i n e . . i s more specific than the determinoA/e ."3"" They begin with Searle's discussion 
of this relationship to spell out the conditions for types falling under other types.3 2 6 The 
criteria are: 
1. Specificity Types at the lower levels imply the types above them to which they belong, 
but not vice versa. " . . . a determinate entails its determinable but the determinable does 
not entail its determinate."327 For example, if there is a simple type-hierarchy B I R D — 
D U C K — M A L L A R D — then if Donald is a duck, then he is a bird, but it does not fol-
low that he is a mallard. 
2. No differentia That is. there is no "genus-species" relation where a third, logically in-
dependent property determines the more specific type. A mallard is a duck, but there is 
no extra, essentially defining property that makes the grouping of creatures 'mallard.' ' 
3 2 4 ibid. 
3 2 5 ibid. 
3 2 6 Searle. J. (1959) "On determinates and resemblances' The Aristotelian Society for the Sys-
tematic Study of Philosophy Part I I . Supplementary volume 33. 141-158. 
3 i Aronson et al op cit. 33. 
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... for a term A to be a determinate of a term B, A must be an undifferentiated sped-
fier of its determinable B. ' J" 8 
3. No conjunction of determinates. This excludes determinables that have parts where 
only one part is functioning as the determinable For example, in the type-hierarchy 
given we want to exclude the possibility of 'fat duck" being a determinate of 'bird' 
'Being non-conjunctive entails being undifferentiated, so we now have as a necessary 
condition of A s being a determinate of B that A is a non-conjunctive specifier of B . ' 3 2 9 
4. Determinable and determinate are logically related This requirement states that the 
more specific determinates should be logically exclusive of one another in any particu-
lar type-hierarchy. A duck cannot at the same time be a goose. Of course, we may at 
different times use different schemes to call an individual a duck and later a goose. This 
excludes determinables such as 'duck and happy' where 'duck' and 'happy' can be 
determinates. Aronson et al quote Searle's own description of this criterion: 
Genuine determinates under a determinable compete with each other for position within 
the same area, they are. as it were, in the same line of business, and for this reason they 
will stand in certain logical relations to each other.330 
5. Same level determinates. The determinates of a given determinable are at the same 
level in hierarchy For example, 'duck and 'goose are at the same level. 'Two terms A 
and B are same-level determinates of C if and only if they are both determinates of C 
and neither is a specifier of the other.'33' 
3 3 8 ibid. 
329 ibid 33-34. 
3 3 0 Searle op at. 148 
3 3 1 Aronson et al op cit. 34. 
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In Searle's account of the determinable-determinate relation there is an unanalysed notion 
o f entailment Determinates entail determinables So we still need to find the precise nature 
of the relationship between the parts o f the type-hierarchy so that it becomes clear what 
logical relation" involves Aronson et al make this point further: 
There is another more serious problem with using entailment to explicate the relation 
between determinables and determinates. It is the same problem that confronted the ... 
rival analyses: if two concepts are co-extensive, they can be uniformly substituted in any 
entailment relation Thus by using entailment as a primitive ... Searle has reintroduced 
all the problems of co-extensive classes ... Thus, like classes and class inclusion, inten-
sions and class inclusion, entailment is too weak a relation to capture the structure of our 
concept " : 
In order to resolve this problem, we need to modify the relation rather than junking all o f 
Searle's criteria. At this point Aronson et al make explicit an important feature o f how 
they are using the notion of a semantic netw ork. 
Semantic networks which have types organised according to levels of generality also 
support a very important property, that of inheritance. In a hierarchically structured se-
mantic net the properties and relations of any giv en type can be inherited by all of its 
subtypes. ... This is called an inheritance hierarchy, or sometimes an /sa-hierarchy.333 
It is the idea that subtypes inherit the properties o f the supertype to which they belong that 
structures the hierarchies for Aronson et al. A mallard isa duck isa bird and in being as-
cribed to the type mallard inherits the properties o f being a duck and being a bird. 
3 3 : ibid 35-36. 
3 3 3 . ibid 36-37. 
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Thus what collects the determinates under a determinable is the fact that they are all ca-
pable of inheriting meta-propcrties from that determinable. ... Inheritance gives us a 
way, then, to non-arbitrarily structure hierarchies: according to whether or not the sub-
types of determinables can take on the meta-properties of the supertype or determinate 
parents. The notion of inheritance is also able to explicate Searle's notion of the logical 
relation between determinates under the same determinable. They are all ' in the same 
business' because they all inherit a set of meta-properties from their determinables.nA 
This means that we can generate a sixth criterion for the structuring o f type-hierarchies: 
6. Inheritance of properties. ' ... for any two terms A and B, I f A is a determinate o f B 
then for any property P, i f P is a second-order property o f B then P is a second-order 
property of A . ' For example, i f we specify 'having a beak' as a property o f 'b i rd ' and 
define it in terms o f 'hardened skin around the mouth' and 'evolutionarily adaptable for 
variable feeding and display purposes' then we would understand 'having a beak' 
through the same properties for 'duck.' 
What we now need to do is define w hat is in fact meant by inheritance. Aronson et al do so 
through identity relations by arguing that we need to find the laws describing the properties 
for each type in the hierarchy and then show that properties at lower levels are just the 
same properties (and therefore manifestations o f law s) o f a higher supertype. 
To say ... of a given object that it is a kind of thing means that the object in question is 
the same as one of the combinations or arrangements of objects represented by the rele-
vant supertype, a combination or arrangement that is a way in which the common 
'supertype' property is realised. It ... means that the common subtype property is identi-
fied with the common supertype property. The identity, here, is between the macro-
scopic property common to the things presented by the subtype and a macroscopic prop-
erty common to all the combinations of entities represented by the supertype.335 
334 ibid. 38. 
3 3 5 ibid. 45. 
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I shall not pursue these details any further As suggested, it serves as an example of how 
we might understand what it means to say that we can grasp a diversity of ways of classi-
fying an object without supposing that this classification of things is any less robust than a 
simple unifiable system It does not follow that all sy stems will work in this way, nor that 
this model will work for all fields of science—discovering that would involve a survey 
each area separately But we do have a way of beginning in this enterprise, and hence a 
way of facing critics who would doubt the rigour of a philosophy of science that strays a 
long way from the formal, positivist, unificatory epistemological and metaphysical ideal 
Unfortunately what this account of natural kinds, as I have sketched it, has not shown is 
how we can understand scientific realism about kinds. Although we have good grounds for 
rejecting monism and instrumentalism, and we can now be fairly specific about how to un-
derstand natural kind terms and their expression in scientific theories, my argument has not 
directly given grounds for a realist reading of natural kinds. Aronson et al do so by provid-
ing an account of verisimilitude that attempts to avoid the problems of accumulating truth 
as a collection of true propositions. In so far as this leads us to embrace practice and the 
non-propositional components of science it can only be for the good. But as already noted, 
Aronson et al rely heavily on a straightforward notion of scientific laws as universal, fun-
damental and expressible. If this is rejected, the defence of realism does not of necessity 
fail, but it does look more disunified. It should be obvious that I do not consider this a bad 
conclusion to draw. The rest of the thesis will show how deep this methodological disunity 
might be and why a rejection of scientific realism and the idea that realism about science is 
a reasonable assumption, cannot be countenanced 
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v M a n i p u l a t i n g r e a l k i n d s — some q u e s t i o n s 
a n s w e r e d 
I have argued that experimentation is an epistemological virtue based on our ability to 
manipulate things beyond ourselves. This virtue is found in the context of science as well 
as elsewhere We can now see more clearly how we might characterise the context for sci-
ence. Scientific theories are instantiated in models of parts of the world. The type-
hierarchies that these models form, as Aronson et al describe them, are analogues of the 
ordering of real natural kinds. Natural kinds reflect the law-like generalisations that we 
draw about the behaviour of the world, and the world participates in the forming of these 
laws through material agency , which in turn is used by us as the core of manipulation and, 
hence, experimentation 
However, our understanding of the laws of nature is limited by the ceteris paribus charac-
ter of their application. Consequently , since w e have thereby limited the nature of the laws 
we can form, we only ever construct ty pe-hierarchies that are orders in part—every context 
of interest reveals a different ordering of types Types are related to natural kinds through 
identity and analogy in a way that, again, can be spelled out by use of the Aronson et al 
theory of natural kinds as described above Taken together with the analy sis of the failure 
of reductionism, essentialism and any minimal account of unity the result is a realistic, plu-
ralistic and disunified reading of the natural kinds in biology. We do not need to lapse into 
instrumentalism to comprehend the complexity of biological kinds 
Aronson et al argue that their ontosemantics determines that we cannot just do anything in 
an attempt to discover the nature of things in the world; we do need a context of kinds in 
which to carry out our manipulation. I do not believe that this is in conflict with the kind of 
ambiguity that Gooding discusses Gooding is concerned with cases where we have some 
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uncertainty about whether the things we observe in experimental situations are in fact 
really entities of specific kinds or outside the possibilities for the experiment altogether. 
Further investigation w ould help to resolve this ambiguity, but the sort of experiments that 
are earned out do rest on assumptions about the kind of things that are assumed to be real. 
This naturally brings us back to Hacking s experimental realism, but the final demonstra-
tion of why it fails on its own w ill have to wait for the next chapter 
What w e are left w ith is a problem about how to decide the status of the vast range of type-
hierarchies we might construct Aronson et al are happy to admit that there are systems 
that are conventional and based on artifice, and human interests beyond the epistemic. For 
our present concerns, the question is this, how are we to understand the possibility that 
some of the types w e find in parts of biology that deal w ith human beings have no analogy 
in real natural kinds? Does not the possibility of the social construction of types, and hence 
kinds, undermine the possibility of grasping anything real This will be the subject of the 
next chapter, and will provide a solution to the issues about experiments and realism. 
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How many questions 
Are there on a forest floor? 
What's a forest floor? 
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4 F o u c a u l t and the 
C o n s t r u c t i o n of K i n d s 
When I heard the learn'd astronomer. 
When the proofs, the figures, were ranged in columns before me. 
When I was shown the charts and diagrams, to add. divide, and measure them. 
When I sitting heard the astronomer where he lectured with much applause 
in the lecture-room. 
How soon unaccountable I became tired and sick. 
Til l rising and gliding out I wander d off by myself. 
In the mystical moist night-air. and from time to time. 
aving put in place the metaphysics for a pluralistic, non-reductive biology we now 
-•-need to return again to the issue o f realism. Having an account o f a possible meta-
physics for biology is not enough to properly articulate the science and its impact on our 
lives, since it is more than 'mere theory / but also a practice sensitive to the agent perspec-
tive discussed in Chapter Two 3 3 7 The question that we have been concerned with through-
out can be put like this: by what criteria are we to judge the reality claims for objects o f 
study o f a field o f enquiry? This is a question that is only answered once we can also make 
sense o f that field o f enquiry as practice. 
We saw in Chapter Two how Hacking articulates an experimental realism for the physical 
sciences and why there is some doubt about the extension o f this form o f realism to other 
3 3 6 Whitman. W. (1975) 'When I Heard the Learn'd Astronomer' Walt Whitman: the Complete 
Poems Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 298. originally published in By the Roadside. 
3 3 7 See p. 26 ff. 
Look'd up in perfect silence at the stars. 336 
i I n t r o d u c t i o n 
H 
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disciplines Hacking is not particularly helpful here Whilst he acknowledges that pluralism 
is an entirely acceptable stance.338 he wants to draw a clear line between science that deals 
with entities in an objective mind-independent world and sciences that construct kinds o f 
people for us to discuss and into which we can transform ourselves So there is an imme-
diate question about whether classes o f things that are not people can be real. Of course, 
given the discussion o f the previous chapter this question is most pressing for us in any 
analysis o f biology that supposes that a plurality o f kinds is real, and that biology is an 
experimental science, which it clearly is. 3 : > 9 We have seen that the manipulation o f classes 
and kinds of things is a part o f biological experimental practice in experiments with crop 
yields and plant behaviour under environmental pressure. And in studies o f human sexual-
ity, types are manipulated in models to find further correlations o f types to supposed kinds. 
However, Hacking applies his analysis only to theoretical entities So one solution to the 
tension here would be simply to say that kinds are not real in the way the entities o f particle 
physics are—species in this context just are individuals, as the pluralist approach to spe-
cies suggests. But even i f it could be argued that we need to treat species and strains as 
individuals whose properties are being manipulated in these cases, we are certainly not 
dealing with unobservable entities that somehow remain free o f our schemes o f classifica-
tion—whether this classification is based on common sense, phylogenetic, or ecological 
taxonomies. That is. treating a species as an individual rather than a class does not provide 
us with neutral entities free from the taxonomy in which we find these entities. This prob-
lem remains: how might we understand Hacking's experimental realism in any case that 
moves away from its initial application to theoretical unobservables?340 
3 3 8 Hacking, I . (1992a)' "Style" for Historians and Philosophers' Studies in History and Phi-
losophy of Science 23. 
3 3 9 See the examples, p 78 ff. 
3 4 0 There remains the problem of how one should pick out these unobservable entities without 
wondering about their belonging to a classification of any sort However. I do not think that a 
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In what follows we shall see more clearly the motivation behind Hacking's program and 
how we can reinterpret his experimental realism in a pluralistic metaphysics o f science that 
uses experiments as a central methodological tool I also address the issue o f how biology 
should be seen in relation to the social sciences—an important relationship, given the im-
pact o f biology on our self understanding and the discussion above. 3 4 ' M y aim is to com-
plete my analysis o f Hacking's philosophy of science and show what can be salvaged from 
his experimental realism that is o f value for biology I do this by taking a somewhat un-
usual route through the work of Michel Foucault. It wi l l emerge that correcting Hacking's 
reading o f Foucault gives us a better, more nuanced description o f biology's relationship 
with the physical and social sciences, and points the way to an overall assessment o f biol-
ogy and scientific realism. 
To begin with a sketch, Hacking's basic claim with regard to the relationship between the 
natural and the human is that. 
In natural science our invention of categories does not "really" change the way the world 
works. Even though we create new phenomena which did not exist before our scientific 
endeavours, we do so only with a licence from the world (or so we think). But in social 
phenomena we may generate kinds of people and kinds of action as we devise new 
classifications and categories. My claim is that we "make up people" in a stronger sense 
than we "make up" the world. 3 4 2 
He takes two influential, but divergent philosophers as central to this distinction, suggest-
ing that Kuhn and Foucault have done roughly the same thing for the natural and social 
sciences respectively. According to Hacking, they have each introduced an aspect of a 
criticism generated from a position that placed the metaphysical horse before the pragmatic 
cart is entirely appropriate here. This is not to deny the importance of the point: there are no 
bare particulars. 
3 4 1 See p. v IT 
3 4 2 Hacking, I . (1995) Three Parables' in Pragmatism: a Contemporary Reader Goodman, Rus-
sell B. (ed.)(1995) London: Routlcdge. 241. 
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nominalism into our understanding of the categories that structure each of these areas of 
enquiry What this actually means will become apparent as we proceed. But in short, for 
Hacking's nominalism the transparent rationality of follow ing this or that line of enquiry is 
not a feature of the world: it is the product of the taxonomies we have chosen Hacking 
has argued that Kuhn and Foucault address different issues—natural sciences and human 
sciences—in different ways because there is a fundamental resistance from the world to 
our actions on it that is absent in the construction of accounts of human beings. Conse-
quently Hacking's Foucault does not talk about the physical sciences, and his Kuhn does 
not discuss the social sciences This leaves the biological sciences undiscussed, as we have 
already noted We need to look in more detail at what Hacking says about Foucault to see 
why this is the case 
Foucault often seems to be referring to biology, giving various roles to the development of 
the understanding of life and the medical application of biological knowledge in his writ-
ings across all stages of his work—from the archaeological, to the genealogical, to the ethi-
cal. Yet, in most cases this reference is indirect. Most obviously in The Order of Things*43 
he discusses the development of biology from natural history in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century. The key transformation is from a procedure of listing and classifying to 
a recognition of function as a defining property of life. But even here, where Foucault 
sounds most like a structuralist, the notion that biology's history—beginning in an epis-
teme of classical ordering and listing—should lead us to believe that modern biology is to 
be understood as no more than a particular way of talking, or writing, is not followed 
through by Foucault. So Foucault s attitude to biology is not immediately clear. 
Foucault. M . (1970) The Order of Things An Archeology of the Human Sciences London: 
Routledge (trans, of (1966) Les mots et les chose Paris: Gallimard] 
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An outright rejection o f Foucault's insights into our institutionalised 'normalising tech-
niques' 3 4 4 is unwarranted, 3 4 5 yet his overall strategy often seems ill at ease with any form o f 
scientific realism, ;/vve suppose that Foucault was ultimately concerned to undermine the 
possibility o f any philosophically sound account o f how we would justify knowledge o f an 
objective world at all. I f we are reading Foucault in this way, there is no reason to suppose 
that any aspect o f science should give us objective knowledge that is unstructured by our 
linguistic practices founded in socio-political interests. For Foucault, biology plays a cru-
cial role in the variety o f categories that crop up in his studies o f the construction o f human 
kinds—sometimes it seems that this reading is the correct one. This is an important issue. 
Having partially dispensed with Rosenberg's instrumentalist challenge f rom a shared ra-
tional stance, are we then faced with the charge that this initial assumption o f rationality 
should be abandoned? I f we take biology seriously can we maintain that there is a clear 
distinction between the natural and the human, when biology has such an immediate impact 
on questions o f human nature at the end of the twentieth century , and the human sciences 
seem in a state o f continuing, spasming self-reflection? Hacking wants to secure natural 
science by making this distinction clear without providing any indications o f what happens 
to biology. 
Let us first uncover some shared background. I shall firstly explore a series o f connections 
between Hacking, Kuhn, Bachelard, Canguilhem and Foucault. Then I shall present a 
reading o f Foucault that makes more sense o f his expressed opinions o f his own philo-
sophical project, than the selective interpretation given by Hacking. I shall then support 
3 4 4 Foucault's term for the means by which we come to accept the kinds and classifications of 
ourselves that are the norms of our culture. Famously Foucault discusses the mad, the sick, the 
criminal, the sexually deviant, and so on. 
3 4 5 For this claim I offer no defence here, except in so far as Foucault's whole program can be 
interpreted as consistent with an objective reading of rationality in the way I shall suggest be-
low. 
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this with examples of where we would expect to find Foucault using biology in his histo-
ries Finally. I shall return to Hacking to pin down the faults in his epistemology that the 
discussion reveals In the last section of this chapter I shall briefly look at how we might 
correct recent historiography of discussion of sex hormones, given my analysis of Hacking 
and Foucault. 
ii H a c k i n g on K u h n a n d F o u c a u l t — 
n o m i n a l i s m in p h i l o s o p h y , s c i e n c e a n d 
s o c i e t y 
Hacking has great respect for Kuhn. 'No one from his generation has had a more dramatic 
impact on the philosophy of science than T S. Kuhn ... the totality of the work of this 
historian places him among the major philosophers of this century . ' 3 4 6 Although the paper 
that contains this praise was written over ten years ago. it is still generally true that, 'any 
discussion of the relation between history and philosophy of science will begin with The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions' This, he notes, is peculiar since Kuhn wrote only on 
the natural sciences (indeed only on the physical sciences) and, 'there is a time-honoured 
opinion that history matters to the very content of the human sciences, while it does not 
matter much to the natural sciences.' It is not through the application of history to the 
comprehension of ideas that marks Kuhn out for Hacking In fact. Hacking suggests that 
on the whole Kuhn has been ignored by the majority of scientists working in the natural 
sciences in this respect: ' ... he did not succeed, and could not have succeeded, in histori-
cizing natural science.' 3 4 7 Where Kuhn's power lies is in the analysis of the construction of 
the order on the world: 
ibid. 240. 
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I hold that Kuhn has importantly advanced the nominalist cause by giving some account 
of how at least an important group of "our" categories come into being in the course of 
scientific revolutions There is a construction of new systems of classification going hand 
in hand with certain interests in describing the world, interests closely connected with 
the "anomalies" on which a community focuses in times of "crisis." At the same time 
this cannot lead us to a very strict nominalism, for the anomalies "really" do have to ap-
pear to be resolved in order for a revolutionary achievement to be recognized. Removal 
of anomaly is never enough. Kuhn has taught, because all sorts of social conditions are 
needed for a revolution to "take " But reality has to go some part of the way—more than 
a wider, stricter, nominalism would allow.3 4 8 
Hacking has further clarified his reading of Kuhn in 'Working in a New World: The Taxo-
nomic Solution."""49 The nominalism that Kuhn advances in Structure2*' has a fairly simple 
form, despite the ontological relativity that seems to be implied by talk of new worlds after 
scientific revolutions—what Hacking calls "the new-world problem.' Hacking proposes 
that while the Kuhnian nominalist accepts that the world itself does not change during a 
change of paradigm, that world is composed only of individuals; the world that we describe 
from within a particular paradigm is one composed of 'kinds of things.'351 Thus it is pos-
sible for us to speak of living in a different world after a revolution: it is the taxonomy of 
the world, the ordering of the kinds of things that it contains as understood, described and 
manipulated by the scientific community, that has changed. 
Hacking is the first to admit that his 'is an unusual approach to Kuhn's past and even pre-
sent writing.' 3 5 2 It is, however, most instructive in understanding Hacking's philosophy of 
3 4 8 ibid. 240-241. 
3 4 9 Hacking. I (1993) Working in a New World: The Taxonomic Solution', in World Changes, 
Thomas Kuhn and the Nature of Science ed. Horwich. P.. Boston: Bradford Books, MIT, 275-
310. 
3 5 0 The nominalism that leads Kuhn to say that, though the world does not change with a change 
of paradigm, the scientist afterwards w orks in a different world . . . - Kuhn. T. S. (1962) The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions Chicago: Chicago University Press. 121. 
3 5 1 Hacking (1993) op cit.. 277. 
3 5 2 ibid. 280. 
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science. Firstly, it gives further insight into how methodological unity in science, under-
stood through a philosophical examination of experimentation may contain confusions with 
ontological unity Secondly, if correct as an account of what scientific realism is (that is, 
experimental realism), its usefulness can be tested by observing its applicability to all of 
the natural sciences, that is. to the biological as well as the physical sciences. If we sup-
pose that biologists also experimentally create phenomena, does Hacking's position have 
any power, especially when taken together with the recognition that biology can be used in 
the 'making up' of kinds of people, and even sometimes looks like the human sciences as 
Foucault addresses them' ,35:' Without a stronger commitment to giving a place for the 
metaphysics of science to provide an appropriate context, experimental realism looks 
empty with regard to the proposal that the world itself does not change in the application of 
revolutionary nominalism, as he labels Kuhn s position 
Hacking's reading is confirmed when we look at the expressed relationship between 
Kuhnian nominalism and Hacking's own position: 
... Kuhn leads us into a "revolutionary nominalism" which makes nominalism less 
mysterious by describing the historical processes whereby new categories and distribu-
tions of objects come into being. But I assert that a seemingly more radical step, literal 
belief in the creation of phenomena, shows why the objects of the sciences, although 
brought into being at moments of time, are not historically constituted. They are phe-
nomena thereafter, regardless of w hat happens. I call this "experimental realism."354 
This, Hacking claims, places him in similar territory to that of Gaston Bachelard who 
'believed in scientific accumulation and connaissance approchee.' that 'what we accumu-
late are experimental techniques and styles of reasoning,*3" not knowledge. It is worth 
3 Seep. 175 fT. 
" Hacking(1985)o/>c/r. 244. 
•- ibid. 
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looking at this claimed similarity because Bachelard is formative for Foucault, the source 
of human science nominalism Hacking's Foucault was concerned with uncovering the hid-
den processes of category creation, the coming into being of kinds of people. As shall be 
made plain shortly. Hacking wants to use the differences between Kuhn and Foucault, de-
spite their shared rejection of essential ordering categories, to lend support to his own gen-
eral attitude to understanding the natural sciences Locating himself alongside Bachelard, 
Hacking is linking himself to a constellation of ideas in French philosophy—not the usual 
French considerations of the subject and her experiences, but the examination of knowl-
edge, reason and rationality Gary Gutting calls this the Bachelard-Canguilhem net-
work 3 5 6 Both Bachelard and Canguilhem can be seen to have been significantly formative 
for Foucault, and they are both important in deepening our understanding of Foucault's 
position on a number of questions about the natural sciences. 
Their influence can also be seen in other writers concerned with the questions Hacking 
finds interesting. Certainly the idea that there are breaks in the historical development of 
science is a key feature of Bachelard s work, decades before Kuhn, 3 5 7 and it is clear that he 
was sensitive to the practices and techniques that make up the day-to-day activities of sci-
entists; Man,' Tiles states, 
Gutting. G. (1989) Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press. Chapter 1. 
1 Gutting [op cit. Chapter 1] picks out two different uses of "break" in Bachelard's 
work—between science and common-sense and between two scientific conceplualizations' (p. 
16). As Gutting points out. all the notions o( "rupture." "coupure." "mutation." and the like 
that Foucault. Althusser and others popularised in the 1960s are directly taken from Bachelard 
(p. 52). 
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Bachelard is concerned with the dynamic processes of correction, revision, rejection 
and creation of theories, with the dynamics of the experimental and the theoretical prac-
tices of science ... his concern is not with scientific knowledge as expressed by theories, 
but with the knowledge, the understanding of scientists which enables them to make sci-
entific advances. The knowing subject is never absent from Bachelard's epistemology, 
and. perhaps most importantly, this subject is historically located 3 5 8 
Hacking writes on these issues too. as my earlier examination of Representing and Inter-
vening showed However, Bachelard was alert to the notion that science just does not dis-
play a unified application of rationality. Examination of the history of science will uncover 
only a regional application of rationalities, 'les regions rationales. " 3 5 9 This regionalism 
does not imply the all-embracing epistemes of Foucault s The Order of Things—it is a 
recognition of the potential impossibility of unify ing science across the history of particular 
fields, or between these fields. It is hard to find such sensitivity in Hacking—he moves 
back and forth from statements about the physical sciences to sweeping claims for scien-
tific realism for science as such 3 6 0 Hacking may even be read as implying a simple meta-
physical reduction of biological categories to physical ones through his approach to ex-
perimentation, although it is unclear that he could consistently state this explicitly. Fur-
thermore, Bachelard did not support the kind of phenomenological realism about everyday 
objects that Hacking quite obviously upholds with his talk about the extension of the notion 
of the real from everyday objects to the world that physics describes. By contrast 
Bachelard 'vigorously defends the reality of the entities postulated by explanatory scientific 
theories and even maintains that it is these entities rather than the objects of ordinary expe-
Tilcs. M. (1984) Bachelard: Science and Objectivity Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
9 
' Bachelard, G. (1949) Le rationalisme applique Paris: PUF. Chapter 7. 
' See, for example, his thoughts about the manipulation of biological entities and light micros-
copy in Representing and Interv ening, a book otherwise concerned with physics and spraying 
electrons. His supposed pluralism is ambiguous in these contexts. 
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rience that are the concrete realities of the physical world. 3 0 1 Again this touches on what 
kinds of pluralism and realism Hacking is defending He often seems to be saying that we 
suppose everyday objects to be real because he can do things with them, hence manipula-
tions and interventions are our best criteria forjudging theoretical things to be real. Again, 
this seems not to exclude kinds of things as he claims it does. 
However one chooses to look at Bachelard and Hacking these surface similarities and dif-
ferences are apparent when we look at what Hacking says about Foucault. 
Foucaulf s books are mostly about practices and how they affect and are affected by the 
talk in which we embed them The upshot is less a fascination with words, than with 
people and institutions, with what we do for people and to people. He does have a noble 
obsession wilh what he takes to be oppression: the asylum, the prison, the hospital, pub-
lic hygiene and forensic medicine His view of these practices may be entirely wrong ... 
But one thing is clear. Foucault ... has not been locked in a cell of words. Moreover, it is 
precisely his intellectual work, his philosophical work, that directs our attention away 
from our talk and on to our practices.36" 
Hacking too has a noble obsession" with practices that create But. Hacking argues, the 
nominalism that Foucault introduces into our understanding of the sciences concerned with 
describing human beings has a much greater scope than the 'revolutionary nominalism' of 
Kuhn, which he endorses In effect Hacking does not see that there may be more to prac-
tices in contexts that are not physics, practices that also provide support for realism in 
contexts. 
In 1982, Foucault wrote 
" Gutting (1989) op cit. 29. 
: Hacking (1985) op at 246 
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I would like lo say. first of all. what has been the goal of my work during the last twenty 
years It has not been to analyze the phenomena of power, nor to elaborate the founda-
tions of such an analysis 
My objective, instead, has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in 
our culture, human beings have made subjects ... Thus, it is not power but the subject 
which is the general theme of my research.363 
The contrast between Kuhn and Foucault rests for Hacking on the fact that he thinks, 'a 
strict and universal nominalism is a preposterous mystery Nominalism about the ordi-
nary natural kinds of experience, about grass, trees and stars" is a real problem. People, 
on the whole, present no such problem.3 6 5 He suggests that this gives us a second kind of 
nominalism, 'dynamic nominalism " Categories of people come into existence at the same 
time as kinds of people come into being to fit those categories, and there is a two-way in-
teraction between these processes.'3 6 6 He gives examples from his own studies of early 
nineteenth century statistical measurement where, 
[constantly new ways of counting people were devised. New slots were created into 
which people could fall and be counted. Even the decennial censuses in the different 
states amazingly show that the categories into which people fall change every ten years. 
This is partly because social change generates new categories of people, but I think the 
countings were not mere reportings. They were part of an elaborate, well-meaning, in-
deed innocent creating of new kinds of ways for people to be. and people innocently 
"chose" to fall into these new categories.36 
3 6 3 Foucault. M The Subject and Power'. Critical Inquiry: 8. no 1 (Summer 1982). 777. 778. 
3 6 4 Hacking (1993) op cit. 247 
3 6 5 Hacking does say that. [p)eople arc alive or dead, tall or short, strong or weak, creative or 
plodding, foolish or intelligent. These categories arise from the nature of people themselves ... 
, ' ibid. 247. but he offers no account of w hy these categories (particularly intelligence, for ex-
ample) should not be inventions of kinds themselves. 
i66,bid. 
367 ibid. 248. 
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It is with these constructions that Hacking s Foucault seems solely concerned, around 
which the human sciences arc clustered Like Kuhn's revolutionary nominalism, Fou-
cault's dynamic nominalism is an historicized nominalism.'368 But the difference really 
does make a difference. Thus. Hacking gives the warning: 
I think we shall lose ourselves in confusion and obscurity for some time yet, in the so-
called social and human sciences, because in those domains the distinction between 
word and thing is constantly blurred. It is precisely experimental methods that I take to 
be essential to the physical sciences and which. I claim, make Kuhn's historicized revo-
lutionary nominalism fall short of a strict nominalism. The experimental methods of the 
human sciences are something else.3 6 9 
He does not say what the experimental methods of the human sciences are. Note, once 
again the lacuna of biology 
To digress slightly, once more, in 'Michel Foucault's Immature Science' 3 7 0 Hacking does 
comment that. "fw]hen we turn from a belief in revolutions to an attempt to analyze their 
structure there is little agreement between Kuhn and Foucault, but possibly this is because 
Kuhn is less concerned with immature science 3 7 1 However, the distinction between mature 
and immature science does not re-occur in Hacking's writing about Kuhn and Foucault, 
which is a pity because it might have better served Hacking as a means of untangling his 
own position on kinds and the construction of kinds. 
To repeat the point, there is a potential gap in all this. It concerns what we are to make of 
the biological sciences In order to show why this hole is damaging for Hacking's attempt 
to drive a wedge between the social and the natural we must firstly look at whether the de-
368 ibid. 248. 
369 ibid. 249. 
3 7 0 Hacking. I. (1979) Michel Foucault's Immature Science' Noiis Volume XIII Number 1 39-52. 
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scription of Foucaults work given by Hacking is a sustainable interpretation Then we 
need to look at how biology is employed by Foucault. and examine whether, and to what 
extent the categories and taxonomies used are mere creations. In doing this I could be ac-
cused of confusing medicine and biology, for it is surely medicine w hich has the most rele-
vant impact on the human sciences. I hope that the following will suggest why the social 
aspects of the biological sciences, that is, accounts of physiology, pathological anatomy, 
genetic diversity and determinism, are not simple medical issues The final section on a 
recent study of the history of sex hormones should make this clear enough. 
Mi F o u c a u l t , h i s t o r y a n d p h i l o s o p h y 
1 Foucault, Bachelard and Canguilhem 
There is a tendency to downplay Foucault's work as a philosopher and historian of sci-
ence—his other more socio-political theses tend to dominate current interpretations of his 
writings. Whether Man" is dead or not37" is no longer a live issue understanding Fou-
cault's work/ 7 3 As Gutting's admirably clear (and. in places, controversial) survey of his 
earlier published material shows. 3 7 4 Foucault did have an evolving general picture of sci-
ence. In this aspect of his work the debt to both Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem is 
clear. 3 7 5 From Bachelard Foucault took the notion that the disclosure of practices in any 
3 7 2 One of the central theses in The Order of Things being that it is only through the possibility of 
separating the notions of the object and subject of know ledge that Man' has become something 
that can be studied at all. allowing Foucault to talk aboul the death of Man' w ith the dissolu-
tion of this divide wiih the end of the modern episteme. 
3 3 Foucault explicitly rejected this thesis later in his expansion of his archaeological method of 
the limits of language into examination of the practices, techniques, institutions that are char-
acteristic of his genealogy, as we shall see. 
3 7 ' Gutting (l 989)o/7. at. 
3 5 Georges Canguilhem succeeded Bachelard at the Institute d'Hisloire des Science el des Tech-
niques. University of Pans in 1955 w here Bachelard had been professor from 1940. Foucault 
places them both w ithin a tradition in recent French thinking of a philosophy of know ledge, of 
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particular area of human enquiry can only be 'regional'; he also made great use of the 
breaks that occur in each of these regions of rationality However. Bachelard's focus is on 
physics—he is concerned to show how the revolutions in physics at the beginning of the 
century should be incorporated into our philosophical perspectives of science; Tiles de-
scribes his position in the following way: 
... Bachelard sees his task, as a philosopher of science, as being to give a philosophical 
characterisation of contemporary , twentieth-century scientific thought and of the differ-
ence between the philosophy appropriate to the science which is developing in the wake 
of relativity theory and quantum mechanics.3 6 
Georges Canguilhem. concerned primarily with the articulation of the history of biology 
and medicine, carried forward many of Bachelard's key concepts including those of epis-
temological breaks and obstacles.3 7 7 but these become less a case of all-or-nothing. Episte-
mological obstacles are not of necessity negative in Canguilhems epistemology of science. 
Gutting suggests that the difference lies in Canguilhem's starting point with history rather 
than philosophy, and his interest in the biological sciences and with their applications to 
people. We do not need to trace the details of the precise differences between Bachelard 
and Canguilhem here, but for our current purposes it is also worth noting that it is in Can-
guilhem that we find another key idea for Foucault. the discussion of the opposition of the 
normal to the deviant, the health) to the pathological. He argues that although there is a 
sense in which the environmental options for a diseased organism are fewer than for a 
healthy one. this can be expressed as a normative understanding of these terms. The 
rationality, and of the concept" - Foucault. M (1985) La vie: l expcrience ct la science." Revue 
de metaphysique el de morale 70. 4. trans. Gutting. G 
6 Tiles o/?. at. 10. 
An epistemological obstacle is any anachronistic concept that is used in a field of science 
That is. it is an idea that prevents further development of that science, or the full adoption of a 
new theory, by an unconscious' reference back to an older theoretical framework. 
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healthy are not only best fitted to the environments relative to which they arc found to be 
healthy, but are also in a position to decide what should constitute health in other situations 
too. That is. 
[bjeing healthy means being not only normal in a given situation but also normative in 
this and other eventual situations. What characterizes health is the possibility of tran-
scending the norm, which defines the momentary normal, the possibility of tolerating 
infractions of the habitual norm and instituting new norms in new situations 3 7 8 
The way in which Foucault extends and develops this idea is easy to see. For a long time it 
seemed to be the question of how objective analysis of what we know about ourselves is 
possible that occupied Foucault In his early and middle period works it looks as though 
the possibility of transcending the norm' is lost That is. he talks as though the processes 
through which we come to know about people in the regions (the discourses) he examines 
are interminable power games, where people are subjected to norms and classifications for 
control, without the possibility of ever adopting a rational perspective from which these 
norms can be justified. This is what Hacking understands as 'dynamic nominalism.' O f 
course, if this were correct, one would have serious doubts about how this insight about 
the structuring of the human w orld (and hence the world for all good structuralists) through 
the interplay of language, power and institutions could ever itself be justified, or given a 
status above these games But in Foucault's later work we see that this is to assume too 
much about the structuralist components of Foucault's ideas. 
Canguilhem. G. (1978) On the \onnal and Pathological Dordrecht: Rcidel. 115. quoted in 
Gutting (1989). 47. 
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2 Aufkiarung379 
'What is Enlightenment."38u an essay never published in French, contains many revelations 
about what philosophy was for Foucault and how he had come to see his whole life's work 
by 1984. the year of his death in discussing Kant's own account of the Enlightenment, he 
presents a picture of philosophy as a means of liberation through an uncovering and cri-
tique of illegitimate uses of reason, although this may not always be in the systematic theo-
retical way that is recognisable in contemporary analytic philosophy. When confronted 
with the uses of reason to dominate and control: 
It is precisely at this moment that the critique is necessary, since its role is that of defin-
ing the conditions under which the use of reason is legitimate in order to determine what 
can be known, what must be done, and what may be hoped. Illegitimate uses of reason 
are what give rise to dogmatism and heteronomy, along with illusion; ... it is when the 
legitimate use of reason has been clearly defined in its principles that its autonomy can 
be assured.381 
This is consistent w ith the Kantian project of finding the limits of reason through the appli-
cation of reason itself But Foucault abandons the hope of securing any a priori or neces-
sary limits. 
9 Enlightenment' The interpretation 1 present of Foucault's philosophy owes much to Gutting 
(esp. (1989) Introduction and Chapter 7. Reason and Philosophy ) and Davidson. A. I. (1994) 
'Ethics as Aesthetics: Foucault. the history of ethics, and ancient thought' in Gutting. G. (ed.) 
The Cambridge Companion to Foucault Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
, u Foucaull. M. What is Enlightenment'7" in Rabinow. P. (ed.)(1986)77;e Foucault Reader Har-
mondsworth: Penguin Books 
1 ibid. 38. 
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Criticism indeed consists of analyzing and reflecting upon limits. But if the Kantian 
question was that of knowing what limits knowledge has to renounce transgressing, it 
seems to me that the crucial question today has been turned back into a positive one: in 
what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by what-
ever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints? The point, in brief, 
is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical 
critique that takes the form of a possible transgression.382 
So that ultimately. 
The critical ontology of ourselves has to be conceived as an altitude, an ethos, a philo-
sophical life in which critique of w hat we are is at one and the same time the historical 
analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of 
going beyond them.38' 
Often it is assumed that Foucault's work contains within it the self-refuting relativism that 
threatens all forms of structuralism. It does not. He saw philosophy as 'the endeavour to 
know how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently/ 3 8 4 The projects he 
undertook were regional' studies—following the regionalism of Bachelard—with a view 
to exposing the illegitimate limitations 'imposed on us' in each of these areas, the human 
sciences as such, psychiatry, clinical medicine, judicial imprisonment and punishment, and 
so on. 
ibid. 45. 
3 ibid. 50. 
4 Foucault, M. (1985) The I ses of Pleasure—The History of Sexuality Volume 2 Harmond-
sworth: Penguin Books. 9 |trans. by Hurley. R. of (1984) Histoire de lasexualite, II: I'usage 
des plaisirs Paris: Gallimard) 
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... Foucaull's focus is always on the domains of "dubious disciplines" dealing with hu-
man beings There is no suggestion that he thinks his archaeological method could be 
applied to sciences like physics or chemistry to show that their claims to truth and objec-
tivity are questionable There is, in fact, strong reason to think that Foucault on the 
whole accepied the objec'.ivis! view of these disciplines held by Bachelard and Canguil-
hem.3 8 5 
Indeed it has been argued by Rudi Visker in a recent book. Michel Foucault: Genealogy as 
Critique196, that one of Foucault's concerns is about a rather familiar problem, that of de-
marcation, how w e assign 'scientificity' to fields of enquiry Thus Foucault says: 
It is surely the follow ing kinds of question that would need to be posed: What types of 
knowledge do you want to disqualify in the very instant of your demand: 'Is it science'? 
Which speaking, discoursing subjects—which subjects of experience and knowl-
edge^ —do you then want to diminish' when you say: I who conduct this discourse am 
conducting a scientific discourse, and I am a scientist'?38 
Clearly this has a different edge to Popper's concerns with demarcating science from non-
science, but it contains within it the suggestion that there are some domains that do qualify 
as science, though there must be care in how we see power in the accolade "science. ' 3 t * 
We are in a position to state a little more clearly what Hacking s 'dynamic nominalism' 
does and does not involve, and whether it can be taken as a good interpretation of Fou-
cault's general program In Hacking's reading of Foucault. dynamic nominalism is a per-
spective on how people are constructed by the network of relations they have to other peo-
ple, bodies of know ledge, linguistic practices, institutions and society as a whole. The cate-
3 8 5 Gutting (1989) op c/7. 273 
3 8 6 Visker. R (1995) Michel Foucault. Genealogy as Critique (trans. Turner. C.) London: Verso. 
3 8 Foucault. M (1980) Two Lectures' Power Knowledge London: Harvester Press. 85. 
3 8 8 Of course, in a more analytic setting it is Mary Midgley w ho has most consistently questioned 
an unchecked scicntism in our culture, our praclices and institutions See. for example. 
Midgley. M. (1989) Wisdom. Information and Wonder: What is Knowledge For? London: 
Routlcdge. 
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gories that are so constructed have no real" basis in the world and would seem to be as 
plastic as you like This is as far as Hacking goes What he fails to take on board is that 
Foucault's analyses do not involve a denial of the possibility of having any objective 
knowledge. It is entirely compatible with Foucault's philosophical project that we could 
get the human sciences right' in the future, although we would always be on the look out 
for illegitimate use of reason in such a future. The emergence of biology from natural his-
tory as a shift in underlying epistcmes does not deny biology's current status as an activity 
that tells us from a rational standpoint what the world is like. 
3 Foucault's use of biology 
So how does Foucault use biology ' Roughly speaking, the chronological order of Fou-
cault's interests, the institutions that exercised him during his life, are psychiatry, insanity 
and mental illness, clinical medicine, the human sciences, punishment and prisons, sexual-
ity and the creation and discipline of the subjective self. Of course, he addresses many 
other issues, but these are the concerns of his major works. What I w ish to show now, by a 
brief survey of some of these, is that it is the application of know ledge about the biological 
world that is so important to how biology became involved in the power/knowledge rela-
tions he examines 
I have already mentioned that for Foucault. biology has not always existed as identified 
field of enquiry. In both The Order of Things and The Archaeology' of Knowledge™9 he 
gives an analysis of the construction of discursive practices that bring together all sorts of 
separate questions and information enabling a science such as biology to emerge. It is clear 
that Foucault believes that it is only when there is a concept of function incorporated into 
our world picture that biology can come into being in its present form. The Order of 
3 8 9 Foucault. M (1972) The Archaeology of Knowledge London Routlcdge |trans. by Sheridan 
Smith, A. of (1969) L ' acheologie du savoir Paris: Gallimard|. 
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Things contains an account of the birth of biology from the transformation of natural his-
tory. For Foucault natural history is not the study of life", there is no such unify ing prop-
erty in the Classical episteme. From the mid-seventeenth century until the beginning of the 
modem episteme in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century natural history was a 
procedure of classification. Putting things in order and specify ing their place in great tables 
of being does not necessarily require that the life is picked out as an object of study in it-
self. The development of analysis as a conceptual tool points, for Foucault, to the historical 
observation in the Classical age. 
... analysis was quickly to acquire the value of a universal method; and the Leibnizian 
project of establishing a mathematics of quantitative orders is situated at the very heart 
of Classical thought: its gravitational centre But. this relation to ntathesis as a gen-
eral science of order does not signify that knowledge is absorbed into mathematics, or 
that the latter becomes the foundation for all possible knowledge: on the contrary , in cor-
relation with the quest for a mathesis. we perceive the appearance of a certain number of 
empirical fields now being formed and defined for the very first time. In none of these 
fields, or almost none, is it possible to find any trace of mechanism or mathematiciza-
tion; and yet they all rely for their foundation upon a possible science of order.390 
So, during the Classical episteme. there can be no biology as such This requires the mod-
ern concern with function as the primary point of view in studying living things. With the 
introduction of the over-arching idea of function, finding the similarities of structure and 
mapping increasing complexity in forms of organisms onto a continuum no longer looks 
good enough. Gutting comments. 
Foucaull (1970) open. 57. 
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... the property of life is no longer just one category of natural classification Rather, all 
classifications express subdiv isions of life (defined in terms of functional system): to 
define a thing's species is to specify the precise sort of functional sy stem that it is. As a 
result, life becomes the category that defines the objects of biological enquiry as such, 
and modern biology becomes, in contrast to Classical natural history , the science of 
life.™ 
There have been many criticisms levelled at the historical accuracy of Foucault's factual 
support for his argument in The Order of Things. The difficulties with the details need not 
detract too much from the point being made, which is repeated in a slightly modified form 
in The Archaeology of Knowledge. Here Foucault lays out what it is that the archaeologi-
cal method he has been employing up to this point is supposed to be He explicitly states 
the purpose of archaeology to be the uncovering of the discursive formations39" that make 
up our field of knowledge On first reading this would suggest that biology is going to have 
to be treated simply as the constructed amalgam of many different discursive techniques. 
This, however, is not what Foucault argues in Archaeology. Uncovering discursive forma-
tions is not the same as the analy sis of the philosophy of a science. Foucault draws a dis-
tinction between connaissance and savoir. Connaissance is an specific body of knowl-
edge, which could be any modem science. Savoir is the discursive formations that make 
possible any particular connaissance: 
In Foucault's v iew, a particular science .. . is the locus of connaissance whereas a dis-
cursive formation is the locus of savoir. As such, the savoir of a discursiv e formation 
provides the objects, types of cognitive authority . . . . concepts, and themes (theoretical 
categories) that are necessary for a body of scientific connaissance.*91 
" Gutting (1989) op cit. 191 
'"' ... Foucault regards a discursiv e formation as involving four basic elements: the objects its 
statement are about, the kinds of cognitive status and authority they have .. .the concepts in 
terms of which they are formulated, and the themes (theoretical viewpoints) they develop." 
Gutting (1989) op cit. 232. 
* ibid. 251. 
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This can be used to strengthen the claim made earlier: Foucault does not question the ob-
jectivity of the natural sciences. The connaissancesavoir distinction does not lead us to 
conclude that, although particular aspects of the discursive formations are traceable 
through the history of a science such as biology, they are all that there is to such sci-
ences—discursive formations are linguistic practices only and the natural sciences consist 
of more than that It is possible that an attack on the 'legend'3 9 4 notion of rationality could 
be constructed along these lines, but Foucault does not do this. Clearly then it is legitimate 
to question the status of the norms of practice, inference and rationality that underpin this 
unity—as recent work on the philosophy of experimentation does, for example. This sort of 
analysis of'good" and 'bad" science is important whether one is a pluralist or a unification-
ist about methodology However, it does not necessarily follow that rationality is excluded 
from savoir. That is. it does not follow that rationality is always excluded from the condi-
tions that make scientific knowledge possible. Indeed, the reason why Foucault's studies 
are interesting is because he shows how the savoir of all sorts of human practices can be 
thoroughly irrational. A deeper relativism would imply quietism about these is-
sues—something which Foucault quite obviously opposed in his active political life. Con-
sequently, although (according to Foucault) biology comes into being in the nineteenth 
century with Cuvier's discussions of organ functions, there is little to suggest that biology 
should be treated as constructed knowledge, in the sense that it lacks objectivity and ra-
tionality I concede, of course, this is only a possible interpretation of what Foucault has to 
say about science—indeed it could be argued that there is evidence in his writing that when 
taken alone would discredit it. As Robert A. Nye has noted, in reading what Foucault says 
about science: 
See the discussion of Kitcher's The Achancement of Science, above, p. 53 ff. 
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... biology, it would appear, is a special case, falling somewhere between these two dis-
cursive domains [ph>sical science and social science], and it is by no means clear that 
Foucault decided where it belonged. With his teacher George Canguilhem, he appears to 
recognize the distinction between the sciences of life and other sciences, but. also like 
Canguilhem. he contrasts self-regulating organic systems with human societies that 
think about themsehes with the help of biological models Yet elsewhere he assimilates 
biology to the human sciences with their notorious epistemological sensitivity to the dis-
continuities and upheavals of political and social history 3 9 \ 
So having said all this, it is knowledge of the living world, through its many applications, 
that time and again Foucault reveals as essential to the hidden power play behind our social 
institutions, and that seems vulnerable to the same critiques that Foucault applies to the 
institutions that they support So how does Foucault use biology? 
In what follows I shall use the word 'biology' to refer both to biology in its modern sense 
and the natural history of the eighteenth century The sharp split that Foucault sees in Or-
der is unworkable in practice in any case: the date for the birth of biology is much harder 
to place. Be this as it may. time and time again in the earlier works it is the general trans-
formation of discursive practices from the Classical tabulation of all beings and forms to 
the modern era's concern with discovering hidden functional and historical relations be-
tween things that is the background to the discussions. 
4 Mad, bad and dangerous to know 
In his earliest writings Foucault s notion of an 'archaeology' for each of his studies is still 
vague and ill-defined. His earliest accounts of mental illness attempted an analysis of 
mental disorders that broke with the traditional picture of their being similarly structured to 
organic disorders, the psy chic analogue of disease'3 9 6 and instead revealed them to be 
' Nye. Robert A (1994) Lose and Reproductive Biology in Fin-de-Siecle France, a Fou-
cauldian Lacuna9' in Foucault and the Writing offfiston- Goldstein. J (ed.)(1994) Oxford: 
Blackwell. 151-152. 
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products of any bourgeois society197, however that society might be structured. By the time 
he wrote Madness and Civilisation™ the Marxist elements in his work had been dropped 
in favour of an exploration of the mechanisms that those who failed to share the values of 
their society were controlled and regulated at different times—thereby suggesting a con-
structivism culturally relative reading of mental illness. This view of the mad involved ex-
tensive analysis of those who tried to say exactly what was w rong w ith these people. Fou-
cault traces the treatment of insanity from the Classical to the beginning of our own mod-
ern age—roughly, from the sixteenth century and the dominant popular image of 'the Ship 
of Fools', through the incarceration of mad people ('the Great Confinement' in the seven-
teenth century ), through attempts to normalise and make them socially acceptable in the 
eighteenth century , to nineteenth century conceptions of mental disease and the beginnings 
of psychology and psychiatry proper, particularly as instantiated in the w ork of Freud. 3 9 9 
The standard history suggests that this progress is a movement towards increasingly hu-
mane treatment of insanity brought about by an increased understanding of what insanity 
is. Foucault questions whether this is an accurate history . He wishes us to take from his 
study the notion that madness has become increasingly regulated during this period; that 
the authority of those who diagnose madness, especially doctors, has been strengthened 
tremendously; and that the medicalisation of madness presents a solidification and institu-
tionalisation of the means of control for undesirable elements in society. Now clearly this 
See Foucault. M. (1976) Mental Illness and Psychology New York: Harper & Row [trans, by 
Sheridan A. of (\95A) Maladie mentale el personnalite Paris: PUF ] 
s Foucaull. M. (1971} .\ ladness and Civilisation: a History of Insanity in the Age of Reason 
London: Roullcdge |trans (and abridged) by Howard. R. of (1961) Folic et deraison: Histoire 
de la folic a I age classique Paris: Plon.| 
5 The subtitle to Madness and Civilisation is A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason because 
the majority of his analysis is of madness in the eighteenth century 
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picture is one that contains the simple idea that all power represses As Hacking has said it 
seems that, 
[a]n exclusion is an exercise of power. It is a putting away. Despite all the fireworks, 
Madness and Civilisation follows the romantic convention that sees the exercise of 
power as repression, w hich is wicked.4 0 0 
The wicked physicians of Madness and Civilisation are seen to be using developing 
knowledge about physiology (amongst other things) to exclude and repress. Thus rudimen-
tary medical, physiological and moral techniques are combined via notions of the meta-
physical nature of soul and body—during the Classical age they are treated together. 
Admittedly it was only later, in the nineteenth century , that the doctor' began to play a 
significant role in the treatment of madness, but there is enough evidence to show that the 
construction of apparently objective mental disorders and the general understanding of 
mad people trades on the objectivity of other kinds of knowledge, but is motivated by po-
litical and economic concerns. 
The position of medicine in Foucault's account of the history of madness is not examined 
in itself, and I have perhaps suggested that it is to be seen to constitute objective knowledge 
in itself, but this need not be so For Foucault, the dev elopment of medicine is not a simple 
progression, a gathering of knowledge. Indeed, it is only in looking at medicine that the 
application of biology to human life becomes apparent. So we turn to The Birth of the 
Clinic.^ Here we find Foucault begins to refine his 'archaeology' Medicine is clearly de-
' Hacking. I. (1981b) The Archaeology of Foucault' The Sew York Review of Books, in Hoy. D. 
C. (ed.)(1986) Foucault. a Critical Reader Oxford: Blackwell. 30. 
1 Foucault. M. (1976) as The Birth of the Clinic: an Archaeology of Medical Perception Lon-
don: Routledge [trans, by Sheridan. A. of (1963) Naissance de la clinique: une archeologie du 
regard medical Paris: PUF | 
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fined as a vital part of the assumptions of contemporary human science Right at the end, 
in the "Conclusion" he remarks: 
It is understandable . . that medicine should have had such importance in the constitu-
tion of the sciences of man—an importance that is not only methodological, but onto-
logical. in that it concerns man's being as object of positiv e knowledge.402 
However, the central issue is how the notion of disease has changed and developed. Dis-
ease, Foucault argues, can be seen to alter as part of a shift in a 'spatial' reading of the 
kinds of things there are in the world. 'Classical medicine ... conceived of diseases as ab-
stract essences.'403 That is. the Classical notion required that physicians make a valiant 
effort to subtract the actual patient from their considerations of the disease in order to see 
the essential nature of the particular disease present—old age, environmental conditions, 
education and so on would obscure the disease's true expression. Using the analogy of 
spatial mapping Foucault puts it this way: 
The exact superposition of the 'body' of the disease and the body of the sick man is no 
more than a historical, temporary datum. Their encounter is self-evident only for us, or, 
rather we are only just beginning to detach ourselves from it. The space of configuration 
of the disease and the space of localization of the illness in the body have been superim-
posed, in medical experience, for only a relativ ely short period of time—the period that 
coincides with nineteenth-century medicine and the privileges accorded to pathological 
4fl4 
anatomy. 
The details of Foucault's analysis are not vital to my case. What is important to note is 
Foucault's ambivalence towards the status of the knowledge that informed the change in 
the concept of disease Whilst the Classical age had had some notion of the connection of 
diseases to env ironment and circumstance w ith debate about the nature of epidemics, it is 
4 0 2 ibid. 197. 
4 0 3 Gutting (1989) 0/7. cit. 112 
4 0 4 Foucault (1963) op. at 3-4 
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only later with the use of pathological anatomy and physiology in medical contexts that the 
modern disease can emerge Trie change is also expressible in terms of a shift from con-
cerns with health to normality: 
Generally speaking, it might be said that up to the end of the eighteenth century medi-
cine related much more to health than normality; it did not begin by analysing a 
'regular' functioning organism and go on to seek where it had deviated, what it was 
disturbed by. and how it could be brought back into normal working order, it referred, 
rather, to qualities of vigour, suppleness, and fluidity, which were lost in illness and 
which it was the task of medicine to restore ... 
Nineteenth century medicine, on the other hand, was regulated more in accordance with 
normality than health: it formed its concepts and prescribed its interpretations in relation 
to a standard of functioning organic structure, and physiological knowledge—once 
marginal and purely theoretical knowledge for the doctors—was to become established 
(Claude Bernard bears witness to this) at the very centre of all medical reflexion.405 
Physiology here provides knowledge as a background to nineteenth century medicine. And 
although Foucault regards the development of pathological anatomy as 'late,' being held 
up by a lack of medical contexts for its application,406 once it is launched by the work of 
Marie-Francois-Xavier Bichet there is reason to suppose that Foucault took that science to 
be well founded and objective: 
Hence the appearance that pathological anatomy assumed at the outset: that of an objec-
tive, real, and at last unquestionable foundation for the description of diseases J n 
Foucault thinks that the change was more than a difference in words and their use—it was 
not just a surface jostling of already formed concepts, 
405 • ibid. 35. 
'ibid. 126. 
ibid. 129. 
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... it was the result of a recasting at the level of epistcmic knowledge (savoir) itself, and 
not at the level of accumulated, refined, deepened, adjusted knowledge 
/ . (08 
(connaissance). 
The knowledge that underpins modern medicine is of a different sort than that of the eight-
eenth century There is no denial by Foucault that that knowledge cannot be regarded as 
objective. 
Like Bachclard, who emphasised the controlling role of reason in the experiments of 
physics and chemistry without denying the objectivity of these disciplines. Foucault does 
not present the interpretative grid of modern medicine as undercutting its scientific 
status. Nor does he think that the value-ladenness and ideological content of medicine 
exclude its objectivity.409 
So not only are the sciences that ground modern medicine taken to provide objective 
knowledge, a well monitored and carefully controlled practice in medicine could too. Fou-
cault's 'analy sis is a splendid instance of laying bare the a priori presuppositions involved 
in reports of allegedly uninterpreted data . . 4 1 0 There is. by the way. no assumption that 
medicine is a science in itself, as we shall see. 
The Archaeology of Knowledge was Foucault's next major study. In it he attempted to pull 
together the general method of his regional' studies up to that date. It is here that we find 
the distinction between savoir and connaissance more clearly laid out than in The Birth of 
the Clinic, alongside the general notion that there is a wide ranging break between the sci-
ences and knowledge of the Classical age up to the end of the eighteenth century and the 
modern period Here he explicitly introduces the idea that we are now moving beyond the 
human subject as the focus for study to the study of "discursive practices". Since 1 have 
4 0 8 ibid. 137. 
Gutting (1989) op cit. 137. 
4 , 0 ibid. 136. 
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already described these aspects of Foucault's above. I shall not dwell on The Archaeology 
of Knowledge here But w e do find further confirmation of Foucault's acceptance of an 
objective reading of the biological foundations of modem medicine: 
Clinical medicine is certainly not a science. Not only because it does not comply with the 
formal criteria, or attain a level of rigour expected of physics, chemistry , or even of 
physiology: but also because it inv olves a scarcely organized mass of empirical observa-
tions, uncontrolled experiments and results, therapeutic prescriptions, and institutional 
regulations. And yet this non-science is not exclusive of science: in the course of the 
nineteenth century, it established definite relations between such perfectly constituted 
sciences as physiology , chemistry or microbiology ; moreover, it gave rise to such dis-
courses as that of morbid anatomy, which it would be presumptuous no doubt to call a 
false science/1" 
Of course Foucault does not tell us what he means by the 'formal criteria' for science, nor 
what it takes for one to be 'perfectly constituted' This is how it should be for Foucault's 
project of illustrating the hidden difficulties that arise when we fail to familiarise ourselves 
with the hidden in our investigations—the hidden that is contingent and different in each 
discipline. If entirely formal criteria could be extracted for the identification of 'science', 
the additional parts of our enquiries—the power relations, the abuses and misuses—would 
be apparent But we do not see this in actual practice. The conceptual archaeologist con-
tinually brings us up against our past discursive practices', showing us how contingent 
they are. challenging us to reform our current attitudes and epistemic commitments. Yet, as 
I have already stressed, this does not lead us to an abandonment of reform for a purpose— 
we suppose that we can speak about the world and we want to know how we might do that 
better. We want to improve on our current commitments. Science and ideology may have 
similar historical roots but they can be distinguished in order to tell the good knowledge 
and practices from the bad. 
Foucault. M. (1972) op. at. 181. 
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The status of clinical medicine as a non-science' is interesting in that it gives us some 
clues as to w hat we should take to be included in a list of accepted and acceptable sciences. 
Biological knowledge is definitely included, despite its relationship to questionable disci-
plines. At the end of his paper on nineteenth century reproductive medicine in France Nye 
asks: 
Did Michel Foucault miss a chance to extend his analysis offin-de-siecle discourses on 
sexual know ledge and power further into the domain of biology ? Did he eschew consid-
eration of reproductive biology because of some disciplinary line be believed divided 
biological science from medical science9 I hope I have provided here an answer to the 
first of these questions, the second I leave to the epistemologists.4i: 
Nye's response to the first question is that Foucault did indeed fail to follow through a po-
tential analy sis. He shows how some aspects of the supposed objective knowledge that 
constituted reproductive biology were the product of a constructive, controlling process to 
maintain gendered social positions and promote racial purity in France. 
Nye's second question can be answered too Foucault did not see a boundary dividing biol-
ogy and medicine per se. Biological knowledge can be made for controlling purposes and 
medicine has the potential to be well founded and articulated I suggest that Foucault did 
not look at particular cases of biological abuse quite simply because against the back-
ground of his contemporary concerns they were not as pressing as pointing to the regula-
tion of people's lives through conceptually murky practices in psychiatry, medicine and 
judicial punishment4 1 3 Had he lived just ten more years I suspect the situation would have 
been different Having said this, we can quite clearly see that in many parts of biology 
4 1 : Nye (1994) op. at. 164. 
4 1 3 The area where he might have most followed through such a study, in the construction of 
modern notions of human sexuality. was left largely unexplored as the project to map this field 
was transformed into a theory of the self and the articulation of an ethic for the self in Greco-
Roman and early Christian philosophy Hence, my survey does not include the second and third 
volumes of the History of Sexuality 
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there are rational, well-controlled experiments, whereas medicine on the whole does not use 
them. There is not so much a line or boundary as a spectrum of increasing rational en-
gagement. As Gutting also comments: 
... clinical medicine is not an experimental science. The latter involves putting questions 
to nature whereas the former is merely a matter of listening to what nature has to say. 
This. [Foucault] says does not mean that clinical medicine is antiexperimental. Its obser-
vations will naturally lead to experiment, but the questions posed will be expressed in 
the language of observ ation—that is. in the language spoken by nature to the clinical 
4] 4 
gaze. 
Nowhere does Foucault exclude the possibility that the epistemological virtue of experi-
menting could be matched in medicine or other human investigations by other rationally 
appropriate methods. In Discipline and Punish4*', as the archaeological method is aug-
mented to become a genealogy that includes concern for non-discursive practices too, we 
see a greater sensitivity to the interplay between objective and questionable realms of 
knowledge: 
The classical age discovered the body as object and target of power. It is easy to find 
signs of the attention paid to the body—to the body that is manipulated, shaped, trained, 
w hich obeys, responds, becomes skilful and increases its forces. The great book of Man-
the-Machine was written simultaneously on two registers: the anatomico-metaphysical 
register, of w hich Descartes w rote the first pages and which the physicians and philoso-
phers continued, and the technico-political register, which was constituted by a whole set 
of regulations and by empirical and calculated methods relating to the army, the school 
and the hospital, for controlling or correcting the operation of the body.416 
4 1 4 Gulling (1989) op. cit. 124. 
4 1 5 Foucault. M. (1979) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books [trans. Sheridan. A. from (1975) Suweiller et punir: Xaissance de la prison Paris: Gal-
limard] 
M6ibid. 136. 
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Discipline and Punish is the history of the control of the body in and through institutions. 
It focuses on judicial punishment, but also has much to say about schools, the army and 
hospitals. Here biological knowledge informs and is itself transformed. The genealogical 
method, that runs through Foucault 's w ork from the mid-seventies through to the end of the 
decade, also informs the beginning of his work on the history of sexuality.4 1 7 This project, 
starting out as a regional articulation of nineteenth century construction of sexual identities 
from behaviour, is similarly sensitive to the entanglement of varied contexts and criteria for 
the real. Once again it is biology (and his continued interest topic of 'health care') applied 
in a medical context that informs his discussion, especially in discussion of homosexuality: 
We must not forget the that psychological, psychiatric, medical category' of homosexual-
it) was constituted from the moment it was characterized ... less by a type of sexual re-
lations than by a certain quality of sexual sensibility , a certain way of inverting the mas-
culine and feminine in oneself Homosexuality appeared as one of the forms of sexuality 
when it was transposed from the practice of sodomy onto a kind of interior androgyny, a 
hermaphrodism of the soul The sodomite had been a temporary aberration: the homo-
sexual was now a species 4 1 8 
Given my earlier discussion of recent research in human sexuality and partner preference, 
this is most interesting 4 1 9 There I suggested that manipulation of models was an obvious 
feature of the experimental situation, and that such research, whilst not directly manipulat-
ing people, does involv e the manipulation of kinds (types) in models, and is, in that regard, 
experimental What we see here is that even the rational use and manipulation of entities 
and classes in models does not on its own guarantee that the kinds involved are real 
(outside of the model). But it does not undermine the use of experiments to discover the 
4 1 7 Foucault. M. (1981) The History of Sexuality: I'olume I, An Introduction Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books (trans, by Hurley. R of (1976) La Volonte de savoir Paris: Gallimard] 
4 , 8 ibid. 43. 
4 1 9 See p. 85 ff. 
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real. In fact, it is precisely because experiments on kinds can reveal the real that they are 
used in contexts w here further investigation is required to ensure the appropriateness of the 
model used. The consequences of this w ill become apparent below. 
In one sense, for Foucault, there are differences to be drawn between the human and natu-
ral sciences, between the dubious and the acceptable, but they do not, and could not consist 
in specific criteria that would apply across the board. Rather the differences can be seen in 
the attitude taken to the history of each area. Whilst parts of biology have at times been, 
and still are called objective' when such a label would be inappropriate, on the whole bi-
ology is secure as an objective science because it is not surprised by its own parents, and 
neither should it be: 
Why should an archaeology of psychiatry function as an anti-psychiatry ', when an ar-
chaeology of biology does not function as anti-biology 0 Is it because of the partial nature 
of the analysis9 Or is it rather that psy chiatry is not on good terms with its own history, 
the result of a certain inability on the part of psychiatry , given what it is. to accept its 
ow n history174"0 
If psychiatry sets itself up w ith certificates copied from the biological laboratory walls it 
should not be disappointed by an unfavourable response from clients and observers when 
the fraud is uncovered. Biology's own credentials are. on the whole, all earned 
5 Reading Foucault 
So what does all this show '7 I think it is fairly clear that we can interpret Foucault in the 
following way. His ambivalence with regard to the status of biology is not the result of 
failing to follow through with his analysis of powerful scientific practices, neither is it a 
product of his possessing irreconcilably different attitudes tow ards human and natural sci-
ences. Rather, precisely because he saw that only regional criticism of know ledge is possi-
4 2 0 Foucault. M. (1980) "The History of Sexuality' in PowerKnowledge. op. cit.. 192. 
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ble in any fruitful enquiry uncovering the roots of contemporary thinking, he could quite 
coherently hold that objective knowledge is attainable from any rational enquiry into the 
nature of parts of the world, whilst constructing severe and often crippling critiques of 
what is now taken be obvious and given about ourselves and our world Biology; having 
had fingers in many pies, is sometimes to be criticised, sometimes to be praised Nothing 
leads us to accept Hacking's labelling of Foucault as a dy namic nominalist', because it 
does not follow from this interpretation that we cannot discover anything real about our-
selves, only that, in the regions of know ledge that Foucault examines, there are serious rea-
sons for us rejecting the objectivity of knowledge claims and re-examining how we might 
better describe things. How else are we to understand appeals to liberation"? 
Rejection of Hacking's reading of Foucault has a knock on effect for the rest of Hacking's 
philosophy, particularly with regard to experimentation and kinds. I shall now return to his 
experimental realism and present a case against the position he presents and provide a bet-
ter use for the epistemological virtues421 provided by experiments. 
iv S c i e n t i f i c r e a l i s m a n d e x p e r i m e n t a l r e a l -
i s m 
Let us recap. Hacking states that there is a nominalist element to the taxonomies we use to 
give meaning to the singular objects in the natural and the human domains. He calls the 
4"' In a number of places I have made reference to "epistemological virtues', or the like. Dupre 
speaks of epislemological virtues (Disorder 10-1 1. 243). Working out a complete virtue epis-
temology is beyond the present study. My comments on Putnam and Rorty below, p. 210. 
should (indirectly) point to how 1 see such a project panning out To date, the only book-length 
treatment of virtue epistemology I know is Zagzebski. L. T. (1996) I 'irtues of the Mind Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press (although this is by no means a satisfactory book)—here 
the idea is traced to Ernest Sosa. One important aspect of Zagzcbski's analysis is that she 
shows why simple forms of rcliablism will not do as virtue epistemologies. which they are often 
taken to be 
190 
Foucault and the 
Construction of Kinds 
nominalism he ascribes to natural science 'revolutionary nominalism' and he sees it at 
work in Kuhn's work. He calls the nominalism he ascribes to the human domain, to social 
science, 'dvnamic nominalism" and says that the writings of Foucault admirably demon-
strate what this form of nominalism means in practice Hacking then goes on to claim that 
the difference between dynamic and revolutionary nominalism is to be found by observing 
that the world that natural science examines is not just constructed by human beings, even 
though the categories that describe that world may change, whereas the human world is 
entirely 'made up'. 
Behind all this is Hacking's belief that scientific realism in the physical sciences is secured 
by the creation of physical phenomena that can be used for other purposes. T f you can 
spray them then they are real." whatever way you then choose to describe the theoretical 
make up of electrons. If phenomena can be manipulated and used then we should believe, 
on these grounds alone12' that the entities manipulated really do exist. As we have seen, 
biology has a methodology (especially in terms of experimentation) that seems entirely 
compatible with the physical sciences Biological sciences too create phenomena for the 
purposes of manipulation of other entities But more than this, in biology we do see also 
the manipulation of kinds and their use—recall the experiments on plant traits. 
Now clearly this could be presented as a problem with the status of the biological sciences 
I f we were to take Rosenberg's instrumental reading of biology as given, then pace all the 
similarities in practice, nothing that experimental biology reveals needs challenge us—only 
physics really gets at the world, and physics experiments show us what entities exist. Tak-
ing Rosenberg and Hacking together we end up with the v ery kind of nominalism that 
4 : : Otherw ise Hacking has to giv e an account of how theory 'connects' with the world—precisely 
the project criticised and rejected in the Representing part of R&I. 
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Hacking ascribes to Foucault being applied to biology. That is to say, a construction of 
instrumentally valuable kinds that should not be taken to be real since they are based on 
limited epistemological abilities and motivated by interests of a socio-political nature. But 
we have already found problems with Rosenberg s epistemology J J J And we have seen that 
an alternative reading of Foucault—one that is much more in accord with his own stated 
aims—paints a very different picture of how we should understand biology and its relation-
ship to our struggle to understand ourselves. This different picture being one where aware-
ness of the ongoing invasion by other interests of our pure' search for rationally justified 
knowledge of the biological world is accepted together with the possibility of there being 
correct answ ers to biological questions about the kinds of things biology describes. 
To put the situation another way. how can we accept the important insights Foucault gives 
us into our cultural practices and maintain a consistent stance on scientific realism i f we 
follow Hacking's own acceptance of Foucault s work?4"4 So if we assume that we want to 
retain some objectivity for the natural sciences three possible solutions present themselves: 
1. Deny biology the same objectivity status as physics. That is, accept Hacking's experi-
mental realism, but exclude biology from this story of "making things real' on the 
grounds that the appearance of similar methodology is an illusion since the nominalism 
that underpins biology is just like that he sees in Foucault's human sciences—dynamic 
and constructive 
4 : 3 Seep. 119 11 
4 2 4 See pp v IT. and 172 ff. for my own reasons for responding positiv ely to much of what Fou-
cault savs 
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2. Discount the cultural impact of the peripheral uses o f biology as irrelevant to the core 
o f biology. That is. draw a clear line between knowledge statements and uses in human 
practice. 
3. Reject the thesis that says that scientific realism can only be understood as experimental 
realism and reintroduce the possibility of there being epistemologically virtuous, ra-
tionally grounded means o f enquiry that 'get the world right'—a stronger form o f sci-
entific realism Reject also the idea that a similar methodology across different sciences 
must imply a single ontological structure to account for all things That is, reject the 
distinction between d\namic and revolutionary nominalism in favour o f increasingly 
numerous taxonomies corresponding to increases in the complexity of the systems 
studied 4 : 5 
The reading of Foucault that I have presented above, especially with regard to biology, 
shows us exactly why options 1 and 2 can be ruled out immediately. Lines o f demarcation 
should not be drawn on the grounds Hacking recommends because we end up with a weak-
ened notion o f good and bad analyses o f human nature and the world I f , however, we ac-
cept that experimentation, as manipulation and testing, 4 2 6 is one amongst other techniques 
that we use to rationally explore the world, then we can augment our historical analyses o f 
our current practices, whilst retaining an edge to our lookout for dubious and spurious 
knowledge claims O f course, what questions we ask is also open to historical analysis 
That is. Hacking s experimental realism hampers our attempts to assess natural science 
precisely because it prevents looking at situations where experiments have been used ra-
tionally to help determine the ontological status o f entities and kinds that are nevertheless 
4 : 5 The real problem with this soultion is that the notion of complexity' is central, yet in itself it 
is notoriously vague. 
4 : 6 See p. 43 fT.. above. 
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embedded in theory. And it hampers our attempts to assess social sciences because it pre-
vents the possibility o f ever understanding them as anything but the 'dynamic 1 creation o f 
ways for us to be. and thereby removing a context for struggle and liberation—'better' 
implies more than different. 
This brings us right to the heart o f my thesis. Will iam McKinney 4 2 7 gives an interesting 
and clear critique o f Hacking's claims that being able to manipulate and use entities is a 
guarantee that such entities are real M y own critique is deeper than this. I have given my 
reasons for why there can be no detailed account of experiments beyond a workable and 
effective epistemology of experiments that includes intervention and manipulation I have 
pointed out that there can be no interpretation of the ontology that such an epistemology is 
supposed to support without a commitment to a general structure (hierarchy) o f kinds o f 
entities under investigation Biology illustrates this perfectly, and at the same time shows 
how there always remains the possibility of our simply inventing kinds, especially when 
dealing with applications o f biology to human beings. Hacking's epistemology o f experi-
ments rest on a distinction between sciences that trade in real kinds and those that do not. 
No such simple distinction exists. 
To criticise Hacking in this way is not to detract from his skill in highlighting the need to 
examine the role of experimentation in science and life. The resistance of the world to our 
actions on it is a vital component in finding out about that world. What we cannot do is 
extract a single, simple epistemological framework for the application o f that fact alone. 
Hacking's attempt to do so results in a distortion and over-simplification of complex rela-
tions of knowledge, practices and techniques for discovery and invention, which, whilst 
4 : McKinncy. W. J (1991) Experimenting on and Experimenting with: Polywaier and Experi-
mental Realism' The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Vol. 42. No. 3 September 
1991. 295-307. 
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sharing aims and general strategies in rationality, can only be assessed regionally in the 
context o f that rationality The key then is the supposition that we could describe science as 
rational. How and why I think this is possible wi l l be part o f the conclusion below. 
v S e x h o r m o n e s — k i n d s a n d e x p e r i m e n t s 
a p p l i e d 
I shall now briefly illustrate the lessons o f the previous section by looking at the applica-
tion o f a Foucauldian archaeological analysis to the history of research on sex hormones 
early this century. In the study I shall consider appeal is made to Hacking's experimental 
realism, and I shall show why it is inappropriate for precisely the reasons I have mentioned 
above. 
1 Hormones and sex 
In Beyond the Natural Body: an Archaeology of Sex HormonesA'% Nelly Oudshoorn exam-
ines the debates that took place in the biological community over the role and nature o f 
human sex hormones in the 1920s and 30s, especially with regard to whether and how they 
function in determining gender. Starting with the assumption that our concepts for bodies 
are in a permanent flux, she argues that the discovery o f a range of hormones in male and 
female bodies had a specific and profound effect on how our hormonal notion o f body was 
constructed, and that the notions used further directed the science thus employed. She 
guides us to the conclusion that regional concerns about specific hormones in particular 
contexts are all to easily used to inform a picture about identity and sexual kinds: 
Oudshoorn. N. (1994) Beyond the Satural Body: an Archaeology of Sex Hormones Routledge: 
London. 
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In ... biomedical discourses, ihe construction of the body as something with a sex has 
been a central theme all through the centuries. The myriad of ways in which scientists 
have understood sex provide many illuminating counter-moves to the argument that sex 
is an unequivocal, a historical attribute of the body that, once unveiled by science, is 
valid everywhere and within ev en context.4"9 
I already noted Dupre's discussion o f the genera! sex categories above 4 3 0 Oudshoorn sup-
plements the observation there that no essential features exist that pick out sex across the 
board—Oudshoorn shows how the concept o f sex in humans is the product o f asking par-
ticular questions of the world, particularly in the modern era. She describes her own book 
thus: 
Beyond the Xatural Body illustrates how scientific body concepts such as the hormonal 
body assume the appearance of natural phenomena by virtue of the activities of scien-
lists. 4 3 ' 
So she believes that the blame for concepts being used as if they were natural is a result o f 
scientists work and. as she discusses it. their relationship with industry She also points out 
how prescientific notions o f the body remain unexamined in the scientists" research—in 
much the same way as Bachelard's "obstacles " In places echoing Foucault o f The Birth of 
the Clinic and Discipline and Punish Oudshoorn pinpoints v arious mechanisms that are 
employed in this construction: 
With the rise of modern science, bodies have thus become transformed into objects that 
can be manipulated w ith an ev er growing number of tools and techniques.43" 
One of the major mechanisms involv ed. Oudshoorn claims, is the laboratory science, ex-
perimentation 
4 : 9 ibid. 6. 
4 5 n Sccp . 120 f f 
4 3 1 Oudshoorn (1994) op cit. 138. 
4 3 : ibid. 5. 
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Laboratory experiments have played a major role in this decontextualization of knowl-
edge claims. Scientists used experiments to transform the concept of sex hormones into 
standardized substances with precisely defined qualities that then become accepted as 
such by the international scientific community and the industrial world. 4 3 3 
Now in order to make this claim stick Oudshoorn calls on Hacking's analysis o f experi-
mentation. She praises Representing and Intervening for its portray al o f the creation o f 
artefacts in the laboratory, and quotes two passages from Tilosofen van het experiment' 4 3 4 
(a paper appearing in a Dutch journal), in which Hacking mentions the laboratory history 
o f sex hormones: 
We did not find sex hormones somewhere in a lost corner, like a desert island lost in the 
mist. We ourselves called sex hormones into existence.43'"1' 
Oudshoorn then comments: 
What Hacking describes here is precisely what science makes so powerful: its capacity to 
create new things and new worlds. By doing this, laboratory sciences establish a material 
authority that is very dominant in our present culture. By selecting specific methods 
of testing, scientists defined which substances they would label as "male" or "female." 4 3 6 
Now there seems to be some confusion here. It is over the existence and nature o f the sub-
stances involved. Oudshoorn suggests that the discovery of chemical messengers, hor-
mones, in the first decade o f this century 4 " 7 led to a drastic change in the paradigm o f 
physiology."^ 8 Be that as it may. surely she would not want to deny that something chemi-
w ibid. 142. 
4 3 4 Hacking. 1. (1989) "Filosofen van het experiment1 Kennis en Methode 13(1). 11-27. 
w ibid. 21. 
4 3 6 Oudshoorn (1994) op. cit. 43 
4 3 In 1849 Bcrthold had demonstrated the effect of something chemical playing a role in the 
regulation of organisms by implanting testes into castrated cocks and thereby preventing the 
onset of the signs of castration But it was not until 1905 thai the term hormone' was coined 
by Ernest Starling [(1905) The Croonian Lectures on the Chemical Correlation of the Func-
tions of the Body' Lancet i i . 339-41). 
4 3 8 ibid. 16. 
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cal was discovered that affected specific organs and the organism as a whole By contrast, 
it would seem extreme to deny that insulin, which can be manufactured and manipulated in 
controlled and specific ways, in fact exists So hormones must exist for us to have doubts 
about whether it is appropriate to label them "male" or 'female ' However, in terms o f her 
support for Hacking s position on the creation o f phenomena, the hormones themselves 
must be created by the experimental techniques involved in their isolation—whatever sort 
of hormone they are. It is unclear what sort of nominalism we are being offered here, just 
as we would expect f rom Hacking s failure to address biology properly. I f it is the Hack-
ing-Kuhn revolutionary sort, then hormones must be seen as real particular things that are 
being described under a constructed scheme which is relative to our interests—but they are 
taken to be chemical substances with particular molecular compositions and biological 
functions to get even this far in demonstrating their existence. In any case, there is not a 
simple technique for hormones per se I f it is the Hacking-Foucault dynamic nominalism 
that is on offer, then apparently well-grounded experimental techniques for the isolation o f 
substances with particular functions and even defined molecular shapes are producing re-
sults with no objective' value at all. The first option seems incoherent, and the second 
leaves us with no reason to even begin looking at and evaluating the use and manipulation 
o f specific hormones, in this case, sex hormones. 
Taken as a regional study o f sex hormones the conclusion we can reach f rom Beyond the 
Natural Body is that the hormonal story is complex and has been used to illustrate and 
control particular gender conceptions It does not follow that hormones themselves do not 
exist, nor that the paradigm o f the hormonal body is false Appeal to Hacking to solve 
problems o f the experimental decontextualization" employ ed by scientists and industry is 
unhelpful and obscures the importance of the Foucauldian archaeology needed to extract 
the good science from the rest. 
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Thoughts o f the rational 
Mind capture parts of the world. 
But not the moment. 
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5 C o n c l u s i o n s 
Epistcmic things, experimental systems, ensembles thereof, and experimental cultures 
are thus concepts with which I try to delineate the frame for an epistemology of experi-
mentation that neither concentrates on concepts in the traditional internalistic sense nor 
on institutions and disciplines in the traditional externalistic sense of the historiography 
of science. It is an attempt to understand the cognitive dynamics of empirical sciences in 
terms of the structure of the practices from which they live. Experimental cultures are 
not homogeneous spaces. They are as bricked and tinkered as the experimental systems 
they are composed of. But they are held together by a specific kind of glue: material, not 
only formal, interaction, epistemic. not merely theoretical, compatibility .' 1 3 9 
i T h e a r g u m e n t 
As I stressed at the beginning, throughout my discussions the aim would be to ar-ticulate the current status o f biology since it is an important science to the current 
concept o f our being The focus has been biology as practice and its relationship to science 
as practice and knowledge. I now want to state explicitly what I think has been shown. 
The general points are as follows. Biology can and should be taken as a realist science. 
Analy sis of its practice and theory reveal a pluralistic and disunified ontology and a com-
plex relationship with the phy sical and social sciences That biology shares a number of 
important epistemological tools with other sciences, most notably experimentation, dem-
onstrates a rational methodology for science, which, in part, underwrites our examination 
of knowledge claims for their supposed objectivity This further supports acceptance of 
scientific realism as a product of a number of rational practices and procedures and pro-
Rheinberger. H-J. (1995) From Experimental Systems to Cultures of Experimentation' in 
Concepts, Theories, and Rationality in the Biological Science (see footnote 181). 
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vidcs us with the context for discussions of the impact of good and bad science on our 
lives. 
However, it does not follow that one could extract explicit methodological rules that apply 
across whole disciplines or science per se. The unity of methodology involved here turns 
on issues deeper than science itself and is related to our being rational beings in a material 
universe. 
This leaves us with a d i f f icul t ) . How is it possible to accept a world o f many different 
kinds o f things that can be described w ith increasing accuracy w ithout producing a single 
prioritised ontology, and yet still claim that there are valuable ways o f investigating that 
world, ways that arc based on fundamental epistemic practices? Indeed, it seems that use 
o f these methods provides support for pluralism and disunity, and this might appear puz-
zling. I do not think it is. and taken together the metaphysical and methodological points 
discussed produce a general picture of science that has well established philosophical cre-
dentials. 
The fact that unified methods can support disunificd beliefs about the world—inconsistent 
sets of beliefs—is made by Nicholas Rescher: 
... method pluralism is something stronger than belief pluralism. Given the generality 
and pow er of what is al issue in a method, w ith its inherent multiplicity of applications, 
it follows that when authentically different cognitive methods are at work, then at least 
some of the resultant beliefs arc bound to be different as well And conversely, a consen-
sus of beliefs across the entire range would indicate that there is consensus on methods 
as well. For w here the beliefs at issue agree altogether, then there w i l l be no justificatory 
basis for any differentiation with regard to these methods that we employ in resolving 
cognitive issues. 
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But the reverse does not hold: different beliefs do not necessarily involve different meth-
ods Even when the cognitive methods are the same, the same beliefs need not result, 
since, for example, the selfsame scientific-inductive method wil l , when orientated to-
wards different bodies of accepted data, quite appropriately yield different results Belief 
dissensus accordingly does not carry method dissensus in its wake.4'40 
I believe that I have outlined this possibility in application in biology. Before I spell out the 
consequences in more detail, let us look at the overall argument presented. 
1 Experiments 
Experimentation is a factor in more than just our scientific know ledge gathering activities. 
It is a feature of our world that intervening in it and manipulating it can tell us something 
about it, and a lot (but not all) o f science makes use o f this fact Why it is a factor is an-
swered by analysis of the practice itself—that is, as far as I can see, a transcendental ar-
gument is implicated here. We can discover about ourselves as much as about the world by 
paying attention to what we do to find out things However, spelling out the how and why 
o f science experiments is a complex activity. The only aspect o f experimentation that is 
necessary is intervention. This is as true o f science as it is generally. None o f the current 
analyses o f experiments capture this fact adequately whilst remaining flexible enough to 
cover a range o f important cases. Bayesian theorising in particular misses out real possible 
situations o f experimentation where there is ambiguity about the status o f the entities and 
phenomena involved Similarly, social constructivist stories about experiments lack ap-
preciation or assessment o f the recalcitrant nature o f the world to our actions on it. In the 
main, the failure lies in attempts to f i t experiments into static epistemological theories 
about science. A dynamic epistcmology, such as that proposed by Kitcher,* 1 1 much better 
" Rescher. N. (1993) Pluralism Against the Demand for Consensus Oxford: Clarendon. Oxford 
University Press. 
1 Of course. I believ e that dy namic models are possible without the explanatory unification 
Kitcher advocates 
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captures the open-ended nature o f the epistemology of experimentation. Such an epistemol-
ogy would allow us to f i t the aims o f research groups as well as individuals into a scheme 
that is still generally rational in the outcome. 
Hacking recognises that intervention/manipulation is a highly important epistemic activity 
that is used to determine the nature of parts of the world in which we live. However, he 
presents a case for scientific realism that is sensitive to his own observation that our 
knowledge is often relative to our own interests—this kind of knowledge he contrasts with 
genuine objective knowledge. That is. in Hacking's terms, manipulation is only an argu-
ment for realism (the existence of the entities discovered) where the theoretical contexts of 
our investigation can be 'transcended' through the use o f the experimentally produced phe-
nomena in other independent contexts. Only experiments in theoretical physics seem to of-
fer such a context for Hacking. There is also some difficulty in extracting his attitude to 
kinds and properties as manipulable. Consequently we are left with an impasse. Either he 
wants us to ascribe the status o f ;real" only to things that are theoretically-free bare par-
ticulars, which itself seems untenable, or there is to be privileging o f phy sics which runs 
counter to his own espoused pluralism—he offers no other criteria for realism. 
In all cases, analysis o f experiments in biology is scant. So we need a picture o f experi-
ments that retains the insights o f epistemically valuable practices, but which is sensitive to 
a range of contexts and applications. This raises questions about the relationship between 
what kinds o f things there are and how we find out about them, the relationship between 
metaphysical and methodological pluralism. 
By looking at real cases o f experimental practice in biology we find some continuity and 
some differences with physics experiments. Intervention and manipulation remain constant 
whenever we can be said to perform experiments. Methodology seems complex, but mini-
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mally unified in this way 4 4 " It also seems that where we want to accept or reject the status 
o f real' for (apparently) manipulated entities the choice does not rest on Hacking's crite-
rion at all. What is required is a clearer picture o f the kinds of things that biologists inves-
tigate compared with those falling in the domain o f physics That is. we need to have 
something to say about metaphysics before we can ful ly respond to Hacking. 
1 have not given an account o f the details o f the replacement epistcmology o f experiments 
implied in what I have discussed I do not believe it is necessary for my purpose 
2 Pluralism, realism and reductionism 
Disunified metaphysical pluralism is a defensible position There is a long tradition that 
resists pluralism because o f the perceived requirement that everything be (ultimately) ex-
plicable within a single scheme. There are a number o f way s of presenting what is meant 
by this, but even in a "modest' form it involves linking notions of reduction, explanation 
and the unity o f science. Dupre's robust defence o f pluralism and disunity helps articulate 
and reject the assumptions that underpin this apparent necessity. The key notions are re-
duction and. especially in the case o f biology, how to understand natural kind terms. The 
rejection o f determinism in a closed form that requires that complete causal descriptions o f 
events should be given by accounts of the micro-structure o f objects is the third component 
o f Dupre's argument. I have not pursued this line in much detail, but embrace his critique 
o f the assumption o f the necessity of causal closure in explanation o f high-level 
(biological) phenomena. 
i : A note on models: I have suggested that models themselves can be used as experimental con-
texts. In this way 'observational' sciences, such as astronomy and priniatology also rest on the 
same general cpistcmic valuable practices as more obvious experimental sciences. Indeed, in 
this most general way. the social sciences may be 'experimental.' Having said this, of course it 
does not follow that all experiments arc transparent or rational or well grounded. 
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Reductionism comes in a variety of forms ranging from a strong theory using bridging 
principles to smoothly explain all aspects o f complex higher-level phenomena in terms of 
lower-level, simpler theories, to explanatory interfacing ' The background of all varieties 
is questionable. Even i f it were not so. in the case of biology there are a number o f good 
arguments blocking the reduction o f biological phenomena. These include consideration o f 
proposed reductions of Mendelian genes to molecular genetic information and the failure o f 
ecological theories to reduce to lower-level ones. 
On the whole reductionism fails because acceptance of the maturity of complex theories 
such as one finds in the biological sciences implies the acceptance o f theoretical vocabular-
ies and relations that do not exist elsewhere and which cannot be matched by other theo-
retical vocabularies, where matched' can take a number of forms So we need to know 
what is involved in the acceptance o f these vocabularies and relations. 
Natural kind terms would f i t neatly into one complete, coherent, nested scheme o f kinds i f 
the world described by science were to be unified. They do not. Biology provides an excel-
lent example of this fact. Different schemes of kinds, different taxonomies f i t the world 
equally well. Since we cannot reduce these schemes one to another we must either take 
them to be real or achieve unity by adopting an instrumental understanding o f biology— 
thus there is disagreement over the acceptance of irreducible vocabularies. This is the heart 
o f the r i f t between Rosenberg and Dupre. The disagreement is resolved by consistently ac-
cepting pluralism Accepting localised nesting of kinds is of further value in articulating 
why scientific realism works here 
Rosenberg's instrumcntalism trades on a cut o f f point for scientific realism based on ap-
parent epistemic limits. This in turn reveals a form of realism that is unacceptably strong 
and which supposes that phy sical science can be held separate from the rest o f science. 
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This is a typical strategy in attempting to maintain unity in the face of pluralist alterna-
tives 
Disunificd pluralism here means not that there are no true descriptions of the world avail-
able, nor that all descriptions are equally true. Rather it means that there are a number o f 
correct taxonomical ontologies that are the product o f rational enquiries. The enquiries 
themselves reveal that these ontologies are not (alway s) unifiablc into a single master on-
tology o f things and kinds. Donald Davidson's discussion o f conceptual schemes shows 
there just cannot be completely incommensurable way s o f talking about the w o r l d . * Ac-
cepting this means that w e should not suppose that in discov ering different ways o f talking 
about things and kinds, that this is the articulation o f a paltry form of relativism. But nei-
ther does it mean that we are alway s in agreement or that the world has to be unifiable in 
our best descriptions. 
A l l this on its own would be too simple It supposes that we never make mistakes or that 
human interests are always rational. There are cases where we think we have discovered 
something, especially about ourselves, but have only invented a new category o f descrip-
tion. 
3 Biology and social science 
Biology seems to have a close relationship with social science too. This arises f rom our 
calling on significant biological background knowledge in a wide range of social sciences, 
from social psychology to criminology to economics. Hacking calls on a particular reading 
o f both Kuhn and Foucault to maintain the kind o f distinction betw een hard science and the 
rest that Rosenberg implicitly embraces This reading is used as the general support for 
A A i Dav idson. D. (1974) "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme' Proceedings and Addresses 
of the American Philosophical Association 47. reprinted in Davidson. D. (1984) Inquiries into 
Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Essay 13. 
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experimental realism since it does favour physics over other sciences—physics finds dif-
ferent ways of redescribing real entities, whereas 'softer" sciences make up the objects as 
the schemes of description. However, a different reading o f Foucault is possible that does 
not contain such a sharp division o f science, nor the exclusion of objectivity from science. 
This interpretation of Foucault is sensitive to the regionalism of Bachelard that underpins 
Foucault's archaeological method. 
Questions about objectivity and scientific realism are to be answered in the context of a 
rational examination of all the components involved in each study , as a regional study. Ex-
perimentation is therefore given a context where it can be used as support for belief in the 
truth o f theories. The fact that we need to be alway s vigilant for the incorporation o f other 
political/power interests into knowledge production does not diminish the possibility o f 
rational discovery o f an objective world. There are epistemic tools that allow this. Without 
this belief there is no clear way of looking at science for its value at all. 
The result shows us that a disunified pluralist metaphysics as revealed by science is itself 
consistent with the notion that we have available to us general way s of finding out about 
the world that have many and varied applications. 
ii C o n s e q u e n c e s 
1 Biology 
The consequences for biology of this examination o f some epistemological and metaphysi-
cal questions are, perhaps, limited. In terms o f technical considerations I doubt that the 
practice of biology could be challenged by a thesis such as this! What might result by f o l -
lowing up my discussion is a better w ay o f examining the relationship between biology and 
207 
Conclusions 
its technological applications It can only be by finding some standard for epistemic testing 
o f the knowledge claims we make that we can open up for inspection the contingency of 
technology, public policy and institutionalised power based on them. I think it is better to 
try to demonstrate this rather than just producing the theoretical framework for such in-
spections—although a two pronged attack is required 
2 Epistemology, (dis)unity and metaphysics (again) 
Despite my insistence on their being grounds for picking out valuable epistemic prac-
tices—practices that themselves are a demonstration o f an assumed (and necessary) atti-
tude to rationality and realism—insights into applications and power should be regional in 
the style o f Bachelard. Canguilhem and Foucault. The very fact of the metaphy sical dis-
unity in science supports this conclusion. It is entirely acceptable to question practices and 
applications that share similar methods of investigation since methods alone are no guaran-
tee o f rational discovery. Some o f the ontologies we accept may w ell turn out to be unreal. 
Accepting that the whole of the ontological world described by science need not f i t into a 
single scheme makes examination o f parts of science easier and also, more importantly, 
more necessary. But this also opens up the realm o f science by removing some constric-
tions on what science should be The world we engage with is disunited at every level, 
particularly the political. As Dupre puts the point: 
... i f science were unified then the legitimate projects of inquiry would be those, and 
only those, that formed part of that unified whole ... only a society with absolutely ho-
mogenous, or at least hegemonic, political commitments and shared assumptions could 
expect a unified science. Unified science ... would require Utopia or totalitarianism.444 
Disorder 261. 
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I take it we do not live in either of these kinds of s t a t e W h a t \vc are still struggling to 
understand in philosophical terms is the relationship between our evolving societal interests 
and the practices we employ to understand the world, ourselves and our place in the world. 
But these questions are the very stuff of philosophy as it has been practised for millennia. 
Consequently, philosophy of science has a real, important role in the whole philosophical 
enterprise. This then is the kind of philosophy of science that, although often apparently 
neglected, we cannot afford to do without. What does distinguish science from non-
science'7 Answering this question, just understanding this question, is radically important 
at this time. The reason being that to deny that science has been an important part of our 
contemporary world view would be foolish. This world view informs our philosophy, and 
yet we are beset w ith an infinite variety of know ledge claims from sources old and new . In 
newspapers misinformed articles about human genetics can be found on the same page as 
adverts for 'lottery beating" strategies and daily astrological forecasts. What we take to be 
rational practice, rational thought, science as rational practice in knowledge gathering and 
philosophy as the general overview of ways that we might come to see our rational being 
and practice, all these are tied together in ways that are not obvious. Looking again at the 
problem of demarcation will be one way of approaching a satisfactory description of the 
relationship between these factors. Again, nothing is being given absolute priority here. I 
am suggesting that the question of demarcation is a neglected and important area of our 
philosophical theorising about science that can now be revitalised without lapsing into 
'mere" analysis of terms. 
On a personal, indulgent note: I began my secondary education in 1980 shortly after Margaret 
Thatcher was elected Prime Minister and I finish my time as a student only a few months after 
the Conservative Government has finally, and conclusively, been swept aside. I have been able 
to take advantage of excellent educational opportunities throughout this period despite this fact, 
not because of it. 
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The fear that embracing a metaphysically disparate world view leads to the collapse of 
valuable insights into that world is unfounded.446 Indeed it avoids the excesses and para-
doxes of the alternatives and allow s us to properly start w ith w hat we believe and do rather 
than having to rule out accepted beliefs and practices a prion. This can oniy be for the 
good since it allows a complete examination of what goes on in our theorising and prac-
tices and therefore tends to support valuable insights Biology is no exception to this prin-
ciple. It provides evidence for its adoption. 
Mi P u t n a m , R o r t y a n d r a t i o n a l i t y 
I could leave my account of scientific realism open, claiming that the questions raised 
about its dependence on a clear notion of rationality and how it might fit into the general 
philosophical issues of global realism about w ord-w orld relations, are beyond the scope of 
my project here. However. I want to show what I think these connections might be in a lit-
tle more clarity than I have in the body of the thesis ."1"7 That is. let me shift the focus a little 
so that I can present the reader w ith a flavour of how the discussion of biology and science 
can fit with the picture of rationality and philosophy"145 that I have been hinting at through-
out. 
3 See, for other different approaches to pluralism per se. James (1900) op cit. and Reseller 
(\993) op cit. 
11 hope that the reader does not take the argument of the thesis (o rest on the analysis and sup-
port I give to the current philosophy of Hilary Putnam. Should this sketch turn out to be ill-
founded. I intend the rest of the thesis to stand alone. However. I do believe that it would be in-
appropriate for me not to discuss the connections between w hat I have argued for so far and 
other contemporary issues about realism. 
! Notwithstanding the points about my motivations for engaging in philosophical reflection set 
out in the Preface, p v 
210 
Conclusions 
There is a continuing debate between Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty about the similari-
ties and differences between their treatment of philosophy, particularly on their theories of 
meaning, reference, rationality and the general nature of realism—both ' common sense" 
realism and "metaphysicaF' realism. Both philosophers claim to have been asked (more 
than once) where they disagree with the other and have become increasingly explicit in 
their treatment of the other s work. I w ish to articulate my own position by looking at some 
of the elements of this debate (best represented in a paper by Rorty called Putnam and the 
Relativist Menace.'""9 and from Putnam's side in 'Realism without Absolutes." The Ques-
tion of Realism" and On Truth")."1 What they consider worth discussing in their shared 
aims to move philosophy away from problems centred on finding foundations for meta-
physics and cpistemology. will help me illustrate some important consequences for the kind 
of multiple realisation of scientific realism implicit in what I have said. Furthermore, I 
believe that Putnam's most recent papers present a position on epistemology, rationality 
and metaphysics entirely consistent with concern for the agent perspective on science prac-
tice I have discussed I think that the disagreement between Putnam and Rorty is substan-
tive, but not easily identified."151 
Rorty. R. (J 993) "Putnam and the Relativist Menace' Journal of Philosophy, vol. X C No. 9, 
443-461 
All in Putnam. H. (1994) Words and Life (cd. Conant. J.) Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press, pp 279-329. Hereafter referred (o as U'&L. 
4 5 1 For comparison w ith my treatment of this discussion see Goodman. R. B (1995) Pragmatism 
London: Routlcdge In his Introduction' to the collection Goodman suggests that the differ-
ences between Putnam and Rom are best expressed as a difference of temperament (p. 10) us-
ing the distinction that James draws at the beginning of his Pragmatism |( 1907). reprinted 
(1975) Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press] between " the tough-minded" and "the ten-
der-minded" philosophical styles This is. as should become clear, to rather duck the issues at 
stake. 
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Both Putnam and Rorty are keen to place a "moratorium"4"" on the gamut of philosophical 
questions concerning the status of an external world and human relations to it. In explain-
ing why they deem this necessary they have both spent much time and energy attempting to 
dismantle what they consider to be key issues in theories about world-word relations in 
particular.""3 Traditional world-word theories, they claim, have out-lived their usefulness 
and have generated insuperable, largely incoherent problems In what follows I shall try to 
sketch their attitudes to realism and fit them into larger, more general pictures to provide a 
context for comparison It is important to get clear what Putnam is (and is not) in fact 
claiming—the comparison with Rorty is telling. 
In 'Putnam and the Relativist Menace" Rorty selects five points from Putnam"1"4 as the core 
of what he takes to be their common ground. These are in outline that: 
1. Language (or mind) is so much part of the world that there can be no account of our-
selves as "representers" or '"mappers" of something independent of that language (or 
mind). There is no God s Eye point of view from which such a programme could be 
carried out. Putnam has argued for this position several times, perhaps most notoriously 
4 5 2 Putnam. H. (1990) Realism with a Human Face Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
118. Hereafter referred to as RHF. 
4 5 3 1 shall not discuss the changing accounts of mind-world relations that Putnam and Rorty have 
given over the last tw enty years. Willi reference to the material I touch on here Putnam de-
scribes their shifts in the following way: ... it seems to me that while I have moved from ver-
sions of "internal realism" I put forward after I left physicalism to a position which I would de-
scribe as increasingly realist—though w ithout going back to the latter-day version of four-
teenth-century semantics known as "metaphysical realism"—Roily has moved from his physi-
calism to an extreme idealism w hich teclers on the edge of solipsism.' M'&L 306. 
4 5 4 / ? / / F 2 8 . 178. 210: Putnam. H. (1987) The Many Faces of Realism London: Open Court, 83. 
Hereafter referred to as MFR: RHF 171. 
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in Reason. Truth and History:4" he calls a belief in the attainability of talk about an 
independent reality 'externalist' and "the view from nowhere.'J X l 
2. We are beings who will always have view points on the world because o f various val-
ues. We cannot stop being valuers and having an outlook that is based on values and 
interests 
3. Objectivity is always possible within this account of our being interest relative' adjudi-
cators of explanation and interpretation of the world, because within the conceptual 
scheme there are ways in which explanations and interpretations are correct. 'What 
Quine called the indeterminacy of translation should rather be viewed as the interest 
relativity of translation. ' A > 1 ' 4 5 8 
4. If during any practical activity we use a particular point of view , a conceptual scheme, 
then we must be aware of the importance of the pragmatist notion of the supremacy of 
the agent point of view . That is. there can be no appeal to the idea of "things as they 
really are." 
5. It is not necessary to assume convergence to one picture of the world to understand 
knowledge 
What does this common ground amount to'7 Herein lies the problem. Rorty believes and 
argues that, given these points of agreement. Putnam must take up a position very similar 
to his own form of pragmatism—a pragmatism that owes as much to Heidegger as to 
4 3 5 Putnam. H. (1981) Reason, Truth and History Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
hereafter referred lo as RTII 
4 5 6 R77/ 49-50. 
4 r Rorty op cit. 443. 
4 5 8 There are Davidsonian connections here too. see Davidson. D. (1973) Radical Interpretation' 
Dialectica 27.313-28. reprinted in Davidson (1984) op cit. Essay 9. 
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James and Dewey Rorty observes that, we seem, both to me and to philosophers who find 
both our views absurd, to be in much the same line of business. But Putnam sees us as 
doing something quite different, and I do not know why.""159 So it is Putnam who contends 
that Rort\ is playing a rather different game to his. The mainstay of his criticism in the 
past has been that Rorty is slipping into a form of relativism But with the development 
of his own position, he has added the charge that Rom is guilty of adopting assumptions 
that are common to the very metaphysical realism he is supposed to be rejecting: 
Failing to inquire into the character of the unintelligibility which vitiates metaphysical 
realism. Rorty remains blind to the way in which his ow n rejection of metaphysical real-
ism partakes of the same unintclligibility. The way in w hich scepticism is the flip side of 
a craving for an unintelligible kind of certainty (a senseless craving, one might say, but 
for all that a deeply human craving) has rarely been more sharply illustrated than by 
Rorty "s complacent willingness to give up the ... idea that language can represent 
something w hich is itself outside of language.46] 
This needs some careful unpacking, but it is obvious that Putnam must see something in 
addition to the five common strategies that Rorty lists, or at the very least he considers 
there to be a way of interpreting them that involves neither the need for relativism nor 
Rorty's kind of pragmatism Where to begin unpacking is difficult to determine: one must 
just start with one's own prejudices and commitments Although it is to rationality that I 
want to finally turn let us look first at realism, since this has informed and been informed 
by much that I have discussed. 
Rorty op cil. 458. 
RHF 19-20. 
W&L 300 
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1 Metaphysical realism and God's cataracts 
What is metaphysical realism? Some realists claim that realism is quite a boring thesis, 4 6 2 
and it is only because alternative theses about word-world and mind-world relations are 
offered by anti-realists that anything needs to be said about realism at all. Putnam takes the 
metaphysical realist position to be that: 
... the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects. There is exactly 
one true and complete description of the way the world is'. Truth involves some sort of 
correspondence relation between words or thought-signs and external things and sets of 
things. I shall call this perspective the externalist perspective, because its favourite point 
of v iew is a God's Eye point of view.463 
Throughout the 1980s Putnam presented a number of arguments with the aim of showing 
that such a view was wrong-headed—because ultimately it had to be incoherent—and that 
consequently one should take up a position counter to this externalism: hence Putnam's 
'internal realism' of Reason. Truth and History. So at first sight Putnam and Rorty appear 
to be denying that that particular position (metaphysical realism) can have any validity. 
However, the debate has become more complicated with the charge from Putnam that 
lurking behind this are some rather obvious anti-realist arguments on Rorty's side of the 
debate that themselves rely on many of the assumptions underpinning metaphysical real-
ism, particularly in regard to there being only one complete and correct description the 
world. 
Before proceeding any further I would like to clarify some points about my own use of the 
word realism ' Throughout this thesis I have been discussing scientific realism. The previ-
ous section showed how I take this to be a pluralistic and disunified notion that applies in a 
variety of different ways to all sorts of different aspects of science. That is, in so far as 
4 6-Devitt, M. (1991) Realism and Truth London: Blackwell (2nd cd ). 1-25. 
4 6 3 RTH 49. 
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science can be picked out from other activities and parts of know ledge, realism about sci-
ence cannot be described in a single, all-embracing theoretical framework, but neither can 
it be abandoned; science gets things right (and wrong) in lots of ways. When philosophers 
discuss reaiism about the whole of our experience, "science" is often taken to mean any 
activity that goes beyond common sense. It is assumed that there is a distinction between 
science and other know ledge gathering activities and that science can be identified by either 
its methods, or content, or both without this distinction being spelt out. Look at how Devitt 
defines "realism" and scientific realism": 
Realism Tokens of most common-sense and scientific physical types objectively exist in-
dependently of the mental ... 
Scientific Realism Tokens of most current unobservable scientific physical types objec-
tively exist independently of the mental.464 
Devitt's scientific realism is a species of realism.46" However, as I have already stated, 
there are many ways that science can be picked out. but there are none that are necessary, 
except in so far as that activity is rational—not all fields of science rely on material ma-
nipulation of the world, different fields make use of different ontologies There can be no 
single theory of scientific realism as such. 4 6 6 Given this diversity of methods and kinds one 
can only hope to produce accounts for the scientific reality of each separate kind of thing 
discovered and investigated by scientists. Again, this is not necessarily a pessimistic posi-
tion in which to be. Since we can recognise the components of the discussion there must be 
much on which to agree. Realism, as agreement about there being a world about which we 
can disagree, and rationality, as the basis for the agreement, need not be disunified or plu-
4 6 4 Devitt. op at. 303. 
4 6 5 Notice, also the physicalistic aspect of Devitt's realism By now it should be clear that I abso-
lutely reject this limiting of the real 
4 6 6 That is. there just is no single theory of realism about science as a w hole. 
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ralistic at all. The relationship between scientific realism and "general" realism can be 
investigated with more care, given this theoretical position. Of course this turns on further 
unpacking realism and its connection with rationality. 
2 Rationality 
A substantial part of the Putnam-Rorty divide is seen in what they have to say about ra-
tionality. Rorty believes that there is not a separate account of rationality to be had— 
separate, that is. from what we already do. He calls his theory a naturalist one, although to 
be consistent, he cannot really talk about rationality at all since he wishes to manage with-
out such 'foundational' philosophical concepts. He says in Objectivity. Relativism and 
Truth that: 
To be a naturalist ... is to be the kind of antiessentialist who. like Dewey, sees no breaks 
in the hierarchy of increasingly complex adjustments to novel situations—the hierarchy 
which has amoeba adjusting themselves to changed water temperature at the bottom, 
bees dancing and chess players check-mating in the middle, and people fomenting sci-
entific, artistic, and political revolutions at the top.468 
His model for inquiry is that of the "recontextualising' of what we know and accept with 
new situations and environmental stimulation. There can be no sense in accessing the level 
at which we would want to ask by what rules of reasonableness and rationality we perform 
this task. They are in flux, as the current cultural needs for this process of recontextualis-
ing in a Quinian network of beliefs change. What it is rational to do at any one time is 
simply what is acceptable practice to the socio-political order of the day. 'Simply' is an 
important word here because, for Rorty, there is no clear sense in which this order can be 
4 6 There are Davidsonian connections here too. And we can also find further support for Put-
nam's rejection of the possibility of naturalising rationality. If scientific realism cannot be iso-
lated as a single theory , there arises a difficulty in finding a context to even discuss rationality 
since it is not obviously a scientific concept at all. except by assumption. 
4 6 8 Rorty. R. (1991a) Objectivity. Relativism and Truth—Philosophical Papers I Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 109. 
217 
Conclusions 
reversed—the grounding for the accepted socio-political order cannot itself be called into 
question Scientists, for example, do not have any unique ways of getting at the truth: 
The habits of relying on persuasion rather than force, of respeci for opinions of col-
leagues, of curiosity and eagerness for new data and ideas, arc the only virtues which 
scientists have . . . . [There is no) intellectual virtue called rationality' over and above 
these moral v ir tues 4 6 9 
The consequence of av oiding any talk of rationality per se is a deep sense of conservatism 
in Rorty s philosophy: 
We Western liberal intellectuals should accept the fact that we have to start from where 
\vc are. and this means that there are lots of views which we simply cannot take seri-
ously. 4 " 
James Robert Brown has paraphrased this as "We white, middle-class, males are happy to 
stay put and thumb our noses at other views/ 4 7 1 Unfortunately, if Rorty is to maintain his 
'radical' edge regarding philosophy such surprisingly backward political moves seem nec-
essary. So he makes the characterisation of rationality unimportant in his own construal of 
pragmatism. He also seems to be making the claim that the idea that rationality is unimpor-
tant and not separately discussible can be used as part of his defence against the charge of 
replacing a realist epistemology with relativism. This can only make any sense within the 
broader political picture he attempts to paint, which I shall not explore here. 
Putnam, on the other hand, goes to great pains to say something about rationality, and how 
it is to fit into the scheme represented by the five points listed earlier. For Putnam, ration-
ality is too fundamental to escape primary treatment in a theory about how we talk about 
469 ibid 39. 
4 , 0 ibid 29. 
4 7 1 Brown. J. R. (1994) Smoke and Mirrors: How Science Reflects Reality London: Routledgc. 31. 
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the world (which is what he is trying to make coherent). He thinks that 'rationality is not an 
easy thing to give an account of.'47" No theory that tries to naturalise rationality will do, 
Putnam claims, because it would require an account of the ways in which it becomes em-
bedded in our social practice and that is where he sees a problem 
If there is such a thing as rationality at all—and we commit ourselves to believing in 
some notion of rationality by engaging in the activities of speaking and arguing—then it 
is self-refuting to argue for that position that it is identical with or properly contained in 
what the institutionalised norms of the culture determine to be instances of it. For no 
such argument can be certified to be correct, or even probably correct by those norms 
alone.J 3 
What does this self-reference amount to? Putnam calls such theories about rationality 
"criterial/ that they give a framework for the verification of rationality. However, no the-
ory itself could ever fulfil whatever criterion was specified, he claims; the thesis that 
'nothing is rationally verifiable unless it is criterially verifiable'4 7 4 is false. What Putnam 
means is that if the theory about how we are to test and recognise rationality, a theory that 
is grounded in criteria of such-and-such practice, is rational itself, then it cannot be shown 
to be because the theory is not part of that practice. This is how things stand in Reason, 
Truth and History where every other aspect of Putnam's enterprise is overlaid with a veri-
fication principle about meaning (there being no externalist position in RTH from which 
meaning can be acquired and examined). RTH offers no genuine account of why rationality 
should not be criterial other than his vague fears about relativism and 'continental' phi-
losophers. Having said this. Putnam's theory of internal realism does go some way to 
placing rationality more precisely than at first might appear to be the case. He does some-
4 7 2 RTH 103. 
J 7 3 ; ^ . 111. 
4 7 4 ibid 
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thing similar with talk about justification, and again Rorty finds the reason for this difficult 
to understand. If Putnam believes that "our norms and standards of anything—including 
warranted assertability—are capable of reform,"475 R o m wonders what 'idealized rational 
acceptability can mean in Putnam's theory of a surrogate idea for truth except, 
... acceptability to an idealized community Nor can I [Rorty| see how. given that no 
such community is going to have a God's eye view, this ideal community can be any-
thing more than us as we should like to be.4 6 
And by "us" Rorty means, of course, educated, sophisticated, tolerant, wet liberals.'4 7 7 So 
Rorty thinks that in talking about rationality in the same breath as "warranted assertabil-
ity," which Putnam wishes to use as the standard for the testing of claims to user-friendly 
knowledge, rationality should be as etnnocentrically locatable as anything else. But this 
would only be the case if the five points of agreement required the pragmatism Rorty es-
pouses. Why they need not is the heart of Putnams internal realism. To agree to 1-5 does 
not mean that Putnam wants to duck out of the issues that arose in the old realist picture. 
And why this is so will become clearer if we look at the motivations behind Putnam's 
thinking about realism and rationality 
Since RTH Putnam has moved away from the verificationism that informs his argument 
there and has radically improved his position His most recent writings have tended to-
wards a deflationary notion of realism, truth, representation and rationality In many ways 
this has involved clarifying what he originally claimed. He now say s: 
4 , 5 RHF 21. 
4 7 6 Rorty, R. (1991) op cit. 451. 
"'ibid 
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... if "realism"' is understood simply as the idea that thought and language can represent 
parts of the world which are not pans of the world and language, then no one should be 
convinced that realism in that sense is an incoherent idea by the mere thought that we do 
not and cannot have "direct access" to the world outside of thought and language.4 8 
And his argument about realism with Rorty has been glossed by James Conant—who ech-
oes and refines almost all of Putnam's current work—in the following way: 
We pass from the (metaphy sical realist's) perception of us being able to step outside of 
our skins to a perception of us as being unable to do so We see ourselves as forever 
scaled within our skins: confined . as it were, to our forms of language and thought. 
Rorty ... trades on such a confinement ... This sense of confinement—of being trapped 
inside something (language, thought)—draws its life. Putnam now suggests, from the 
temptation to express the failure of metaphysical realism in terms of something we can-
not do.4"9 
With this most recent Putnam I am in agreement. Putnam now thinks that we can find fault 
with the claims about what metaphy sical realism can do—it is indeed an incoherent theo-
retical position. But it does not follow from this that we should give up all our everyday 
notions about acting rationally based on the evidence of our being able to describe features 
of the world. To do so is to mistakenly believe that because metaphy sical realism is inco-
herent its 'opposite'—the idea that we are stuck w ith no notion of reference or truth in a 
common sense way—must be correct. So whether his argument is really any good or not, 
Putnam's position is very different from Rorty s. Putnam is making a real claim about the 
nature of certain philosophical issues that places them bey ond a simple naturalised picture 
that can be embedded in our culture s norms and language and fixed there. This, I think, is 
precisely the kind of background that makes sense of the ideas I have been following 
throughout. We need a means of recognising that we can describe the world and that we 
8 W&L 299. 
9 ibid. xxvi. 
221 
Conclusions 
can make mistakes. We also need a way of seeing that a diverse set of ontological com-
mitments is possible for beings with shared epistemic means of understanding the world. 
Naturalism across the range of philosophical commitments involved would not help, since 
naturalism implies that things in general are explicable in the same unifiable scheme.4 8 0 
Rortys pragmatic naturalism is yet another theoretical framework that draws the teeth of 
any critique of current practices and concerns. 
Part of the problem had been that Rorty read Putnam's talk of "internal realism' as just the 
kind of confinement Putnam now wants to explicitly av oid in this reading of his position. 
For Putnam, internal realism was a "philosophical perspective' or 'temperament' designed 
to provide a framework in which each of the five 'agreed" points could make sense without 
recourse to naturalism or relativism. In RTH internal realism is: 
.. . a realism which recognises a difference between and I think that p\ between 
being right, and merely thinking one is right without locating that objectivity in either 
transcendental correspondence or mere consensus.481 
The Putnam of RTH rejects metaphysical realism as the evil demon that allowed us to 
speculate about evil demons and brains-in-vats as genuine sceptical worries in the first 
place, and the cause of various tangles over reference. Metaphysical realism is a three 
headed beast. The three elements of it—a fixed mind-independent w orld of objects; a single 
true account of this w orld: and truth as correspondence—are rejected by Putnam explicitly. 
He also claims that all these three parts of metaphysical realism have to be taken together, 
despite the fact that realists, such as Devitt, have consistently argued that we should sepa-
J I take it that there is no clear notion of naturalism to be had in any case, above and beyond a 
belief that our theories about our psychological states and the nature of the physical world are 
enough to fully describe, explain and support all other concepts we employ 
' Putnam. H. (198.1) Realism and Reason—Philosophical Papers. I'o/ume 3 Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press. 225-226. 
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rate ontological, epistemological and semantic issues as far as we possibly can in order to 
make sense of what realism is about. 4 8 : In RTH Putnam thinks that the issues cannot be 
independent because no part of human debate can be freed from the fact that language 
structures what is discussible and meaningful—hence Rorty's ciaim that they are so close 
as to be practically in agreement. 
To digress for a moment. Brown picks out three different ideas that are crucial, he claims, 
to the definitions of realism in the work of Boyd. Dummett. Newton-Smith. Papineau, Sel-
lars and van Fraassen. On top of the independence thesis above, he lists the idea that we 
can make rational (though fallible) choices among rival theories, and that science aims at 
the truth. 4 8 3 In RTH Putnam"s criticisms of metaphysical realism only focus on the inde-
pendence thesis. Internal realism is set up as a cure for the problems and paradoxes gener-
ated by the belief that theories are true or false, and that what makes them that way exists 
completely independently of us. Metaphysical realists, he claims, fail to appreciate that the 
usefulness of talking about representing the world to ourselves in thoughts or words (a sev-
enteenth century construction according to Rorty 4 8 4) was just a way of solving certain old 
fashioned philosophical problems in the first place. Internal realists: 
... hold that what objects does the world consist of7 is a question that it only makes 
sense to ask within a theory or description ... that there is more than one 'true' theory or 
description of the world. Truth' ... is some sort of (idealized) rational acceptability . .. 
There is no God's Eye point of view that we can know or usefully imagine; there are 
only the various points of view of actual persons reflecting various interests and purposes 
that their descriptions and theories subserve.48' 
; : Devitt. M. (1991) 'Introduction'. 
1 3 Brown. J. R. (1994) 81 
1 4 Rorty. R. (1979) Philosophy and the Mirror of Mature London: Blackwell. Part II. 
15 R TH 49-50. 
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So the theoretical structure behind internal realism is not. RTH-Putnam claims, a clever 
form of relativism. He believes he escapes such a charge by his "idealized rational accept-
ability ' He embraces the second part of Brown's characterisation of realism, that we can 
make rational choices amongst alternative theories, because, as was suggested earlier, Put-
nam tries to avoid pinning rationality to any particular socio-political community in the 
way that Rorty does. The Tightness of our claims to know ledge can be objectively tested 
(against the notion of "idealized rational acceptability") without recourse to mere consen-
sus Unfortunately all Putnam can say about 'idealized rational acceptability" in RTH is 
that it is like a frictionless plane, something we can never obtain but can approximate to 
for calculation and predictive purposes. Once again this point is clarified by Putnam's re-
cent adoption of a deflationary and pluralistic reading of his earlier position. (Although it 
should be noted that he does not embrace a simple disquotational theory of truth, as 'On 
Truth" 4 8 6 demonstrates.) 
But if all the epistemological. ontological and semantic issues involved in internal realism 
are tied together, Rorty cannot see how Putnam fails to take the road towards a picture of 
rationality as an identifiable part of our w hole socio-political, ethnocentric account of cul-
ture in which philosophy has a small role to play Internal realism raised many questions 
for Rorty, which Putnam has endeavoured to answer, whilst refusing to adopt the form of 
cultural relativism espoused by Rorty 
Meaningfulness in a public language is indeed a culturally relative property ; but war-
ranted assertabilily cannot be identified with a culturally relative property any more than 
truth can be .. 4 8 
6 W&L 315 ff. 
7 ibid. 324. 
224 
Conclusions 
The reason being, as already noted. Putnam does not believe that a naturalised notion of 
truth is available—with no closed account of truth or warranted assertability they cannot 
be relativised to anything. And as we have seen. Putnam's shift away from the more con-
fusing parts of RTH have helped to clarify exactly why Rorty has been missing the point 
here. 
3 Deeper still—realist rejoinders 
Before I indicate my own stance on the debate, I w ant to look at how defenders of the kind 
of realism that both Putnam and Rorty attack might respond to their criticisms. 
In Rationality and Science*** Roger Trigg argues that only by grounding rationality in re-
ality, in the way things are rather than in descriptions of the way things are, can we ever 
hope to make sense of our interactions with the world and our attempts to gather knowl-
edge about that reality. This is a typical realist claim, and it is typical of post-
Wittgensteinian philosophy of language and metaphysics in that it is precisely that distinc-
tion, between reality and a description of reality, which cannot be drawn. Both Putnam and 
Rorty both appear to be the Wittgenstein camp. They believe that the failure to make sense 
of a God's ey e point of view means that there can be no way of accessing what reality is 
like apart from our schemes for talking about it. But, Tngg states, it seems odd that we 
have talk of 'our' schemes here at all He say s: 
There has to be something radically wrong with a metaphysics that claims to be about 
reality but turns out to be about how we engage with it. 4 8 9 
Trigg's point is that to set up realism as a theory about how we engage reality (which is 
what Putnam does with internal realism), is to miss what is being proposed by the realists. 
Trigg. R. (1993) Rationality and Science London: Blackwcll. 117. 
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The same point is made by Devitt when he says that realism is an ontological thesis at 
heart, and that as a working assumption in looking at it we must separate the problems of 
engagement from the questions of existence.490 It is for this reason that Trigg is also puz-
zled by Putnam's claim that the search for a foundation for Being has failed"191—for realists 
Being needs no foundation. Once again, there is a confusion here in reading the RTH Put-
nam to be closer to Rorty than is in fact the case. If one really accepts the Wittgensteinian 
line then there cannot be a position where there is no escape from language—exactly what 
Putnam points out about Rorty"s position and what the realist respondents fail to recognise 
in Putnam's philosophy. 
4 Attitudes 
Rorty sees the realist position as part of a whole attitude to philosophy in which human 
beings try to make sense of their lives by placing them in a larger context of a non-human 
reality. He contrasts this w ith the context of human activity itself. He calls the first attitude 
a striving towards objectivity , the latter a move towards solidarity.4 9 2 He says that the lib-
eral West dispensed with religion because it required human beings to be humbled before 
an external power; objectivity is the continuation of this unnecessary trend in which God is 
replaced by reality. His whole approach in grounding objectivity in solidarity is so that 
philosophers who follow his so-called pragmatist line. 
... do not need an account of the relation between beliefs and objects called 
'correspondence", nor an account of human cognitive abilities which ensures that our 
species is capable of entering into that relation.45 ' 
4 9 0 Devitt. M. (1991) op at. Chapter 11. 
4 9 1 Putnam. H. (\9W) RHF 19. 
A 9 - Rorty. R.(1991a) 21. 
4 9 3 ibid. 22. 
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Once again, one wonders how accurate this picture can be since it is hard to find any area 
of human activity where this picture of cosy agreement holds true; and the idea of wet. 
western, liberals ignoring anyone who fails to join the club seems somewhat incompatible 
with what I generally assume being tolerant and liberal is all about 
Rorty calls the realist position about the independent existence of the tokens of common 
sense and science 'a banal anti-idealist thesis" and 'as no more than out-moded rhetoric."194 
He also explicitly says that there can be no sense in the Kuhnian notion that people with 
different theories live in different worlds 4 9" Why he rejects this thesis is not clear, although 
it is most probably because it is too much in the mode of the older antirealist tradition.496 
The deconstruction of the sceptical problematic in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. 
by the demonstration that there is no need to talk of mental or linguistic representation, 
leaves the question of the independent existence of objects untouched—but unknowable in 
the sense that we cannot see how well we are doing in describing anything. The theory he 
claims to share with Putnam (i above), that there is no view from nowhere, is about what 
we as human beings cannot do, given that we are human beings, and is not about reality at 
all. In fact no realist would want to say that they were attempting to find a view from no-
where—as Rorty and Putnam would agree, such an account of the world would be of value 
to no-one. 
Rorty's major positive programme tries to make the more substantive questions tradition-
ally related to realism/anti-rcalism (questions about epistemology. he would claim) fall free 
of our philosophical enterprise Devitt s claim that Rorty is a realist (because of his failure 
Rorty. R. (1991b) Essays on Heidegger and Others—Philosophical Papers 2 Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 354. 
' Rorty, R. (1979) 324. 
' Davidsonian considerations urge agreement on this point 
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to explicitly reject the independence thesis) is a claim made from within a framework that 
Rorty denies is of any use 4 9 7 Rorty wishes philosophy to become cultural hermeneutics, 
realism is boring and trivial: 
... my strategy for escaping the self-referential difficulties into which the Relativist' 
keeps getting himself is to move everything over from episicmology and metaphysics to 
cultural politics, from claims to knowledge and appeals to self-evidence to suggestions 
about what we should try. 4 9 8 
Finally, we see that if Rorty did not make the move of emphasis to the shelter of "us" west-
ern, liberal intellectuals, he would justly be accused of being the relativist that Putnam has 
claimed he is. But since the socio-political picture that results may be conservative and 
potentially easily exploitable by those not so keen to be in solidarity w ith him, one wonders 
whether it might not be worth just sticking with the relativist label. 4 9 9 All these considera-
tions support Putnam's analysis of Rorty 's failure to rid himself of the Cartesian scepti-
cism informing the realist s theorising. Devitt's rampantly realist musings on Rorty are 
more revealing than they might at first seem—relativism and realism being two sides of the 
same com. 
5 The pragmatist, the realist and I 
Let me now say what I think all this shows. From a survey of literature it initially appears 
that Rorty wants to drop the whole area of epistemology and metaphysics involved in the 
realism/anti-realism debate via a deconstruction of the problematic that generated it, 
4 9 7 Devitt op cit. 
4 9 8 Rorty, R. (1993) op. cit. 457. 
4 9 9 It is worth noting, however, thai one response to this charge might be something like the fol-
lowing. Liberalism is as much a part of the cultural game as everything else: that the whole 
game of liberating' suppressed groups is as much a socio-polilically determined notion as 
every other political overview. Consequently there can be no way of externally judging whether 
Rorty gets a hold on liberalism' or not There isn't a God's Eye point of v iew for that either. I 
suspect that such a defence by Rorty might hold water only if his overall picture holds water in 
dealing with the deeper philosophical worries raised here. 
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namely scepticism: Putnam, on the other hand, is keen to demonstrate why the traditional 
picture fails and show how it is related to each part of that traditional account as a new and 
better story From what has emerged, it should be clear that it is precisely because Rorty 
has not escaped the sceptic s problematic that Putnam wants to distance himself from 
Rorty 
... why is Rorty so bothered by the lack of a guarantee that our words represent things 
outside themselves9 Evidently. Rom 's craving for such a guarantee is so strong that, 
finding the guarantee to be '"impossible.'' he feels forced to conclude that our words do 
not represent anything. It is at this point in Rom's position that one detects the trace of 
a disappointed metaphysical realist impulse I think the trouble here comes when one 
does not properly explore the sort of " impossibility" which is at issue when one con-
cludes ... that such a guarantee is indeed impossible What I want to emphasize is that 
Rort> moves from a conclusion about the unintelligibility of metaphysical realism ... to a 
skepticism about the possibility of representation tout court.'M 
Now, as the last section indicates, this points us further away from some of the technical 
difficulties so far discussed to issues connected to the general approach to philosophy that 
Putnam and Rorty adopt. 
Rorty accepts a broadly naturalistic picture on a number of issues. In particular, he firmly 
believes that, given the prevalence of natural science in our/his culture, a physicalist ac-
count of the world is quite acceptable as a theory that we do work with usefully. However, 
there is some doubt whether the kind of eliminative materialism he espouses can be under-
stood without the background of the debate about how mind fits with the world, a back-
ground Rorty seems to want to do without Somewhat more consistently, Putnam is un-
happy with such theories since he sees in them the kinds of naturalism he is trying to avoid 
elsewhere. He believes that any attempt to place mind in the natural world, fitting it into 
ibid 299-300. 
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some ecological niche, presents the danger of having to talk about what the evolutionary 
benefits of mind could be; he then sees only a small step to having mind map the world and 
the regeneration of a correspondence theory of truth. 
Putnam is prepared to make claims for philosophy that take it beyond the cultural herme-
neutics that Rorty wishes to see Putnam continuously points out that we cannot let the 
norms of the day have a definitional role in dealing with the very tools of reasoning itself. 
He believes that philosophy has more than just a socio-political role in cultural debate. 
Philosophy con use transcendental arguments to show how assumptions about reality and 
realism are misguided and incoherent: we cannot just move the debate over to politics, be-
cause the key concepts at the heart of philosophy as we practise it—reality , rationality, 
justification and belief—cannot be found elsewhere. He states that: 
...no philosophical position of any importance can be verified in the conclusive and 
culturally recognised way I have described.50' 
And he later highlights the kinds of impulses he sees motivating Rorty (and his similarities 
to Auguste Comte) and himself: 
RTH 111 
230 
Conclusions 
The sort of philosophical reflection I have been engaging in is just the sort of reflection 
that both Conite and Rorty see as pointless. For Comte such reflection is a throwback to 
a prescientific age; for Rorty. a reluctance to full) enter into a postmodern one. ... what 
is common to Rom and Comte is the idea that much of w hat we know cannot have the 
status it seems to have For Richard Rorty the recommended response is to take a more 
"playful" attitude to what we think we know: and for Auguste Comte it is to sternly re-
strict ourselves to "positive knowledge." But understanding the temptation and seduc-
tions of the idea that Comte and Rorty share, so that we can live with those temptations 
and seductions without succumbing to them, is far more important—and more valid as a 
response—than pretending that the world is either just a playpen or just a scientific labo-
50; 
ratory. 
Putnam cannot claim that internal realism is about deconstructing the whole of the prob-
lematic about scepticism and realism but is. rather, an answer to some of the problems 
there Perhaps Rorty. in the end. is providing these answers too. but I believe he tries to 
take the more extreme philosophical route to close down whole branches of philosophy as 
normative activities In this task he fails, for the very reasons Putnam highlights Putnam 
just wants these areas limiting to ways he considers coherent. 
A final way the tension in the debate can perhaps be captured is by noticing that Putnam 
often lumps Rorty together w ith Foucault. If one is prepared to accept similarities there, 
despite the different historical backgrounds to their philosophies, then there may be a case 
for saying that in the Putnam-Rorty discussion we hav e all the components of the analytic-
continental discussion in miniature Consider, Putnam accepts that he is involved in de-
tailed linguistic games to produce clarification of important concepts, of philosophical ar-
guments that do real work; while Rorty talks of cultural hermeneutics and socio-political 
solidarity. That is. if from a "continental' perspective they can get so close as to agree on 
the five points I listed above, and yet still remain at logger-heads, then one suggestion 
so: W&L 309-10. 
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might be that movements towards a more unified picture of the whole of western philoso-
phy will also remain incomplete. However, the reading of Foucault I have given 5 0 3 should 
scotch this and suggests that Putnam could add to his own position by a more careful con-
sideration of Foucault 
I promised at the beginning of this section to say something about my own approach to 
rationality and realism In the main I agree with the most recent Putnam, and I hope the 
debate between Putnam and Rorty. although given in a somewhat sketchy form, shows why 
I do not consider this a rejection of amthing one wants to call 'realism' in a pre-
philosophical engagement with the world The context always determines the best ways of 
proceeding—the best ways are what are the most rational, of course. For example, in in-
vestigating a world that intervenes in our physical and biological being, structured physical 
and biological intervention is usually best, that is experiments are usually best. Rationality 
itself cannot be fixed by simple reference to our current best descriptions of our psychol-
ogy or socio-political circumstances without being circular But neither can we suppose 
that any philosophical theory will pin it down in something metaphysically transcendent. 
Philosophical analysis will not be able to complete the task of capturing rationality. 
A disunified, pluralistic metaphysics fits perfectly well into such a picture and leaves us 
with scope to demonstrate that metaphysics. It also provides its own test for the scientific 
theories we produce to articulate it. 
I leave the final w ord to of this section to Putnam: 
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We make up uses of words—many, many different uses of words—and the senses of 
"agree" in which our various sentences "agree" with reality, when they do. are plural in-
deed Yet for all that, some of our sentences are true, and—in spite of Rorty's objections 
to say ing that things "make*' sentences true—the truth of "I had cereal for breakfast this 
morning'' does depend on what happened this morning.5"4 
W&L 302. 
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Waking and stretching. 
Unfinished pillow dreams 
Cooled by the frost 
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6 P o s t s c r i p t 
We must take more responsibility for the Nature (and the biology ) we construct. We do 
not. however, manufacture either our own natures or Nature out there as detached. God-
like subjects. Our responsibility, then, is not the responsibility of unmoved movers, abso-
lute originators projecting order on chaos. Rather, the construction is mutual: it occurs 
through intimate interactions. By the same token, we do not simply record facts about 
external Nature, any more than we are simply manifestations of an internal nature en-
coded in some genetic text. " Information." that is. is not given independently of us. and 
because this is so, we cannot disclaim a kind of ownership. Our cognitive and ethical re-
sponsibilities are based on our response-ability, our capacity to know and to do, our ac-
tive involv ement in knowledge and reflection.505 
We are biological beings. We are also social, political, sexual, creative, destruc-
tive, emotional, rational, physical, chemical, psychological, spiritual, ethical, 
finite, ... beings. This investigation has been into the nature of biology as it stands in rela-
tion to other epistemological practices and procedures associated with it. There are other 
important questions about biology. Evolutionary theory and the process of natural selection 
are fascinating and have consequences for both epistemology and metaphysics. In conduct-
ing this investigation I hope I have provided at least part of a context for the discussion of 
these kinds of questions. However, this has not been my direct intention I have been striv-
ing here to begin a study of a small aspect of our contemporary selves: our being biologi-
cal. In no sense could this be a complete study of human being—my hope is only to gener-
ate a new perspective on our biological nature and perhaps anticipate some of the conse-
quences of taking this perspective. What this perspective might be is still unclear to me, 
but the study that will be the support to it is, I think, well worth undertaking Having said 
5 0 5 Oy ama, S. (1991) "The Conceptualization of Nature: Nature as Design' in Thompson. W. I. 
(ed.) Gaia 2 - Emergence: The New Science of Becoming New York: Lindisfarnc Press. 179. 
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this, it is entirely possible that we lose more than we gain. So be it—that would be valuable 
too. 
Harre has conducted a series of studies of human being from three perspectives under the 
general heading Ways of Being'"6 The three perspectives are the social, the personal and 
the physical. Whilst Harres studies are incomplete and perhaps in parts politically unac-
ceptable (by my own lights at the very least), his general strategy is attractive—a philo-
sophical examination of the complex and multiply related concepts that make up our cur-
rent thoughts about our selves and our culture. It retains a generally rational approach— 
the role of philosophy w ith w hich I began is recognisable in many of Harre's points. But I 
want to take this kind of philosophical study further into more speculative territory with 
regard to our biology. Writers obsessed with science as the sole guide to our epistemic 
practices have looked at biology in many ways. Dawkins' attempts to analyse whole 
swathes of our culture in terms of an evolutionary/biological model,5 0 7 are radically unat-
tractive to me. There are both reductionism and scientism here, and his epistemology is 
fatally flawed by its simplicity In any case, such a theory does not help us decide what 
place biology and its attended technologies can and should do in our lives. Something much 
more general and philosophically broad is required for that. 
Biotechnology is technology. Like all technology its development is contingent.508 There is 
nothing of necessity built into any technology. The contingency rests on the metaphysical 
and epistemological assumptions that inform the actual paths we choose to take. This is 
especially true of biotechnology. What counts as a biological property? What determines 
5 0 6 Harre, R (1979) Social Being. (1983b) Personal Being. (1991) Physical Being, all three, 
Oxford: Blackwcll. 
5 0 7 Dawkins, R. (1982) The Extended Phenotype Oxford. Oxford University Press. 
5 0 8 For a history of this technology in the twentieth century see. Bud. R. (1993) The Uses of Life: 
A History of Biotechnology Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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biological properties9 What are the boundaries of biological kinds 9 What can we know 
about such a complex and diverse subject matter? What is a function9 What is life 9 How 
might it be manipulated9 I am convinced that it can only be through a continuing pushing 
at the edges of what these current assumptions are that we will cope with the possibilities 
and the contingency Included in the study would be contemporary contingent concerns 
with health and body images.5 0 9 and the connections between biology and morality. 
But life is always a difficult subject: 
Supposing that knowledge is one of the things that is fine and valuable, and one kind 
rather so than another either for its accuracy or by being of better or more wonderful 
things, on both these grounds we would be right to place the inquiry into the soul among 
the first kinds of knowledge. But know ledge of the soul is also held to make a great con-
tribution to the complete understanding of the truth and especially towards that of na-
ture. For the soul is. so to speak, the first principle of living things. We seek to contem-
plate and know its nature and substance and then the things that are accidental to it. Of 
these same are held to be affections peculiar to the soul itself, and others belong to the 
animal as well as in v irtue of the soul. In general, and in all ways, it is one of the hardest 
of things to gain any conviction about the soul. 5 1 0 
Aristotle's psyche is best translated as "animating principle' or 'principle of animation.' De 
Anima is an investigation of the idea of life itself. As arcane as such thinking seems there is 
still much to be learned from it. As I mentioned in the Preface, there is growing philosophi-
cal interest in artificial life research in order that the mechanisms of living systems can, 
after millennia, find some formal description. I am not necessarily suggesting that formal-
ism answers the fundamental questions that are posed by this work, but it does highlight 
the possibility of taking up Aristotle's enquiry w ith some of its motivation intact. I would 
like to suggest, therefore, that the next stage of the general enquiry I have outlined, should 
5 0 9 Notice how ageing has become a health issue in last few years! 
5 1 0 Aristotle (1986) De Anima trans Hugh Lawson-Tancred Harntondsworth: Penguin Books, 
126 (402a). 
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be an open survey of the concept life,' how it is understood in relation to biology and our-
selves, to death, to the natural world and our responsibilities to it I think such a study 
would be a more appropriate way of approaching questions about human beings as the 
product of evolution and accident. The details of this study w ill involve some quite techni-
cal material, but as with this thesis the aim will be to comprehend the key components and 
their consequences. This would be impossible without understanding what we can know 
and how we can know it when considering our given examples of living things—for myself 
I now have that understanding in outline. Consequently, the next stage of my study will be 
an investigation of the concept 'life " 
One other issue that I think could provide fruitful future research as part of my project is 
the demarcation of science from non-science. Dupre raises it, 5" as do commentators on 
Foucault, as I mentioned earlier. Fresh insights such as these could re-invigorate the impor-
tant issues here and help clarify the context of investigation of interests and values in sci-
ence and philosophy of science. 
Science and its connection to our concept of rationality is fascinating and, I believe, a vital 
aspect of human development and progress. But science is not all that our culture is. It is 
limited and investigating its inveigling nature is a task that is neglected at the cost of this 
progress. Human beings are not passive observers of an ordered and perfect world. Such a 
picture must be dispatched. Aside from its restrictive and enslaving consequences, it is 
deeply unimaginative and stifles exciting futures where there is hope for human and envi-
ronmental relations. Wonder and liberation are close at hand if we pay attention to what we 
think we know . 
511 Disorder Chapter 10. 
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I hope I have fulfilled my own goals of experimenting a little w ith some ideas to help keep 
alive our responses to the parts of the world we assume to be real, and that philosophy (of 
science) is still exciting! 
17 November, 1997 
(Final) 
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